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UNIONS AND THE SOUTHERN COURTS: PART IIITHE CONSPIRACY AND TORT FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LABOR INJUNCTION
SYLVESTER PETROt

"On the eve of the New Dealperiod,with its legislationprofessedly
designedto correct an allegedimbalanceagainst worker organizations,
such organizationswere already enjoying specialprivllegesdeniedto all
otherpersons andgroups." Mr. Petro supports this conclusion with a
review of the law of conspiracy as a tort and of the primafacie tort
theory. He contendsthat not only legislaturesbut manyjudges after the
turn ofthe century abandonedestablishedtortprinciplesto grant unions
specialprivileges to act in ways denied to others.
In this, thefinalinstallment in his series "Unionsand the Southern
Courts," Mr. Petro concludes his reexamination of some of the basic
assumptions that underlieprevailinginterpretationsof Southern labor
history
I. INTRODUCTION

The present Article analyzes the rules of conduct for labor disputes that
British and American courts developed in the period of common-law ascendancy' and thus serves as background for two previous articles that this journal has published on the way the courts of the old Confederacy dealt with
labor disputes. 2 At the same time it carries forward the author's project of a
definitive evaluation of the labor policies of the United States. 3
Had the kind of legal scholarship common at the turn of the century continued to prevail, there would have been less need now of a work such as this.
Writers then had a firm grasp of what the courts were doing and of why they
were doing it. They knew that the British and American courts were seeking
to adapt to labor disputes the same rules and principles of conduct that had
t Member of the Illinois Bar. A.B., 1943 and J.D., 1945, University of Chicago; LL.M.,
University of Michigan, 1950. Director, Institute for Law and Policy Analysis, Winston-Salem,
N.C. Author, The Labor Policy of the Free Society (1957) and other books and articles.
1. This Article is concerned mainly with the period 1690-1930, but in tracing the evolution
of conspiracy and tort doctrine its coverage goes back to the conspiracy statutes of Edward I, e.g.,
33 Edw. (1305) and the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw., ch. 24 (1285)..
2. Part I, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 99 (1980); Part II, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 867 (1981).
3. The first installment of this projected evaluation has been published as Petro, Injunctions
and Labor-Disputes: 1880-1932-Part I: What the Courts Actually Did--and Why, 14 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 341 (1978). Although the present Article was written in connection with the symposium on Labor in the South, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1-173 (1980), it may be considered a tentative draft
of Part II of the series on Injunctions and Labor-Disputes, for it sets forth the substantive law
bases of the labor injunction as it developed in the period of so-called "government by
injunction."
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brought a tendency toward progress, order and harmony to British and American society out of the disorder and misery which dominated medieval England.4 They were aware that the principles of personal autonomy defined in
the legal rights of private property and freedom of contract had increased social harmony and productivity and that in this productive harmony the creative talents of extraordinary persons had been liberated to improve the lot of
mankind in an unprecedented flood of economic, scientific, artistic and spiritual achievement. They understood that in labor disputes the courts were
seeking to prevent violent and oppressive unions from destroying the free markets upon which5 all the other ameliorations of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries rested.
However, that type of scholarship was supplanted in the early years of the
present century by a variety that viewed liberty of contract as a "jejune" abstraction, to use Felix Frankfurter's characterization. 6 These later writers were
interested less in examining and describing what the majority of English and
American courts were doing in labor disputes than they were in rewriting the
rule of law insofar as unions were concerned. They felt that it was morally
wrong and socially unwise to hamper the activities of organized labor by requiring unions to abide by the rules of conduct that courts applied to other
interpersonal relationships. 7 They apparently believed that if organizing activities were strictly governed, workers would go unrepresented by unions, and
employers and free labor markets would abuse and exploit them. The Marxist
labor-disadvantage idea seemed a self-evident truth to the leading legal scholars of the first third of this century. It moved them to action and in due course
4. For a few of the many excellent works of the period, see J. Bryan, The Development of

the English Law of Conspiracy (1909); A. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England (1905); A.
Eddy, The Law of Combinations (1901); W. Erie, The Law Relating to Trade Umons (1869). See
also Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18
Harv. L. Rev. 411 (1905); Lewis, The Closed Market, the Union Shop, and the Common Law, 18
Harv. L. Rev. 444 (1905); Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 345,429
(1907).
5. See especially Lewis, supra note 4.
6. F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor Injunction 148 (1930). Perhaps the most influential writer of the period in the labor relations field was Felix Frankfurter, and the most influential
single work, The Labor Injunction. For his philosophy of labor relations, see Frankfurter, Rationalization in Industry and the Labor Problem, 13 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 171, 171-77 (1928). The
most committed of the anticapitalist and antilibertarian legal writers in labor relations was probably Walter Nelles of Yale. See, e.g., Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 Yale LJ. 165, 175
(1931); A Strike and Its Legal Consequences-An Examination of the Receivership Precedent for
the Labor Injunction, 40 Yale LJ. 507 (1931); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 1128
(1932). Francis Sayre must also be included among the more vehement critics of common-law
developments in the labor field. See, e.g., Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393
(1922); Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1923); Labor and the Courts, 39 Yale
LJ. 682 (1930). The most disinterested of the crusaders against "government by injunction" was
Edwin Witte. On the basis of his work as a whole, one may conclude that he tried to understand
and to report fairly what the courts were doing. He believed, however, that unions and collective
bargaining should not be governed by the regular law of the land. For some of his typical work,
see E. Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes (1932); Results of Injunctions in Labor Disputes,
12 Am. Lab. Legs. Rev. 197 (1922); Early American Labor Cases, 35 Yale L.J. 825 (1926); The
Labor Injunction-A Red Flag, 18 Am. Lab. Legs. Rev. 315 (928); Social Consequences of
Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 24111. L. Rev. 772 (1930); Labor's Resort to Injunctions, 39 Yale
LJ.374 (1930).
7. See, e.g., Witte, The Labor Injunction-A Red Flag, 18 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev. 315 (1928).
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brought to this country the pro-union, pro-collective bargaining policies that
still prevail.
In order to discredit what the majority of American courts were doing in
labor disputes at the turn of the century, these writers generally adopted two
approaches. They contended that the courts were stretching old legal doctrines impermissibly to place unfair restraints upon unions, and they argued
that the rules applied to other interpersonal disputes should not be applied to
union organizers because those organizers were doing work of such immense
social value.8
The primary approach consisted largely of an attack upon the conspiracy
doctrine and the prima facie tort principle as applied in labor disputes. The
pro-union writers accused the courts of holding that lawful acts of individual
workers became unlawful merely because performed in concert. 9 They also
accused the courts of holding, under the prima facie tort principle, that acts
lawful in themselves became actionable and enjoinable when performed by
organized labor peacefully to advance its own interests.10
The main purpose of this Article is to test these accusations by presenting
an accurate account of the nature and role of the conspiracy doctrine and of
the prima facie tort principle in labor disputes. The contention that union
organizers and organized labor in general should be specially privileged, indefensible though it seems to me, rests upon assumptions of fact and of theory
that are beyond the scope of this Article.
II.

CONSPIRACY, THE PHANTOM TORT

Few figments of the imagination have had more success in producing
political results in the evolution of labor policy than the phantom legal category called "conspiracy." Several generations of Americans, including lawyers, judges and legislators, have been convinced by their teachers to believe
with Mr. Justice Jackson that "[t]he most effective legal weapon against the
struggling labor union was the doctrine that concerted activities were conspiracies, and for that reason illegal. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
took this conspiracy weapon away from the employer in employment relations
which affect interstate commerce."'" The persistence of the belief that employers could defeat union aspirations merely by charging "conspiracy" is a
remarkable phenomenon. Although the most influential of the pro-union legal scholars in the first third of the century-men such as Nelles and indeed
Felix Frankfurter himself' 2 -denied that the conspiracy doctrine was legally
8. See, e.g., F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, supra note 6, at 204-05; Nelles, The First American
Labor Case, 41 Yale LJ. 165, 175 (1931); Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. L. Rev.
663, 694 (1923).

9. See, e.g., Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 427 (1922); Witte, Results of
Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 12 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev. 197, 198 (1922).
10. See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 8, at 690-93.
11. UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 257-58 (1949).
12. See F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, supra note 6, at 2-5; Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32
Colum. L. Rev. 1128, 1163-64 (1932).
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significant as a control on union conduct, the belief persisted: a tribute to the
talent of the unionists and their supporters among the journalists and intellectuals. The persistence of the myth also can be credited to the law teachers and
writers who woodenly repeated the frightening stories of the wicked league in
the "bad old days" of the judges and the employers against the "struggling"
labor unions. The unions may have been struggling, it is true. But the struggle, as we shall see, was less against judges and employers than it was against
employees who resisted being dragged into unions of which they
disapproved.13
Despite the considerable confusion and controversy prevailing in legal
literature on the role of the conspiracy doctrine in labor relations, 14 a satisfactory explanation of the true situation is not very difficult. One needs first to
understand, however, why there should have been a legal problem at all.
The problem arose out of that most significant historical development, the
growth of large aggregates of capital accompanied by large units of employment, the two conditions necessary for the development of labor unions. Unions are employee representatives and, therefore, have no reason for being
13. For the kind of analysis of the labor cases from which the mythic doctrine of conspiracy
has emerged, see J. Commons & J. Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation 381-83 (4th rev. ed.
1936); A. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law 22-37, 237-42 (1925); E. Witte, The Government
in Labor Disputes 46-66 (1932). And for an example ofjudicial credulousness, see the opinion of
Judge Jackson in State ex rel. Taylor v. Circuit Ct, 240 Ind. 94, 97-99, 162 N.E.2d 90, 91-92
(1959). With the foregoing, compare the account of the old criminal conspiracy cases contained
herein, especially in note 26 infra, and in Judge Daly's opinion in Master Stevedores' Ass'n v.
Walsh, 2 Daly I (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867), discussed at text accompanying notes 31-34 infra. For extensive documentation of the statement in the text that unionists were engaged mainly in forcing
themselves on unwilling employees, see Petro, supra note 3, at 390-428.
14. See J. Bryan, supra note 4; T. Cogley, The Law of Strikes, Lockouts, and Labor Organizations (1894); F. Cooke, The Law of Trade and Labor Combinations (1898); A. Eddy, supra note
4; W. Erle, supra note 4; C. Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d rev. ed. 1958); D. Harrison, Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort in English Law (1924); H. Laidler, Boycotts and the Labor Struggle
(1913); J. Landis & M. Manoff, Cases on Labor Law 1-40 (2d ed. 1942); A. Mason, supra note 13;
3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 202-27 (1883); M. Turner, The Early
American Labor Conspiracy Cases: Their Place in Labor Law (1967); E. Witte, supra note 13; R.
Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements (1887); Allen, Criminal Conspiracies
in Restraint of Trade at Common Law, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (1910); Blair, The Judge-Made Law
of Conspiracy, 37 Am. L. Rev. 33 (1903); Brigham, Strikes and Boycotts as Indictable Conspiracies at Common Law, 21 Am. L. Rev. 41 (1887); Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, and as a Tort, 7
Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1907); Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 117 (1908); Butcher, The Law of Conspiracy in England and Ireland, 6 L.Q. Rev. 247 (1890); Chalmers-Hunt,
Labour Competition and the Law, 19 L.Q. Rev. 37 (1903); Cheyney, Decisions of the Courts in
Conspiracy and Boycott Cases, 4 Pol. Sci. Q. 261 (1889); Darling, The Law of Strikes and Boycotts, 43 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 73 (1904); Digby, The Law of Criminal Conspiracy in England and
Ireland, 6 L.Q. Rev. 129 (1890); George, The Combination Laws, 6 Econ. Hist. Rev. 172 (1936)
[hereinafter cited as George, The Combination Laws]; George, The Combination Laws Reconsidered, Colum. U. Reprint from I Econ. Hist. 214 (1931) [hereinafter cited as George, Laws Reconsidered]; Greenhood, Combinations to Stifle or Diminish Competition from the Standpoint of
Public Policy, 20 Am. L. Rev. 194 (1886); Low, The British Conspiracy and Protection of Property
Act and Its Operation, S. Doc. No. 190, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1902); Mason, The Labor Decisions of Chief Justice Taft, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585 (1930); Morris, Criminal Conspiracy and Early
Labor Combinations in New York, 52 Pol Sci. Q. 51 (1937); Nelles, supra note 8; Prentice, John
C. Calhoun and the Labor Question, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1900); Purrington, The Tubwomen v.
The Brewers of London, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 447 (1903); Sayre, supra note 9; Selfridge, American
Law of Strikes and Boycotts as Crimes, 22 Am. L. Rev. 233 (1888); Smith, supra note 4; Witte,
Early American Labor Cases, 35 Yale LJ. 825 (1926).
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until there are employees. Moreover, small employment units are unlikely to
create large labor organizations. Big unions capable of exerting powerful
physical and economic pressures, therefore, did not and probably could not
exist until the free enterprise system began to produce the necessary conditions
in the nineteenth century.
There is nothing particularly new in this insight, although its implications
for the history of unionization in the southern United States tend to be overlooked. Judges knew that the great economic developments of the nineteenth
century were creating new capacities for legal injury. Thus, in response to the
contention that a strike threat to compel the discharge of rival unionists could
not be tortious because there were no precedents making it so, the court in
Allen v. Flood15 explained the lack of precedents as follows:
[U]ntil the influence of the trade unions became as great as it is now
no workman was or could be exposed to such an injury as we are
now discussing, because no men or body of men would previously6
have had the power to dictate to their employers as they can now.'
It is true, of course, that union propagandists could (and did) quote the
language of Recorder Levy to the effect that lawful conduct became unlawful
when done by numbers in concert: "A combination of workmen to raise their
wages may be considered in a two fold point of view: one is to benefit themselves. . . the other is to injure those who do not join their society. The rule
of law condemns both." 17 Although the contrary has been asserted by powerful authority,18 we may agree for the sake of argument that peaceful strikes for
higher wages were held to be criminalconspiracies-but only in England.19 In
the United States, there was no basis for the position taken by Recorder Levy.
Even in his own case, Commonwealth v. Pullis,20 the defense demolished the
authority of the conspiracy doctrine, and the prosecution declared that it was
concerned only with the defendant union's aggressions against nonunionists
peaceful, voluntary efforts to
and that it was unconcerned with the 2defendant's
1
members.
own
its
of
wages
raise the
We encounter here a distinction of critical significance to the development of labor law in this country-the distinction between se/f-governing conduct, such as a peaceful, voluntary, concerted work stoppage for higher wages,
15. Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. 1.

16. Id. at 54-55. For some other contemporary comments on the novelty and the significance
of the legal problems raised by combined action at the turn of the century, see Martell v. White,
185 Mass. 255, 257-58, 69 N.E. 1085, 1086 (1904); Aiken, Legal Restraint of Labor Strikes, 4 Yale
L.J 13 (1894).
17. Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), reported in 3 A Documentary History of American Industrial Society 61,233 (J. Commons, U. Phillips, E. Gilmore, H. Sumner & J. Andrews eds. 1910)
[hereinafter cited as Doc. Hist.].
18. J. Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law §§ 497-502 (8th ed. 1947). See also Master
Stevedores' Ass'n. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1,5 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow &
Co., 1892 A.C. 25, 39 (Lord Halsbury), 47 (Lord Bramwell).
19. See George, The Combination Laws, supra note 14; George, Laws Reconsidered, supra
note 14.
20. Commonwealth v. Pu~lis, 3 Doc. Hist., supra note 17, at 61.
21. See id. at 155-56 (Hawkins for the defense), 221-22 (Ingersoll for the prosecution).
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and other-governingconduct, such as a strike for a closed shop or one designed
to compel the discharge of nonmembers or a strike against an employer in
order to induce him to cease dealing with some other employer. It will be
observed that in what we have called self-governing conduct, the union is
seeking only to affect its own economic interests and relations with the employer with whom it is dealing; while in the other-governing case, even though
its own interest is necessarily engaged, the moving impulse is a relationship
between the employer and some other person. To designate the distinction in
a more familiar way, a peaceful strike for economic improvement of the condition of the strikers-what we are calling self-governing conduct-as it is
designed to affect only the relations between the strikers and the struck employer, may therefore be called aprimary boycott; while a strike or a strikethreat against an employer, when designed to affect the relationships between
the struck employer and other persons, either nonunion employees or other
employers-thus "other-governing"-may be called a secondary boycott. The
distinction between primary and secondary boycotts is then based, as seems
semantically reasonable and logical, on the relational design of the action
involved.2
There should be no need for strenuous emphasis upon the legal significance of the distinction between primary and secondary action, at least not in
a purportedly free society.3 In such a society the law's concern is dominantly
with conduct that affects others especially when designed to do so. No one is
or should be privileged in a free society deliberately to invade the freedom of
others or deliberately to visit temporal harm upon them, except when a superior ground of privilege or justification exists. On the other hand, a purportedly free society cannot remain so unless it refrains as much as possible from
limiting purely self-governing conduct. 24 Any society that attempted thoroughly to control purely self-governing conduct would soon break down because of the practical problems alone. Voluntary peaceful strikes for higher
wages are privileged in this country on the freedom-principle, but they are
privileged also because courts at a 25very early date learned that there is no
effective means of preventing them.
22. This method of distinguishing between primary and secondary action is radically different from the one adopted by the National Labor Relations Board, (see S. Petro, How the NLRB
Repealed Taft-Hartley 71-110 (1958)), and by Justice Brennan in National Wood Mfrs. Ass'n v.

NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) (see Petro, Unions, Housing Costs, and the National Labor Policy, 32
Law & Contemp. Probs. 319, 335-48 (1967)).
23. Sentiment may no longer be what it was when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
stated in Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 15 (1870), that "[flreedom is the policy of this country." But in the period covered by this Article, there can be little doubt that the common law
judges were mainly intent upon developing the law of tort upon the concept of personal freedom.
On the role of freedom in common-law development generally, see II W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 477-79 (1924); B. Leoni, Freedom and the Law (1972); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4
J. Legal Stud. 391, 411 (1975).

24. For further discussion of the role of freedom in the development of the prima fade tort
theory, see section IVA. infra.
25. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894), modifying Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, P. & S. Ry., 39 F. 143 (W.D. Wis. 1889); Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co.,
54 F. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1893).
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No doubt these considerations, while certainly not explicit in the cases,
governed court decisions, especially the early "conspiracy" cases collected by
Professor Commons. 2 6 He and his associates surveyed seventeen cases, including Commonwealth v. pullis.2 7 Of the seventeen, only three involved
purely self-regulating action.28 Of those three, only one held the defendants
guilty. 29 But two important things stand out in that one case: first, the defendants were employers; and second, the defendants' guilt was asserted only conditionally and hypothetically; in short, it was never definitively established.
26. See Doc. Hist., supra note 17. For the most recent "reinterpretation" of the cases collected by Commons and his associates, see M. Turner, supra note 14, a work which like most
others fails to recognize that not one of those old cases held that a strike for higher wages, standing

alone, was indictable at common law.
27. The following are all of the "conspiracy" cases gathered in Doc. Hist., supra note 17:

Commonwealth v. Pullis (Philadelphia Cordwainers) (1806), 3 Doe. Hist. 61 (industry-wide strike
and boycott designed to raise wages, force a closed shop and oust "scabs"; defendants held guilty);
Maryland v. Powley (Baltimore Cordwainers) (1809), 3 Doc. Hist. 249 (combination to prevent
certain employees from obtaining employment; conviction); People v. Melvin (New York Cordwainers) (1809), 3 Doc. Hist. 251 (combination to refuse to work for wages below certain level or
to work for employers who employed "scabs"; conviction on latter grounds); Commonwealth v.
Morrow (Pittsburgh Cordwainers) (1815), 4 Doc. Hist. 15 (combination to fix wages and to oust
"scabs"; conviction only for latter); Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightley's Nisi Prius Cases 36
(Pa. N.P. 1821), cited in 4 Doc. Hist. 89 (employer combination to reduce wages held unlawful
unless defendants proved their combination was only a response to a labor combination to raise
wages above "market level"); People v. Trequier (New York Hatters), I Wheeler's Criminal Cases
142 (N.Y. 1823), cited in 4 Doc. Hist. 91 (combination to cause discharge of employee who was
denied membership in the union; conviction); Buffalo Tailors (1824), 4 Doc. Hist. 93 (combination
to fix wages and to procure discharge of all "scabs"; brief newspaper report states that first jury
was hung and second returned conviction); Commonwealth v. Moore (Twenty-four Journeymen
Tailors) (1827), 4 Doc. Hist. 99 (combination to fix wages, oust nonnionists and violently exclude
nonstrikers; conviction only on last ground--evidence of violen& and intimidation, id. at 115,
121-22, 134-40); Kennedy v. Treillou (Philadelphia Spinners) (1829), 4 Doc. Hist. 265 (violent,
intimidatory combination but no evidence case ever went to trial, id. at 268 n.3); Baltimore Weavers (1829), 4 Doc. Hist. 269 (peaceful refusal to work at reduced wages; verdict of not guilty, it
appearing that "no efforts were made.., by threats or otherwise to compel into submission...
such as were unwilling to participate in [the combination]," id. at 271); Chambersburg Shoemakers (1829), 4 Doc. Hist. 273 (defendants convicted but report of case-from Philadelphia National
Gazette, Nov. 19, 1829-too bare of facts to form any reliable conclusion); People v. Fisher (Geneva Shoemakers), 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835), cited in 4 Doc. Hist. 275 (combination to fix
wages, to refuse to work with wage-cutter and to procure discharge of certain employees indictable as violation of statute forbidding combinations "injurious to trade," 14 Wend. at 15, limited in
Master Stevedores' Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867), to combinations intended to force
the will of the defendants upon outsiders); People v. Cooper (Hudson Shoemakers) (1836), 4 Doc.
Hist. 277 (combination to raise wages, to oust nonunionists and to fine employers who cut wages
or hired nonunionists; jury instructed to disregard People v. Fisher, see id. at 311; verdict not
guilty); Thompsonville Carpet Mfg. Co. v. Taylor (1834) and Taylor v. Thompsonville Mfg. Co.
(1836), 4 Doc. Hist. (Supp. Vol.) 15 (employer charging union with conspiracy to disrupt and
destroy business; jury instructed to find for plaintiff only if it believed defendant used coercive and
violent means, id. at 113-14; verdict for defendant); People v. Faulkner (Twenty Journeymen
Tailors) (1836), 4 Doc. Hist. 315 (combination, strike over wages and work rules, threats, intimidation, and violence to oust "scabs"; verdict of guilty); Commonwealth v. Grinder (Philadelphia
Plasterers) (1836), 4 Doc. Hist. 335 (conspiracy to oust nonunion men, verdict of not guilty despite
a charge decidedly unfavorable to the defendants); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111
(1842), cited in 4 Doc. Hist. 343 (combination to procure discharge of nonunionists not an indictable conspiracy when illegal ends or means not charged).
28. Thompsonville Carpet Mfg. Co. v. Taylor (1834), 4 Doc. Hist. (Supp. Vol.), supra note
17, at 15; Baltimore Weavers (1829), cited in id. at 269; Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightley's
Nisi Prius Cases 36 (Pa. N.P. 1821), cited in id. at 89.
29. Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightley's Nisi Prius Cases 36 (Pa. N.P. 1821), cited in id. at
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The astounding fact, therefore, is that notwithstanding all the propaganda
about the "bad old days" in which the "conspiracy" doctrine was said to apply
to all concerted union action, those bad old days were purely imaginary. Not
once, so far as the records show, did an American court in the first half of the
nineteenth century hold that a peaceful strike for higher wages, standing
a criminal conspiracy at common law, let alone a private
alone, constituted
0
cause of action?
Even more astounding is the fact that one of the outstanding "conspiracy"
cases of the second half of the nineteenth century, Master Stevedores'Association v. Walsh,3 1 ignored by most writers in the field, pointed out that the older
cases had distinguished between self-governing and other-governing combinations. In that case, Judge Daly challenged the idea that peaceful strikes for
higher wages had ever been held criminal conspiracies, 32 rejected so much of
People v. Fisher33 as asserted the contrary, and pointed out that Recorder
court on which Recorder Levy
Levy's dictum was spurned later by the same
34
had sat, the Philadelphia Mayor's Court.
To go back to the first half of the century, the 1842 decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt35 explicitly rejected the pure conspiracy doctrine that collective
action alone made unlawful otherwise lawful conduct. In Hunt Chief Judge
Shaw declared that a combination could be criminally prosecuted only if unlawful means or ends were alleged. 36 But it seems to have gone generally
unappreciated, despite Judge Daly's powerful opinion in Master Stevedores',
that this requirement of unlawful ends or means made conspiracy no longer
relevant or meaningful as a separate, substantive, common-law tort.37 Once
allegation and proof of unlawful ends or means is required, what is the point
of a conspiracy count? If means or ends are unlawful, presumably they will be
so regardless of the number of persons involved. As we shall presently see,
numbers as such no longer count. The issue is whether there has been legal
injury to the plaintiff.
Once the analysis reached this point, however, considerable confusion
30. As a matter of fact, People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835), involved a primitive antitrust statute. Even so, as noted in the text above, its dictum to the effect that a peaceful
strike for higher wages amounted to a criminal conspiracy (under the statute) was rejected in
Master Stevedores' Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1, 5 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867).
31. 2 Daly I (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867).
32. Id. at 5.
33. 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). See also note 30 supra.
34. Commonwealth v. Moore, (1827), 4 Doc. Hist., supra note 17, at 99.
35. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass (4 Met.) 111 (1842), discussed in Nelles, supra note 12.
36. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 125-35.
37. The oft-quoted formulation by Sergeant Hawkins-"Mhere can be no doubt, but that all
confederacies whatsoever, wrongfully to prejudice a third person, are highly criminal at common
law," W. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, bk. I, ch. 72, at 190 (1st ed. 1716)becomes a mere tautology when applied to civil actions in tort. Indeed, under the prima facie tort
theory, which probably took part of its impetus from this kind of formulation, all conduct deliberately designed to injure another, whether the conduct be that of an individual or of a group,
becomes actionable unless justified by some superior social value (e.g., self defense). See text
accompanying notes 136-40 infra.
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arose concerning the role, if any, that the continued addition of a charge of
combined action played in legal complaints.
The confusion seems to have originated in the persistence of the idea behind the old discredited conspiracy doctrine (that numbers alone made unlawful otherwise privileged conduct) even after that doctrine had been rejected.
The idea seems to have survived because of the way opinion diverged on what
was actually a controversy over the basic principle of tort law: whether human
actions were tortious or not "in themselves," with the old common-law forms
of action settling the question; or whether acts as such are legally neutral till it
is determined whether or not they inflict unjustified harm on the plaintiffs. We
shall be spending considerable time on this question in the succeeding sections
of this Article. Here, it is necessary to note only that the controversy over
basic tort principle, brewing contemporaneously with the dispute over the effect of combined action, seems to have exacerbated the confusion on the latter
question.
Thus courts and commentators disagreed whether the "same act" privileged in an individual could become indictable or actionable if done in concert. Many insisted that numbers alone could not make unlawful an otherwise
lawful act. 38 Others, however, pointed out that conduct innocuous when done
by a single person could become very harmful and, therefore, actionable if
38. Dissenting in Vegelahn v. Gutner, 167 Mass. 92, 107-08, 44 N.E. 1077, 1031 (1896),
Holmes challenged the idea that numbers alone could transform a "lawful" act into an "unlawful"
one.

[Tihere is a notion, which latterly has been insisted on a good deal, that a combination of
persons to do what any one of them lawfully might do by himself will make the otherwise lawful conduct unlawful. It would be rash to say gat some as yet unformulated
truth may not be hidden under this proposition. But, in the general form in which it has
been presented and accepted by many courts, I think it plainly untrue, both on authority
and principle.
The authorities cited in note 39 and accompanying text infra indicate that Holmes was misrepresenting the views of those who thought that numbers counted. Very few judges or commentators,
if any, thought that numbers alone transformed conduct from legal to illegal. However, there
were other judges who reflected Holmes' view. For example, in National Protective Ass'n of
Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 321, 63 N.E. 369, 369-70 (1902), Chief Judge Parker
stated that "[w]hatever one man may do alone, he may do in combination with others.... Mere
numbers do not ordinarily affect the quality of the act." The readers willing to concentrate on this
statement and to compare it with the discussion in the text above and the cases cited in note 39
infra will discern in it a gross complex of fallacy. For some other such statements, see Hopkins v.
Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 930-31 (8th Cir. 1897) (Caldwell, J., dissenting); Kimball v. Harman,
34 Md. 407, 410-11 (1871); Wellington v. Small, 57 Mass. (2 Cush.) 145, 150 (1849); Bohn Mfg.
Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 234, 55 N.W. 1119, 1121 (1893); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc.
v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260,262, 157 N.E. 130, 132 (1927), Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 178 A.D.
270, -, 165 N.Y.S. 469, 471-72 (1917), afl'd, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919); Foster v. Retail
Clerks Int'l Protective Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48,-, 78 N.Y.S. 860, 867 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Macauley Brothers v. Tierney, 19 RI. 255, 258, 261, 33 A. 1, 3 (1895).
For one article demonstrating the fallacy of the idea that numbers cannot change the quality
of an act but nevertheless arguing that numbers should not be allowed to convert a "legal" into an
"illegal" act, see Sayre, supra note 9, at 409-11,419-20, 425-27. See also Huffcut, Interference with
Contracts and Business in New York, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 429-30 (1905); Selfridge, supra note
14, at 246-48; Shepard, Principles Applicable in Determining the Lawfulness of a Boycott by a
Labor Union, 17 Case and Con. 159, 161-63 (1910). For a less question-begging consideration of
the "numbers" problem, see Smith, supra note 4, at 348-51. Apparently Jeremy Bentham took the
position that numbers should not be regarded as affecting legalty. See 13 W. Holdsworth, supra
note 23, at 340-41 n.6 (citing 5 J. Bentham, Works 248 (Edinburgh 1843)).
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unjustified, when done by many in concert. 39 One person hissing an actor
would not hurt him very much; but the effect of many doing it preconcertedly
with a deliberate intent to harm him might become actionable because of the
greater embarrassment. 4° One grain of gunpowder was nothing; a pound
could do considerable damage. 4 ' One person whistling down the street at
night hurts nobody; but let a crowd whistle and sleep is disturbed. 4 2
Many such examples were given in order to demonstrate the fallacy in the
belief that the acts of individuals remain unchanged when many join to do the
"same thing." The point was not that an otherwise privileged act automatically became actionable when done in concert; the rejection of the conspiracy
doctrine put that contention to rest. The point was that when numbers act in
concert their action may acquire a character essentially different from the
character that the superficially similar act had when it was done by a single
individual; in thus becoming essentially different, the concerted act may have
a capacity for harm that the individual act did not possess; and finally, that the
legal justification which privileges an individual act may disappear when
many act in concert.43
There was no good reason for confusion to persist on this issue after the
turn of the century. By then everyone had agreed that, whatever might be the
case in regard to criminal conspiracy, 44 in the tort or civil action sounding in
39. See, e.g., Irving v. Neal, 209 F. 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83

F. 912, 920 (8th Cir. 1897); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 111. 346, 350 (1875); Newton v. Commonwealth, 244 Ky. 41, 42-43, 50 S.W.2d 18, 18-19 (1932) (demonstrating how 150 striking miners
could prevent others from working when one alone could not); State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317,
351-52 (Md. 1821); A.T. Steams Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 56, 157 N.E. 82, 85 (1927),
aft'd, 264 Mass. 511, 163 N.E. 193 (1928); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 579-82, 78 N.E. 753,
756-58 (1906); Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 257, 259-60, 69 N.E. 1085, 1086, 1087 (1904); State
v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151, 155-56 (1867); People v. Wilzig, 4 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 403, 413-14
(1886); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 92, 56 A. 327, 331-33 (1903); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1,67,42 A. 607, 609 (1899). See also the comments of Lord Bramwell in Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 1892 A.C. 25, 45, and of Judge Crompton in Walsby v. Anley, 3 EL & EL 516,
523-24, 121 Eng. Rep. 536, 538-39 (1861).
The best writers of the period were well aware of the fallacy of the belief that an individual's
act retained the identical juristic character when done by many in concert. E.g., J. Bryan, supra
note 4, at 56, 79, 154-57; A. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England 150-58, 467-68 (1930 ed.); A.
Mason, supra note 13, at 34. See also W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 1028-29 (1941);
Restatement of Torts § 765 (1925). For some of the periodical literature, see Freund, Malice and
Unlawful Interference, 11 Hare. L. Rev. 449,457-58 (1898); Jaffli, Theorems in Anglo-American
Labor Law, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1104, 1122-23 (1931); Lewis, supra note 4, at 444-51; Purrington,
supra note 14, at 449, 452-53, 461; Sayre, supra note 9, at 409-11, 419-20, 425-27.
40. Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 134 Eng. Rep. 866, 1178 (1843-44).
41. Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495, 530 (Brampton, LJ.).
42. Sayre, supra note 9, at 411.
43. As Purrington pointed out, there is nothing at all anomalous in the old conspiracy doctrine if it is slightly rephrased from the indicative to the subjunctive mood, so that it reads: acts
lawful in an individual may become unlawful when done by many in concert with a deliberate
intent to harm. Purrington, supra note 14, at 461.
44. The most extensive treatment of the old criminal conspiracy cases is to be found in J.
Bryan, supra note 4, and in D. Harrison, supra note 14. Both trace exhaustively the development
of the idea that in crimInal conspiracy the essence of the delict was in the agreement, so that no
overt act and therefore no actual damage to anyone needed to be proved. Rex v. Robinson &
Taylor, I Leach's Crown Cases 47 (1746). The same rule, dispensing with the necessity of pleading anding anng an overt act, prevailed in the United States at common law. Commonwealth v.
Tibbets, 2 Mass. 536 (1807).
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conspiracy, the heart of the action was harm to the plaintiff. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said as early as 1867, in a tort action for
"conspiracy":
The gist of the plaintiffs action is not the conspiracy alleged in the
declaration, but the damage done to the plaintiff by the alleged acts
of the defendants; and the averment that the acts were done in pursu45
ance of a conspiracy does not change the nature of the action.
If the gist is harm to the plaintiff, then obviously more than a mere question of
numbers is involved. The conduct of a large number of persons-e.g., attendance at a football game-may be nonactionable, while the conduct of a single
person, for example, assault and battery of another at the same football game,
may be actionable, unless justified.
Lord Lindley's opinion in Quinn v. Leathem,4 6 a case decided by the
House of Lords in 1901, should have put the question to rest forever. A tort
action in conspiracy was brought by Leathem, a slaughterer, against a union
for inducing one Munce, a butcher, to quit purchasing from Leathem because
he refused to discharge his nonunion employees-employees whom the union
refused to admit to membership even though Leathem offered to pay their
dues and fees. Munce actually quit dealing with the plaintiff when the union
threatened to call out his employees.
The union's defense was that each of its members would have been privileged to refuse to work for Munce, so the threat of concerted action should
have made no difference. Lindley did not say that the conduct was actionable
merely because it was concerted. He held the conduct actionable because it
was wrongful, being deliberately designed to injure the plaintiff and his employees. It would have been wrongful if the same deliberate harm could have
been done by a single person acting alone. Harm to the plaintiff, not the numbers involved, constituted the gist of the action.
In Lindley's words,
It was contended at the bar that if what was done in this case had
been done by one person only, his conduct would not have been actionable, and that the fact that what was done was effected by many
acting in concert makes no difference. My Lords, one man without
45. Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499, 502 (1867). In an "action upon the case in
the nature of a conspiracy... the damage sustained by the plaintiff is the ground of the action,
and not the conspiracy." Skinner v. Gunton, 1 Notes to Saunders' Reports 269, 271-72 (1871).
The Sknner case may also be found in 1 Saund. 228d, 2 Keb. *473, *476, *497, 84 Eng. Rep. 297,
298, 312 (1669). See also D. Harrison, supra note 14, at 53-54 (quoting Salaman v. Waiver, 1891
L.T.R. 431, 480, 484). For some representative American cases, see National Park Bank v. Louisville & N. Ry., 199 Ala. 192, 197, 74 So. 69, 72-73 (1917) (not a labor case); Employing Printers'
Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 515, 50 S.E. 353, 354 (1905); Kimball v. Harman &
Burch, 34 Md. 407,409 (1871); May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 13, 51 N.E. 191, 192 (1898); Darrow v.
Briggs, 261 Mo. 244,277-78, 169 S.W. 118, 125 (1914). For an argument in favor of regarding civil
conspiracy as a separate tort category, see Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 11720 (1908). Lord Bowen took it for granted that there was no such thing as a tort action for conspiracy as such since "it is the damage wrongfully done, and not the conspiracy, that is the gist of
actions on the case for conspiracy." Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 598,
616, afr'd, 1892 A.C. 25.
46. 1901 A.C. 495.
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others behind him who would obey his orders could not have done
what these defendants did. One man exercising the same control
over others as these defendants had could have acted as they did,
and, if he had done so, I conceive that he would have committed a
wrong towards the plaintiff for which the plaintiff could have maintained an action. 47
Although it has been customary to view Quinn v. Leathem as a decision resting
on the conspiracy doctrine, the foregoing language indicates that the decision
rested rather on the general tort theory that the deliberate infliction of temporal harm is actionable unless justified. In addition to the language just quoted,
other language in Lindley's opinion bears out this interpretation. For example, in a reference to Lumley v. Gye, 48 which held that inducing breach of
contract was actionable, Lindley said that the "principle which underlies the
decision reaches all wrongful acts done intentionally to damage a particular
individual and actually damaging him."'49 Lindley also noted that in Quinn v.
Leathem "there was no evidence to justify or excuse the conduct of the defendants."5 0 And, re-emphasizing the critical importance of the just-cause
principle to the decision, Lindley asked: "What is the legal justification or
excuse for ... [the defendants'] conduct?" 51

In shifting from conspiracy to tort doctrine, Quinn v. Leathem was doing
only what all the pre-New Deal labor cases were doing. Although the complaints alleged conspiracy, the judicial inquiries were always along substantive
tort lines. 52 The only function served by the conspiracy allegation of a complaint was to forestall the operation of the fallacious contention that acts lawful for individuals were automatically lawful for groups. It is difficult to think
of a concerted action that is the same as a purely individual, unconcerted action. The quality of concert alone, especially from the legal point of view,
makes a difference. Hence the conspiracy allegation served at least to bring
attention to the fact that something different from purely individual conduct
was being charged. Judge and jury might then inspect the conduct charged
with judgment unimpaired by the question-begging assumption that individual and group actions were juristically identical conduct.
Thus, although conspiracy as a substantive tort was a phantom, the conspiracy charge in the labor cases, especially in those involving peaceful boycotts, served the same kind of purpose that most pleading rules serve: it
helped direct the inquiry and removed the blinders from judges and juries in
47. Id. at 537.
48.
49.
50.
51.

2 EL & BL *216 (1853), 3 EL & BL 114 (1854), 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 1083.
1901 A.C. 495, 535.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537. That this is typical language of the just-cause or prima facie tort principle

appears in section IV.C. infra. The mistaken conception of Quinn v. Leathem as a "conspiracy"
case persists in Epstein, supra note 23, at 438-40.
52. See the cases and other authorities cited and quoted in note 45 and accompanying text
supra. Each of the hundreds of "conspiracy" suits brought against unions between 1880 and 1932
could orrectly be cited in support of this atfrmation. The cases are collected and briefed in Petro,

supra note 3, at 486-569.
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those states that were prepared to limit, at least to some degree, the coercion
and aggression of trade unions.
Use of the term "conspiracy" in the pleadings unwittingly served another
purpose, one that has proved historically to be vastly more important. Because of the oppressive connotation that the term somehow attained, the unions and their sympathizers were able, because of persistent use of the word by
employers in legal pleadings, to convince several generations of Americans
that they, the unions, had been the victims of judicial oppression and deserved
the special privileges that the Congress and the Supreme
Court of the United
53
States were finally induced in the 1930s to give them.
In recapitulation, the conspiracy doctrine has never been significant in the
private common law of the United States applicable to union action, not even
in the first half of the nineteenth century. As shown, the cases collected by
Commons and his associates demonstrate this. Most were criminal conspiracy
indictments, but, even so, conduct designed to injure others was required; selfgoverning conduct was held privileged, though some of the judges made loose
statements to the effect that otherwise lawful conduct became indictable if
concerted.
In the civil conspiracy cases, the gist of the action was, from the beginning, harm to the plaintiff. Purely self-governing conduct could not become
actionable in tort, therefore, since it was not designed to affect third parties. If
one wished to recover in tort, or to base a petition for injunctive relief on
deliberately inflicted irreparable injury, he had to allege and prove conduct
that a court was willing to find legally wrongful, that is, tortious, as regarded
some other person.
Conduct could be found tortious either under one of the ancient categories, such as trespass, libel, or assault and battery, or it could be found tortious
under the general theory that had been evolving since the Statute of Westminster I[ at the end of the thirteenth century authorized the English Chancery to
issue new writs in cases "similar" to those in which recovery had previously
been allowed. 54 This general theory, commonly called the prima facie tort
theory, attained a wide degree of acceptance at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first third of the twentieth. It declared that the deliberate
infliction of harm was actionable unless privileged by some socially valuable
justification or excuse. The breadth and the generality of the theory were
needed in order for the law to cope with the new forms of harm that the economic developments of the nineteenth century had brought into being, or
made possible, for the first time. The old categories were not capacious
53. For a relatively brief attempt by the author to explain the respective roles of Congress
and the Supreme Court in establishing for unions a privilege to do intentional harm, see S. Petro,
Power Unlimited: The Corruption of Union Leadership 221-50 (1959).
54. 13 Edw., ch. 24 (1285). One of the best ways to grasp the effect of this stimulus to legal
progress is to consult the old commentators' treatment of the action on the case, which traces to
westminster .I. E.g., I M. Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law 44-64 (5th ed. London 1786)
(1st ed. London 1736), and I J. Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England 278-433, especially 41925 (1st Am. ed. N.Y. 1824) (Ist ed. London 1762).
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enough to include the acts of business firms that have come to be called unfair
competition. There were no pigeonholes, either, entitled "secondary boycott,"
the principal peaceable means by which unions forced themselves upon unwilling employers and employees.
If unfair competition and secondary union boycotts were to be restrained,
it would have to be done under a general principle of legal injury such as the
prima facie tort theory. This is why those seeking to defend themselves from
the coercive activities of unions were anxious to develop the general theory
and why those seeking to establish a privileged status for the peaceful but
coercive conduct of unions were determined to establish that only such action
should be considered tortious as had been so considered in the middle ages,
before Westminster II.
Until roughly 1930, the forces in favor of the prima facie tort theory
gained ground, and the main forms of economic coercion developed by unions
were to some extent controlled, although the courts in a few of the more developed states of the Union either rejected the prima facie tort theory or interpreted it in a way that left unions at liberty to use practically any form of
economic coercion without fear of legal liability or restraint.55 After 1930,
federal legislation and constitutional doctrines newly fashioned by the
Supreme Court of the United States largely supplanted the common law as the
governing device in labor relations. The prima facie tort theory, despite its
elegance and long evolutionary history, went into such a decline that it is now
practically untaught in law school and unknown to lawyers, judges, and law
56
students.
Still, it is not possible to understand the ruling law of labor relations during the most significant period of the economic development of the United
States, the period from 1870 to 1930, without understanding the prima facie
tort theory and its rival, the theory that unless action was tortious under one of
the ancient categories it was lawful "in itself' and therefore absolutely privileged. 57 We proceed now to an investigation of these competing legal
55. See section IV.B. -D. infra.
56. Some sense of the decline, as noted by writers who regretted it, may be discerned in
Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Fade Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 563
(1959), and Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 Buffalo L. Rev. 7 (1957). For cases
in which unions have attempted to avail themselves of the prima fade tort principle, see Friendly
Society of Engravers v. Calico Engraving Co., 238 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956) (preemption doctrine
precludes damages action against employer for wrongful interference); Robertson v. Limestone
Mfg. Co., 20 F.R.D. 365 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (suit dismissed for lack of diversity of citizenship).
57. One additional legal category, restraint-of-trade, appeared frequently in the earlier labor
cases, especially in the federal court decisions. This doctrine represents one of the earliest common-law efforts to define and distinguish self-governing activities and activities governing others.
See section IV.E. infra. It was transformed from a common-law doctrine to a statutory one by
such statutes as the Sherman Act, and, by way of the Sherman Act, it played a role in some of the
labor dispute decisions of the federal courts. For example, secondary boycotts, which might be
held actionable under the prima facie tort theory, as they were in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572,
78 N.E. 753 (1906), and Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 A.C. 495, were held unlawful in the federal
courts under the Sherman Act, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
However, it is incorrect to believe, as some have contended, that unions have been especially
victimized under the Sherman Act. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States early held
that violent union conduct was not subject to the Sherman Act, allowing, in my opinion, the most
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approaches.
III.

A.

THE "LAWFUL IN ITSELF" THEORY OF TORTS

Allen v. Flood andActs '"Lafulin Themselves"

The House of Lords decision inAllen v. lood,58 though now over eighty
years old, remains the most extended statement in the law reports of the doctrine that acts are lawful or unlawful "in themselves." The headnote of the
case reads, in fact, that "[a]n act lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious
or bad motive into an unlawful act so as to make the doer of the actliable to a
59
civil action."
From an early date, judges such as Lord Lindley and Justice Holmes and
commentators such as Lewis, Pollock, and Williams, all convinced that there
was no such thing as an absolutely privileged (or unlawful) act, contended that
offensive and damaging type of monopoly to be liberated from the constraints of antitrust law.
United Leather Workers Int'l Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924); see
also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295
(1925). And the Sherman Act strictures against secondary union boycotts were later erased by the
Supreme Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) and United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), except when unions joined with employer groups in establishing
restraints of trade that would violate the Sherman Act even if no union were involved. UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). For the latest word from the Supreme Court concerning the
applicability of the Sherman Act to union boycotts, see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local
100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). For cases suggesting that neither the National Labor Relations Act nor
the Sherman Act seriously embarrasses the persistently monopolistic activities and objectives of
unions, see, respectively, National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), and
Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1076 (1981). The contention that unions were being treated unfairly under the Sherman Act
was challenged at an early date in Quigg, The Shipstead Substitute Anti-Injunction Bill, II Law &
Lab. 3 (1929).
58. 1898 A.C. 1.
59. Id. For other British cases of similar tenor, see Boots v. Grundy, 82 L.T.R. 769, 771
(1900); Ajello v. Worsley, [1898] 1 Ch. 274,280-82; Huttley v. Simons, [1898] 1 Q.B. 181; Rogers v.
Rajendro Dutt, [1860] 13 Moo. P.C. 209, 236. The American cases of the period contain numerous similar comments, at times in dissenting opinions, at times in majority opinions later overruled or incompatible with other decisions of the same court. More space than is available here
would be necessary in order to unravel the cases and to put them in order. For some of the more
or less contemporaneous American opinions purportedly espousing the "lawful in itself' doctrine,
however, see Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1897) (Caldwel, J.,
dissenting); Sparks v. McCreary, 156 Ala. 382, 387, 47 So. 332, 334 (1908); Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618,
626, 132 S.W. 988, 991 (1910); J.F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P.
1027 (1908); McCune v. Norwich City Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521,524 (1862); Chipley v. Atkinson, 23
Fla. 206,212-18, 1 So. 934,937-38 (1887); Saulsberry v. Coopers Int'l Union, 147 Ky. 170, 176, 143
S.W. 1018, 1021 (1912); Orr v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann. 255, 256 (1857); Heywood v.
Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 234,239-41 (1883); W.A. Snow Iron Works, Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382,
116 N.E. 801 (1917); Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499, 503 (1867); Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 133 (1842); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119
(1893); Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583, 592 (1854); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348,
369-72,34 N.E.2d 349,358-60 (1941) (Lehman, J., dissenting); National Protective Ass'n of Steam
Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 335, 63 N.E. 369, 375 (1902) (Gray, J., concurring); Walter A.
Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, -, 186 N.Y.S. 95, 98 (Sup. Ct.
1921); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 419, 431, 66 S.E. 439, 445 (1909) (Hoke, J.,
dissenting); State
v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904); Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308, 310 (1855); Payne v.
Western & AUt. R.R., 81 Tenn. 401, 407-11, 414-15, 416-17 (1884) (but see the dissenting opinion
of Judge Freeman, id. at 423-28, adopted in Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527,540, 179 S.W. 134,
137 (1915)); Raycrofl v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 A. 53 (1896). But see Wesley v. Native Lumber
Co., 97 Miss. 814, 820, 53 So. 346, 347 (1910).
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the "lawful per se" language permeating the majority opinions in Allen -v.
Floodwas obiter dictum.60 Whether or not they were correct, we shall have to
consider after reviewing the facts of the case and the opinions of the judges.
Plaintiffs Flood and Taylor were shipwrights, trained to do both wood
and iron work on ships. Defendant Allen was London district delegate of the
United Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders. The members of this
union, referred to throughout the case as iron workers, were trained to work
only in metal, and one of their objectives was to secure for themselves all the
metal work on ships. The more versatile shipwrights were the iron workers'
principal rivals. Matters came to a head when Flood and Taylor were employed by the Glengall Iron Company to do the wood work on a ship on
which approximately a hundred iron workers were being employed. The iron
workers did not claim the wood work that Flood and Taylor were engaged by
Glengall to do. But, as Lord Macnaghten explained:
[U]nfortunately Flood and Taylor had come straight from a yard
•..* where, owing to a dispute which occurred some few years ago
about this very question, shipwrights only are now employed, and do
both iron and woodwork. Flood and Taylor had been in this yard
about four months taking the bottom out of a big iron ship. Their
presence there had been observed, and it was known what they were
doing. They were excellent workmen, skilful, steady, and well-behaved. But in the eyes of the iron-men they had committed an unpardonable offence. 6 1
Although the iron-men were not qualified to do the work that Flood and
Taylor were doing for Glengall, and although they did not claim that work
and, presumably, were reconciled to working in the future on ships on which
shipwrights were employed to do wood work, the iron workers informed their
delegate, the defendant Allen, that unless Glengall discharged Flood and Taylor they were going to strike. 62 Furthermore, they indicated that they would
never work on a ship with Flood and Taylor.63 Thereupon Allen went to the
Glengall management to discuss the matter, after having urged the iron workers to refrain from striking.
The crucial fact-issue of the case arose at this point. According to the
Glengall people, Allen told them that he would call the men out unless Flood
and Taylor were fired. 64 According to his own testimony, Allen merely informed the Glengall people of what the iron workers had told him.65 In any
60. Lord Lindley's analysis of.4llen v. Floodis in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495, 532-34.
For Justice Holmes' view, see Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194,204-05 (1904) and note 100 infra.
See also F. Pollock, The Law of Torts 341 (9th ed. 1912); Lewis, supra note 4, at 447; Lewis, Some
Leading English Cases on Trade and Labor Disputes, 42 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 125, 145-60 (1903);
Williams, The Foundations of Tortios Liability, 7 Cambridge L.J. 111, 127-29 (1939). But see
Epstein, supra note 23, at 437-40 (contending that the court in Allen v. Flood had held as the
headnote writer suggested it had done).
61. 1898 A.C. 1, 145.
62. Id. at 2-3.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 82 (Lord Hasbury, dissenting).
65. Id. (Lord Hasbury, dissenting).
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event, Glengall fired Flood and Taylor forthwith.
Flood and Taylor then brought an action against Allen and certain other
officials of the boilermakers union, charging them with "maliciously and
wrongfully, and with intent to injure the plaintiffs, procuring and inducing the
Glengall Company to break their contract with the plaintiffs and not to enter
into new contracts with them," and also with "unlawfully and maliciously
conspiring with others" to do the same.6 6 Dismissing the other defendants
after trial for lack of proof of participation with Allen, the trial judge ruled
that there was no evidence of conspiracy, of intimidation or coercion, or of
inducing breach of contract, the contract with Glengall being one at will. 67
However, the trial judge refused to grant judgment for defendant. Instead, he
sent the case to the jury with these questions: 68 (1) Did Allen maliciously
induce Glengall to discharge Flood and Taylor? (2) Did Allen maliciously
induce Glengall to refuse to re-engage the plaintiffs elsewhere? The jury answered yes to both questions and after further argument, the plaintiffs were
granted judgment and damages of £20 each. 69 The court of appeal affirmed. 70
The House of Lords granted an appeal. After the first hearing in 1895,
before seven law lords, the House decided to conduct a rehearing in company
with eight judges of the Queen's Bench. The second hearing was thus before
eight Queen's Bench judges and nine law lords, with two additional lords, the
Lord Chancellor of Ireland and Lord James of Hereford, participating. 7 1 The
lords asked the judges this question: "Assuming the evidence given by the
plaintiffs' witnesses to be correct, was there any evidence of a cause of action
72
fit to be left to the jury?"

The reader is advised to consider very carefully the question that the lords
addressed to the Queen's Bench judges, since a determination of what principle, if any, is established by Allen v. Flood, turns upon the meaning of this
question and upon the way in which the majority of the lords dealt with it.
Since the main question submitted to the jury had been whether or not Alien
had maliciously-that is, intentionally and without justification-induced the
discharges, the law lords asked the judges whether the procuring of plaintiffs'
discharges, if intentionally done, was actionable where the defendant was unable to establish a just cause or excuse.
66. Id. at 3. For a fuller version of the complaint, see Flood v. Jackson, [1895] 2 Q.B. 21, 22-

23.
67. 1898 A.C. at 3.
68. Id. at 82.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id.
71. 32 Ir. L.T. & Sol. J. 45, 46 (1898). For a thorough review of the case, see Wilgus, The
Authority of Allen v. Rood, I Mich. L. Rev. 28 (1902).

72. 1898 A.C. at 11. Since the Glengall people, as witnesses for the plaintiffs, testified that
Allen had threatened a strike, this direction would seem to suggest that the judges should consider
the question on the assumption that the defendant Allen had threatened to call a strike against
Glengall unless Flood and Taylor were discharged. The difficulty of squaring this influence with

the view of the majority of the law lords that Allen was a mere "informant" rather than a "threat-

ener"---see references in note 56 supra and in the text accompanying notes 83-86 infra-is one of
the unsatisfactory features of the majority decision.
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Accordingly, if the judges acted on the factual premise that Allen had
intentionally procured the discharges, as the lords had instructed them to do,
then an affirmative answer would imply adoption of the prima facie tort principle that an act not "in itself' wrongful might become so if it did temporal
harm intentionally with no socially acceptable motive. A negative answer, on
the other hand, would imply a holding that, unless an act fell within one of the
historical, "pigeonhole" categories such as trespass, battery, conversion, etc., it
would be privileged.
However, if either the judges or the lords abandoned the factual premise
of the question and were to act on the assumption that Allen hadnotintentionallyprocuredthe plaintffs' discharges, then the case would become insignificant.73 On this assumption, the "great" case ofAllen v. Flood would actually
become a travesty of due process and of judicial administration, a clumsy betrayal of the fundamental principle of procedural justice that appellate judges
must never substitute their fact-findings for those made by a jury. If an appellate court believes that a jury's fact-finding is flagrantly out of line, what it
must do is honestly and straightforwardly vacate the finding and send the case
back; it must not make a different finding.
The majority of the lords must have been stunned when they received an
affirmative reply to their question from six of the eight Queen's Bench
judges.74 For now, counting the trial judge and the three lords justices of the
court of appeal, all of whom had held for the plaintiffs, 75 ten of her majesty's
high-court judges were committed to the proposition that conduct otherwise
lawful might become actionable when improperly motivated. In short, a majority of her majesty's judges had embraced the prima facie tort theory as expressed by Lord Bowen in the Mogul case--the deliberate infliction of
economic harm is actionable, whatever the means, except where justified by
76
some superior ground of public policy.
Six of the nine lords voted to reverse the courts below and thus to grant
judgment to defendant. 77 They, together with the two Queen's Bench judges
73. "[I]f
we find that the final judgment of the House of Lords was reached because they put
this interpretation on the evidence, a case of less importance was never taken to that tribunal."
Lewis, Some Leading English Cases, supra note 60, at 145. See Dean Lewis' further comment
quoted in the text accompanying note 98 infra. Dean William Draper Lewis, who later founded
the American Law Institute, was an extremely productive scholar from the turn of the century to
the 1930s.
74. 1898 A.C. at 11 (Hawkins, J.), 28 (Cave, J.), 38 (North, J.), 44 (Wills, J.), 51 (Grantham,
J.), 58 (Lawrence, J.).
75. Flood v. Jackson, [1895] 2 Q.B. 21.
76. "Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to
damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is
actionable if done without just cause or excuse. Such intentional action when done without just
cause or excuse is what the law calls a malicious wrong." Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, &
Co., [18891 23 Q.B. 598, 613, afl'd, 1892 A.C. 25. For recent condemnation of this principle and
particularly of Bowen's opinion in Mogul, see Epstein, supra note 23, at 423-38. Epstein's contentious are evaluated at notes 87-106 and accompanying text infra.
77. The majority was composed of Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, Shand, Davey,
and Lord James of Hereford. Lords Hasbury, Morris, and Ashbourne dissented.
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who recommended the same result,78 engaged in extended discussions of the
question whether an otherwise lawful act might become actionable when maliciously motivated. Each said more or less the same thing, namely, that an act
"lawful in itself' could not become actionable merely in virtue of a bad motive, as, they said, the court below had held. All the judges and lords in the
majority took it for granted that the iron workers, not being bound by contract, were privileged to strike at will. For them, this would have been "lawful
in itself," and no motive however deplorable could convert it into an unlawful
act. As Lord James of Hereford put it, since it was lawful for Glengall to fire
plaintiffs and to refuse to rehire them and since it was lawful for the iron
workers to refuse to work with plaintiffs or to threaten to do so, it would be
anomalous to hold that the most innocent party.-Allen-should be held guilty
of a tort in informing Glengall of the imminent strike.79 Lord Macnaghten
saw plaintiffs as left without a remedy. They could not sue the union because
neither the officers nor members had authorized Allen to act as he did; a conspiracy charge had to be dismissed because the alleged co-conspirators, certain
union officials, "had no more to do with the matter than any of your Lordships"; and finally, Allen himself had to be exonerated because he had done
nothing more than inform the employer of what the iron workers had
80
decided.
The character and tenor of the reasoning of all the majority opinions may
be gathered from Lord Davey's comment on the opinion below:
The proposition of those learned judges [below], when analyzed,
seems to me to amount to this: that damnum absque injuria, if accompanied by malicious intent, will give a right of action, or that a
malicious motive per se amounts, or may in certain circumstances
amount, to injuria. I am unable to assent to either of these propositions. "Malice, in common acceptation," says Bayley J.in .. .
Bromage v. Prosser,"means ill-will against a person; but in its legal
sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause
or excuse." If so, it seems to be an argument in a circle
to say that an
8
act not otherwise wrongful becomes so if malicious. '
The alleged circularity of the opinions below disappears if their doctrine is
stated more fairly and accurately to declare that an otherwise lawful act, if it
deliberately produces economic harm, may become actionable in certain circumstances, for example, when motivated by an objective incompatible with
the public good.8 2 But, however that may be, the majority did give a negative
78. Judges Mathew and Wright
79. 1898 A.C. at 177-78. See also the opinion of Lord Shand. Id. at 161-67. And Lord

Macnaghten stated that "the iron-men were perfectly free to leave their work for any reason, or
for no reason, or even for a bad reason; any one of them might have gone singly to the manager,
or they might have gone to him all together (if... quietly and peaceably) ...
80. Id. at 147-50. The quoted language is on page 147.
81. Id. at 171.

"

Id. at 148.

82. The classic statement of the principle is that of Lord Bowen, quoted supra note 76. For a
more elaborate treatment, see 1898 A.C. at 30-32 (opinion of Cave, J.). We shall be evaluating the
charge of circularity more fully in section EII.B. infra.

1982]

CONSPIR4CYAND TORT IN LABOR LAW

answer to the question that the judges had answered affirmatively. They held
that after the evidence was in, the trial judge should have directed a verdict for
defendant rather than letting the case go to the jury.
As indicated above, 83 respectable authorities over the years have viewed
the "lawful per se" language in the majority opinions as dictum. Their estimate is based on the fact, first pointed out by Lord Lindley in Quinn v.
Leathem,8 4 that each of the six law lords voting for reversal interpreted the
evidence as establishing that Allen had merely informed Glengall of the iron
workers' decision to strike. Lord Lindley's observation, though not the whole
truth, is substantially accurate. Lord Herschell stated that he would have
voted for reversal even if Allen had threatenedto call a strike rather than having merely informed Glengall of the iron workers' decision; 85 however, since
Herschell also interpreted the evidence as establishing that Allen had merely
informed Glengall of the iron workers' decision to strike,86 his comment about
ruling the same way if Allen had threatened to call a strike himself, is obiter
dictum.
If the foregoing is accurate, then we must assess Herschell's opinion as an
example of a judge's attempt to make a decision stand for a broader principle
than he has been able to convince the whole court that it ought to establish.
Following in Lord Herschell's footsteps, Richard Epstein argues that41en
v. Flood actually stands for the proposition stated in its headnote.8 7 He bases
his contention on the jury finding "that.. .procurement [of the discharges of
Flood and Taylor] was the precise effect of Allen's warnings8 8to Glengall,
thereby giving the case its great importance on a point of law."
Epstein is doing an odd thing here, referring to the jury finding when the
proposition that he is defending was that the case should never have been sent
to the jury. More than that, besides holding that the case should never have
gone to the jury, the majority decision that Epstein approves actually rejected
the jury-finding on which Epstein bases his construction of the reach of the
majority decision! In brief, Epstein's evaluation of the majority decision in
Allen v. Flood rests on a jury-finding that the aforesaid majority disagreed
with and held should never have been made.
These things come out clearly in the dissenting opinion of Lord Morris in
Allen v. Flood 9 and, later, in Lord Lindley's construction in Quinn v.
Leathem90 of the true holding of Allen v. Flood. First, Lord Morris's observa83. See authorities cited at note 60 supra.
84. 1901 A.C. 495, 532-33. There may have been some misprints in Lord Lindley's citations
to the opinions of the majority in41len v. Flood. Thus, Lord Watson thought Allen an "informant," 1898 A.C. at 98-100; so did Lord Macnaghten, id. at 149-50; Lord Davey, id. at 172; Lord
Shand, id. at 161-62, 165; and Lord James of Hereford, id. at 178.
85. 1898 A.C. at 117.
86. Id. at 116-17.
87. Epstein, supra note 23, at 439-40.
88. Id. at 440.
89. 1898 A.C. at 159. See text accompanying note 91 infra.
90. 1901 A.C. 495, 532-33.
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tions on what the majority had done in Allen v. Flood:
[I]t appears to me that some of your Lordships have put yourselves in
the place of the jury by coming to the conclusion that Allen had gone
to the employers merely to intimate, as has been said, or represent to
them the feelings and views of the men-to be their messenger or
mouthpiece-that being the very case that was negatived by the jury.
Indeed, my noble and learned friend Lord James in his judgment,
which I have had the advantage of reading, has gone further, for he
says: 'For him (Allen) to communicate such intention to the company did not injure the respondents.' If this was correct,there was no
necessity to go anyfurther. Theplaintiffs wouldnot have suffered damage by the act of the defendant. In my opinion it was for the jury, the
constituted tribunal in such cases, and not for your Lordships, to say
whether Allen went to the employers as peacemaker, intimator, representer, messenger, or mouthpiece, as was stated by him, or rather
for him by some of your Lordships, or whether he went with the
object and for the purpose of having the plaintiffs punished for past
alleged offences by getting them discharged at once from their
employment.
The defendant gave a complete denial to the substance of [the
Glengall Company's] evidence. The defendant did not take in his
evidence the position which is now taken up for him by some of your
Lordships of being a messenger or an intimator of what had occurred. He was conscious he had done wrong, and accordingly, to
try to save himself, he denied altogether what Mr. Halkett [of the
Glengall Company] had proved. The jury disbelieved him. His untruthful evidence gave colour to his conduct and action which, in my
opinion, amounted to this. He was an outsider, though he was telegraphed for by Elliott. He proceeded to threaten the employers with
the withdrawal of the boilermakers which would be most injurious to
the employers, unless the plaintiffs were dismissed at once. His object was to injure the plaintiffs and to punish them, and he had the
intention of further persecuting them by not allowing them to work
anywhere, which was not the wish of the men or their union. His
conduct was unauthorized, and he misrepresented to the employers
both the wishes of the men and their objects, and acted outside the
91
scope of his authority as a district delegate of the union.
Bear in mind this question that the House of Lords propounded to the
Queen's Bench judges: "Assuming the evidence given by the plaintiffs' witnesses to be correct, was there any evidence of a cause of action fit to be left to
the jury?" 92 Now the evidence of the Glengall Company's officials, testifying
for the plaintiffs, was that Allen (without authorization from the union, its
members, or its officials) had threatened to call a strike unless the plaintiffs
were discharged, in order to punish them for having done iron work on a job
91. 1898 A.C. at 159-60 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 11.
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Presumably three law lords and six of the eight Queen's Bench judges
took the Lords' direction seriously, for they expressed the opinion that if the
facts were as the Glengall officials testified, the plaintiffs had a good cause of
action on the prima facie tort theory, in other words, that Allen's threat, having deliberately induced the plaintiffs' temporal harm and being totally without redeeming social value or justification, was wrongful and tortious. In
brief, they would hold that if the jury were to find the facts in accordance with
the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, Allen would have appeared to be acting
out of spite and rancor.94 Allen v. Flood then would have been an important
case.

It would have been important if the lords had adopted the Queen's Bench
judges' recommendation because the decision then would have confirmed the
generally developed tort theory, culminating in Lord Bowen's principled statement in Mogul. 95 It would thus constitute a dramatic demonstration of the
common law's capacity to produce a broad general principle rivalling the efficacy and the elegance of the Roman law and of the European codes.
Allen v. Flood would have been equally important had the lords ruled
exactly contrary to the judges' recommendation---s'o long as they had done so
on the samefactualpremise. If the Lords' majority had held Allen's conduct
nonactionable even though it was a purely spiteful threat, then the case would
stand for the proposition stated by the headnote writer, namely, that regardless
of motivation, a peaceful threat not falling within one of the previously recognized tort categories, could not be held actionable even though it was intended
to and did actually cause temporal harm to the plaintiffs. No matter how
much one might doubt the viability of the view that some acts are absolutely
privileged, regardless of the circumstances or of the motivation, at least there
would have been a clean-cut decision to that effect by the highest court of
England and its commonwealth.
But, as we have seen, the majority of the law lords changed the premise of
the question put to the Queen's Bench. As Lord Morris pointed out in the
comment quoted just above and as Lord Lindley pointed out later in Quinn v.
Leathem, the majority in Allen v. lood interpreted the evidence as establishing that Allen had been a mere good-faith informant who could not really be
charged with either moral or teleological or even purely causal culpability in

96
bringing about the plaintiffs' discharge.

Such being the case, Messrs. Holmes, Lindley, Pollock, Lewis and Williams would seem to have been correct in referring to the bulk of the language
93. The threatening nature of Allen's interview with the Glengall officials is brought out
strongly in the opinion of Lord Esher below, Flood v. Jackson, [1895] 2 Q.B. 21, 37.
94. See especially the opinions of Lord Ashbourne, 1898 A.C. at 111, and Judge Gratham, id.

at 52-53. Typical of the rationale of the three dissenting law lords was that of Lord Halsbury, id.
at 68-69. And for perhaps the most scholarly and coherent of the opinions of the Queen's Bench
judges, see that of Judge Cave, id. at 28-37.
95. Quoted in note 76 supra.

96. 1901 A.C. at 532-33. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

of the opinions in Allen v. Flood as mere obiter dictum. 97 And William
Draper Lewis would seem to have made the definitive comment when he said
that Allen v. Flood "merely stands for the obvious legal rule that a man who
of another. . is not liable for the harm resulting
has not caused the discharge
98
from such discharge."
If Professor Lewis was right about this, and it seems clear that he was, it
becomes as hard to accept Professor Epstein's interpretation of the case as it is
to condone the coarse treatment given due process of law by the majority of
the law lords. The lords had no business interpreting the evidence favorably
to the defendant-especially after instructing the Queen's Bench judges to interpret it favorably to the plaintiffs. Courts of last resort duly respectful of
due-process considerations should never substitute their credibility hunches
for those of the trier of the facts except in cases of gross abuse by trial judge or
jury-certainly not present in Allen v. Flood.99
The majority opinion in Allen v. Flood deserved the fate that it received.
1°° The House of Lords
Most American courts and commentators rejected it.
0
1
in Quinn v. Leathem1 swiftly shunted Allen v. Foodto an inactive siding. A
little later, in Giblan, 10 2 a high English court decided for plaintiff a case
weaker than the plaintiffs' case in Allen v. Flood. A union was held liable in
Giblan for bringing about the discharge of a member even though its action
was motivated by a desire to induce the plaintiff to pay a debt he owed the
union.
It is true that the dictum of the majority inAllen v. lood became the law
of England by way of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.103 But no one could
97. See authorities cited at note 60 supra.
98. Lewis, The Modem American Cases Arising Out of Trade and Labor Disputes, 44 Am.
L. Reg. (n.s.) 465, 495 n.86 (1905).
99. See the careful trial court opinion of Judge Kennedy in Flood v. Jackson, [1895] 2 Q.B.
21, 24-34.
100. Holmes gyrated somewhat on the "lawful in itself" issue. Dissenting in Plant v. Woods,
176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900), he was obviously pleased that the lords inAllen Y.
Floodhad agreed with the views he had expressed in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44
N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896). But two years earlier, dissenting in May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 14-16, 51
N.E. 191, 192-93 (1898), Holmes thought that the Massachusetts decisions had rightly rejected the
"lawful in itself' position taken by the majority in Allen v. Flood. His fundamental views seem to
have been along the lines of the prima facie tort principle. See, e.g., 0. Holmes, The Common
Law 54 (1881). See also Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894), which
tracked Lord Bowen's opinion in Mogul almost perfectly. And of course, Holmes' opinion in
Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204-07 (1904), has always been regarded as one of the leading
and most authoritative statements of the prima facie tort principle in the United States. According
to Cooley, llen v. Floodwas much criticized in the United States. T. Cooley, Torts 598 n.38 (3d
ed. 1906). See also Lewis, Should the Motive of the Defendant Affect the Question of His Liability?, 5 Colum. L. Rev. 107, 112-15 (1905); Ames, supra note 4; Wilgus, supra note 71, at 55-57;
Note, Allen v. Flood, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1898).
101. 1901 A.C. 495. Ames thought that Quinn v. Leathem rendered Allen v. Flood harmless as
a precedent but feared that its dictum would survive and have "a mischievous influence." Ames,
supra note 4, at 411-12.
102. Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, [1903] 2 K.B. 600. The majority's
premise in Allen v. Floodwas that the iron workers' union was absolutely privileged to withdraw
from work in the absence of contract. Giblan held precisely the contrary, awarding damages
against the union for the wrongful acts of its agents in procuring the discharge of the plaintiff.
103. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 3. But see Conway v. Wade, 1909 A.C. 506, suggesting that the House
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ever defend that statute juristically. It was pure politics.10 4 So too was the
0 5 Professor Epstein errs in attribdecision of the law lords in Allen v. Flood.1
uting substantivefuridical importance to Allen v. Flood, as he does in attempting to establish the dictum of the case as a holding. His "reinterpretation" of
the "facts,"' 10 6 based as it is on a jury-finding that Allen caused the discharge
when the House of Lords rejected that finding, makes no sense.
B. A Critiqueof Allen v. Flood and the 'Lawful in Itself' Doctrine
No paragon of the prima fade tort theory, Lord Halsbury seemed to distrust broad principle, logic, even consistency in the law;' 0 7 he thought that
persons had absolute rights to do certain things, for example, to dig on their
own land. 10 8 Nevertheless he did grasp the basic flaw of the majority in Allen
v. Flood when he said of their position: "The fallacy appears to me to reside
in the assumption that everything must be absolutely lawful or absolutely unlawful. There are many things which may become lawful or unlawful according to circumstances."10 9 Justice Holmes at an earlier date had gone even
further. In his book, The Common Law, he had written, "All acts, taken apart
from their surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to the law."" 0 In an
intelligently developed legal system, among the circumstances most relevant to
evaluation of human conduct is its motive.
of Lords was not pleased with this statutory espousal of the theories announced by the majority in
Allen v. Flood. In Bussy v. Amalgamated Soey of Ry. Servants, 24 T.L.R 437 (1908), Justice
Darling stated that "[f]ron the humiliating position of being on a level with other lawful associations.. ., the statute of 1906 has relieved all registered trade unions, and they are now super
legem, just as the medieval Emperor was supergraramaticam." Id. at 437. For a collection of
critical comments on the 1906 Act, see Smith, supra note 4, at 351 n.3.
104. Smith, supra note 4, at 351 n.3.
105. Professor Heydon's explanation of the majority decision inAllen v. Flood seems at least
near the mark. According to Heydon, the lords feared that if they affirmed the decision below,
English juries would destroy unions. Heydon, The Future of the Economic Torts, 12 U.W. Austl.
L. Rev. 1, 15 (1975). Since it was seriously contended in the United States that the Taft-Hartley
Act and state right to work laws would destroy unions, it is possible that the majority of the lords
believed what Heydon thought.
106. Epstein, supra note 23, at 440 n.126.
107. See Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 A.C. at 506. But in that case, of course, the Lord Chancellor
was intent on doing what he could to prevent the noxious dictum ofAllen v. Flood from having
any influence on the future law of England when he stated that "a case is only an authority for
what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to
follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical
code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." Id.
108. Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. at 84. The Lord Chancellor undoubtedly was referring in that
case to Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, 1895 A.C. 587, a test run, so to speak, of the dictum ofAllen
v. Flood, as applied to digging on one's own land. But the Lord Chancellor was careful in his
opinion in Allen v. Flood to avoid the circular "lawful in itself' formula. He stated, "To dig into
one's own land under the circumstancesstated requires no cause or excuse. [The defendant landowner] may act from mere caprice, but his right on his own land is absolute, so long as he does not
inte fere with the rights o/others." 1898 A.C. at 84 (emphasis added). This seems a curious way to
talk about "absolute" right.
109. 1898 A.C. at 84.
110. 0. Holmes, supra note 100, at 54. See also the following comments of Judge Finch in
People v. Hughes, 137 N.Y. 29, 39, 32 N.E. 1105, 1107-08 (1893): "Conduct takes its legal color
and quality more or less from the circumstances surrounding it, and the intent or purpose which
controls it, and the same act may be lawful or unlawful as thus colored and qualified."
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The "lawful in itself' doctrine is primitive. "Primitive law," Ames wrote,

"regards the word and the act of the individual; it searches not his heart. 'The
thought of man shall not be tried,' said Chief Justice Bryan, one of the best of
the medieval lawyers, 'for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of
man.'",l To illustrate the point, Ames then recounted an old assault and
battery case in which the jury found for the plaintiff without even permitting
112
the defendant to attempt to justify his conduct with a plea of self defense.
This is primitive law in its essential mode. No civilized society could emerge
from such a system of law, or long tolerate it if civility did happen to emerge.
When Ames was writing, his comments about primitive law with its emphasis
on the "externalities" of human action and on the rejection of subjective intent
represented a common theme of legal scholarship. 1 3 Pollock and Maitland,
for example, observed in their14History that primitive law is strict liability, precluding teleological inquiry.
Primitive man had read purpose into natural events and things--storms,
famine, brooks, clouds, hills, even stones. But when primitive legal systems
dealt with human action, they paid no attention to its driving purposes. The
primitives had things exactly backwards because only human beings act or
pursue purposes and objectives. 15 As Giorgio del Vecchio pointed out long
ago, a certain degree of legal sophistication is required before the law begins to
realize that it cannot ignore purpose when dealing with human action: "Law
can never be unaffected by the 'animus' or psychic element of an act .... 1 6
[I]ncreased attention to psychic factors is characteristic ofjuristic progress."'
Documenting del Vecchio's observation exhaustively from the American
cases would involve citing most of the contents of the law reporters, so we
must be content with citing in the footnote a few especially interesting examples of the tendency of advancing law to consider all the surrounding circumstances, including the motives of the actors. 17 Here we need emphasize only
that the idea of strict privilege (or liability) is a primitive one that evolving
111. J. Ames, Lectures on Legal History 435 (1913) (citing Y.B. 7 Edw. 4, f. 2, pl. 2 (1467)).
112. Id. Ames provides no citation to the case.
113. E.g., F. Bohlen, Cases on Torts at iii-viii (1915). See also Holmes, The Path of the Law,

10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897); Lewis, supra note 4, at 450-51; Purrington, supra note 14, at 469;
Smith, supra note 4; Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1927);
Wyman, The Law as to the Boycott, 15 Green Bag 208 (1903).
114. 2 F. Pollock & W. Maitland, The History of English Law 474-75 (2d ed. 1898).
115. Cf. Fried, Right and Wrong-Preliminary Considerations, 5 J. Legal Stud. 165, 180, 183,
193 (1976). Though obviously aware of the inherently purposive character of human action,
Fried's statement that "human causality is special," id. at 193, is cryptic until amplified by the
brilliant exposition of the role of teleological analysis in the various fields of human action, including law and economics, which is to be found in the works of Ludwig von Mises, especially
Human Action (1949), Theory and History (1957) [hereinafter cited as L. von Mises, Theory], and

The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (1962) [hereinafter cited as L. von Mises, Ultimate
Foundation]. In these works teleology is viewed in human action as the archetype of causal analysis, the kind of causation concerning which there can be none of the problems that Hume raised,
because we know with absolute certainty when we have willed a result (for example, raising an
arm, pulling a trigger, striking a billiard ball).
116. G. del Vecchio, The Formal Base of Law 142-43 (1914).
117. E.g., Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 A. 224 (1914); Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527,
179 S.W. 134 (1915); Payne v. Western & AtL R.R., 81 Tenn. 401 (1884) (especially the dissenting
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legal systems abandon as they come to realize that the essential character and
meaning of human action lies in the purposes and motives that animate it, that
human action, as von Mises put it,11 8 is purposive action, and that no legal
system which fails to take into consideration the circumstances surrounding
action, including motive,-can adequately serve society.
Because of its failure to consider motive or purpose, the "lawful in itself'
doctrine is logically obtuse. The pride that some English scholars and jurists
took in their supposed illogicality and anti-intellectualism, their stress on the
superiority of "experience" over "logic,"' 19 made a good fit with the "lawful in
itself' doctrine-surely one of the cruder examples of circularity to be found
in the law books. American judges, apparently less neurotic about the uses of
logic, were quick to see the defects of a doctrine which held that an act lawful
in itself could not become actionable because of its motivation. Thus, according to Judge Hammond,
It is said also that, where one has the lawful right to do a thing, the
motive by which he is actuated is immaterial. One form of this statement appears in the first headnote in Allen v. Flood, as reported in
(1898) App. Cas. 1, as follows: "An act lawful in itself is not converted, by a bad or malicious motive, into an unlawful act, so as to
make the doer of the act liable to a civil action." If the meaning of
this and similar expressions is that, where a person has the lawful
right to do a thing irrespective of his motive, his motive is immaterial, the proposition is a mere truism. If, however, the meaning is
that where a person, if actuated by one kind of a motive, has a lawful
right to do a thing, the act is lawful when done under any conceivable motive, or that an act lawful under one set of circumstances is
therefore lawful under every conceivable set of circumstances, the
proposition does20 not commend itself to us as either logically or legally accurate.'

In case after case, the question-begging circularity and fundamental arbitrariness of the "lawful in itself' doctrine was exposed.' 2 ' It became more and
opinion of Judge Freeman adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hutton v. Watters, 132

Tenn. 527, 540, 179 S.W. 134, 137 (1915)); State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901).

118. See authorities cited at note 115 supra.
119. On the anti-intellectual strain in Anglo-American law and scholarship, see Cohen, The

Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1916); Guest, Logic in the Law, in Oxford Essays
in Jurisprudence 176-97 (A. Guest ed. 1961). The great English legal historians, especially
Maitland and Holdsworth, in love with their antiquities, criticized Henry Maine's penchant for
logic and grand generalizations, and we have already observed Lord Halsbury's indignation over
the idea that a case should stand for the necessary implications of its holding. See note 107 supra.
There is much to be said against grandiose systems for running other peoples' lives. Cf. F. Hayek,
Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vols. I &2 (1973, 1976). But the idea that there is something wrong
with insisting that law be logical seems difficult to justify.
120. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 499, 57 N.E. 1011, 1014 (1900). See also Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 540, 179 S.W. 134, 137 (1915); Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co.,
54 F. 730, 737-38 (N.D. Ohio 1893); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 147-50, 119 N.W. 946, 947
(1909). Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 196, 197-98
(1946); Huffcut, Malice in the Law of Tort, 1Nw. U.L. Rev. 65, 66-67 (1893); Jaffin, supra note 39,
at 1130-31 nn.78-80; Lewis, supra note 100, at 115.
121. For a few examples, see the cases cited in note 120 supra.
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more apparent that calling an act "lawful in itself' without any inquiry into its
purposes and its effects on others was a perversion of law, a grant of a special
privilege to do harm. One after another, the so-called "absolute" rights gave
way before the cognition that the role of law in society is to harmonize interpersonal relationships by preventing aggression and harm-not to establish
rigid areas of absolute privilege. 122 Human relationships are too dynamic and
fluid for such static analysis. The broad principle, sic utere luo ut alienum non
laedas ("use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of
another"), came into its own. 12 As civility increased, the law became increas122. In the jurisprudence of any civilized country there are but few, if any, absolute
rights-rights which bead to nothing and to which everything else must bend. The right
to one's life would seem to be quite absolute, but it must yield to the private right ofselfdefense and to the public right to punish for crime. And so in the case before us, neither
the right of the plaintiff to a free labor market nor the right of the union to impose a fine
upon its members is absolute. Neither is to be considered apart from the other, or without reference to any other conflicting right, whether public or private; but each must be
regarded as having in the rules of human conduct its own place beyond the limits of
which it must not go.
Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 118-19, 85 N.E. 897, 901 (1908) (opinion of Hammond, J.) (fining union members for working during strike held actionable and enjoinable on suit
by struck employer against union). At least some American courts were fully aware that the
prima facie tort principle, then sweeping the country, was displacing the absolute-rights "lawful in
itself' doctrine. E.g., Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 351-52, 74 A. 595, 598 (1909) (true statement
held actionable when aimed exclusively at injuring plaintiff).
123. Thus even the so-called "absolute" right of employers to discharge at will in the absence
of a fixed-term employment contract gave way. See Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W.
134 (1915) (overruling Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 401 (1884), and adopting the
dissenting opinion therein of Judge Freeman). See also Robison v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, 40
S.W. 843 (Tex. 1897); International & Great N. Ry. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 21 S.W.
559 (1893). Other revealing cases holding that presumptively lawful activities causing harm to the
plaintiff might become actionable when motivated purely by spite and rancor include Tuttle v.
Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (complaint good that charged the defendant with
setting up a competing barbershop solely to ruin the plaintiff probably the best known example).
But the cases involving spite fences and other such structures, or rancorous and spiteful diversions
of underground waters, implied the same principle and evoked equally productive judicial analyses. Spitefences: Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); Rideout v. Knox, 148
Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889); Kuzniak v. Kozminski, 107 Mich. 444, 65 N.W. 275 (1895); Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N.W. 381 (1890); Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838
(1888); Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N.H. 93,54 A. 945 (1903); Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1835) (holding a blocking structure privileged, but facts indicate a kind of self-defense justification); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 433,66 S.E. 439 (1909); Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio 73,42 N.E.
765 (1896) (held that since defendant was privileged to build an income-producing structure on his
property, he was privileged also to erect a purely rancorous spite fence).
Water diversions: Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 163 Ind.687, 72 N.E. 849 (1904)
(collects the authorities); Barclay v. Abraham, 121 Iowa 619, 96 N.W. 1080 (1903); Chesley v.
King, 74 Me. 164, 171-72 (1882) (features a powerful rejection of the "lawful in itself' idea long
before.411en v. Hood); Greenleafv. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836) (water diversion privileged in absence of "mere" spite, rancor, id. at 122); Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58,
93 N.W. 907 (1903), and 92 Minn. 230, 99 N.W. 882 (1904) (court distinguishes between water that
defendant was wasting and water that he was using; see especially 89 Minn. at 61-66, 93 N.W. at
907-08); Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N.Y. 39 (1878) (judgment for defendant despite finding of pure
spite, on the basis of "lawful in itself' formulation in its purest and most question-begging form);
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855) (judgment for defendant on "lawful i itself' grounds). The
leading English cases are Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, 1895 A.C. 587, and Chasemore v. Richards, 29 L.J. Exch. 81, 7 H.L. Cases 349 (1859). Neither of these had to be decided on "lawful in
itself' grounds, since justification easily might have been found, but both, like41en v.Flood,have
been regarded as having established the irrelevance of motive where an act is "lawful in itself."
It is not unusual to think of the spite-fence and water-diversion cases as typical applications
of the prima facie tort theory. But there is no good reason for this. These cases fit comfortably

1982]

CONSPIRA CY AND TORT IN LABOR LAW

ingly sensitive to harm, especially to deliberate harm. For as Adam Smith
observed, "The object of justice is the security from injury, and it is the foundation of civil government."' 12 4 So, acts privileged in one set of circumstances
might become actionable in others, when they did harm. Again, harm that
might amount to damnum absque injuria in one set of circumstances could
become legal injury, hence compensable or enjoinable, in others. Always, the
motive would rank high among the circumstances with which the court had to
reckon, or should reckon. In one of the most powerful expressions of these
concepts ever written, William Draper Lewis stated,
The attitude of mind which asks, when a plaintiff complains of
injury, "Had the defendant a right to do the act which caused the
injury?" must be consciously or unconsciously based on the assumption that there are some acts which man has an inherent right to do,
irrespective of the circumstances under which he does them. Once
admit this proposition, and someone will sooner or later perform the
act which it is declared he has a legal right to do under all circumstances, under circumstances in which harm to others results, without
any corresponding benefit to the community. The act of selling one's
labor or one's goods is an act which in the past has usually gone
unquestioned, because it was never performed under circumstances
which shocked the moral sense of the community. The idea that
there is an inherent right to buy or sell, to work or not to work, as one
pleases, was the natural result. But the act of selling one's labor or
one's goods does not differ essentially from any other act. There is
no less and no more inherent right to sell labor or goods than to chop
a tree. The legality of the act of tree-chopping depends on the surrounding circumstances; so with the sale. The law of tort, in the past
from an examination of the
has not sprung, and could not spring
1 25
rights of those who injured others.
The "lawful in itself" doctrine ignores the essential feature of human action and obstructs the central purpose of human society. Men are not trees but
instead are actors with purposes.' 26 As Schopenhauer pointed out, a person is
what he wills. 27 Will implies conscious direction of muscles, to produce actions or deliberate refusals.128 Holmes said that "[in a proper sense, the state
within the structure of the prima facie tort principle as examples of harmful conduct lacking any
redeeming social quality, for decent society is not interested in encouraging spiteful and rancorous
harm, as it does nobody any good. See text accompanying notes 265-74 infra.
124. A. Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms 3 (E. Cannan ed. 1896).
125. Lewis, supra note 4, at 449-50. Dean Lewis saw the essence of the prima fade tort theory
in its focus on the harm done to the plaintiff rather than on the "rights" of the defendant. Id. at
448. Professor Heydon has made the same point much more recently. See Heydon, The Defence
of Justification in Cases of Intentionally Caused Economic Loss, 20 U. Toronto LJ. 139, 181-82
(1970). The relevance of such comments to the supposed "absolute right to strike" is obvious. See
Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1893); Bausbach v. Reiff, 244
Pa. 559, 91 A. 224 (1914).
126. Cf. Fried, supra note 115, at 193.
127. A. Schopenhauer, Essay on the Freedom of the Will 21-22, 34-36 (mod. lib. ed. 1960).
128. 1 J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 415, 419, 498 (1911). G. del Vecchio has stated
that "a phenomenon cannot be legal or illegal except in reference to subjective will. Only those
John Stuart Mill goes
acts... which show a subjective element can bejuridically weighed ....
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29 In a
of a man's consciousness always is material to his liability ....
1
rational legal system an unwilled activity implies no liability.
Thus, when the
130
law talks about human action, it means willed action.
It is true that the law concerns itself perforce only with interpersonal ac1 31
tivities, or as Kohler put it, "the will that is active in the external world."
And from this fact, some jurists have reasoned that the motives of actions can
and should be ignored in order to simplify legal administration and to minimize restrictions on personal freedom. 132 But this position unfortunately ignores the point that human conduct is for legal purposes nondescript when
divorced from the purpose that animates it. The meaning of human action lies
in its purpose.
It is necessary to emphasize again and again that no statement
or proposition concerning human action can be made that does not
imply reference to ends aimed at. The very concept of action is finalistic and is devoid of any sense and meaning if there is no referring to
conscious aiming at chosen ends. There is no experience in the field
of human action that can be had without resorting to the category of
means and ends. If the observer is not familiar with the ideology, the
technology, and the therapeutics of the men whose behavior he observes, he cannot make head or tail of it. He sees people running
here and there and moving their hands, but he begins to understand
what it is all
about only when he begins to discover what they want
133

to achieve.

so far as to say that 'an act is not one thing, but a series of two things, the state of mind called
volition, followed by an effect."' G. del Vecchio, supra note 116, at 125-27 (citing 1 J. Mill, A
System of Logic 59 (4th ed. London 1856) (1st ed. London 1843)). See also Hart, Negligence,
Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 29.49 (A. Guest ed.
1961).
129. Holmes, supra note 100, at 5.
130. "There can be no doubt that every act [of legal import] is willed" ("non 6 dubbio che
qualsiasi atto 6 determinato da un movente"). G. Sena, I1Boicottagio: Un Aspetto della Disciplina della Concorrenza 92 (Milan 1970).
131. J.Kohler, Philosophy of Law 82 (A. Albrecht trans. 1921).
132. G.del Vecchio, supra note 116. Nevertheless, del Vecchio stated, "Psychic facts and the
psychic element in acts have been, and will continue to be, the object ofjuridical consideration,
although, as we have said, only when shown in action." Id. at 146.
133. L. von Mises, Theory, supra note 115, at 284; see also L. von Mises, Ultimate Foundation,
supra note 115, at 240. "As law is based on and interpenetrates life, it cannot disregard any of its
essential elements, and in weighing human acts should not disregard the spirit which effects
them." G. del Vecchio, supra note 116, at 143. For other works recognizing the essentially teleological character of all human action and the importance of this fact to the law, see R. von Thering,
Law as a Means to an End (1914); N. Korkunov, General Theory of Law 41-46 (1922) (ethical
norms make all other norms cohere "to the realization simultaneously of all human ends," id. at
42); R. Norman, Reasons for Actions 19-20 (1971); G. Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence 3436, 142, 428-29 (1964); Fitzgerald, Voluntary and Involuntary Acts, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 1-28 (A. Guest ed. 1961). The editorial committee of the American Association of Law
Schools, in the introduction to N. Korkunov, supra, at ix, made this statement: 'Without some
fundamental basis of action, or theory of ends, all legislation and judicial interpretation are reduced to an anarchy of uncertainty. It is like mathematics without fundamental defitions and
axioms.... Even... experimental legislation... cannot successfully ignore the necessity of
having social ends." Furthermore, G. Gottlieb, in The Logic of Choice 160 (1968), has stated that
"whenever legal rules are applied or relied upon,.., considerations of purposes, policies and
choices... are inescapable unless one is prepared to disregard what it is that the relevant rules
are designed to accomplish; unless, in other words, one is prepared to allow the self-defeating
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Thus law ignores purpose at its peril. If it penalizes a person for striking
another without asking why the blow was struck, it takes the risk of invading
freedom and right, rather than defending them. Motive, justification, excuse,
mitigation-all these are relevant to a civilized legal system. This is obvious in
ihe self-defense cases, but it is no less true, though much less obvious, in other
cases. Indeed, one is hard put to find a single instance in which human action
may justly be condemned, or held privileged, without inquiry into the motive
and other circumstances animating it. Litton's Case,134 in which the Court of
High Commission discharged the defendant even though he had been caught
relieving himself in St. Paul's, is instructive. So too is Regina v. Dudley,135 in
which men convicted of cannibalism had a death sentence commuted to six
months' imprisonment.
No lawyer worth his salt will venture a legal opinion of a merely overt
event, for example, "A was digging." He will not even give a firm opinion on
the more extended statement, "A was digging on his own land." All the judges
inAllen v. Flood, including the dissenters, stated that there is an absolute right
to dig on one's own land. But the water diversion cases in the United States,
and the other cases involving allegations of pure spite and rancor, have
demonstrated the deficiencies of that assumption.
The social and legal meaning of actions depends upon their purpose. One
may sound a horn to salute a girlfriend, to annoy the neighbors, or to save a
life--or for many other reasons. In any case only one physical event has occurred-horn blowing-but as many different acts have occurred as the variety of possible motives. Herein lies the reactionary obtuseness of the majority
in Allen v. Flood and of the "law of itself' doctrine. The legality of an "act"
must vary with its motive.
application of rules." See also a remarkable. book review by E. Gager, 28 Yale L.. 617 (1919),
emphasizing the teleological, ends-means essence of the role of law in society.
134. The full text of Litton's Case, as reported in Cases in the Courts of Star Chamber and
High Commission 280-81, 298 (Council of Camden Society) (S. Gardiner ed. 1886), is as follows:
Because the rest were not come in they [the court] went to another matter which was
against one Francis Litton (as I take it his name was). He was apprehended in Paule's
for pissing against a pillar in the Church. THE BisHop OF LONDON shewed, that he had
received order from the Lords of the CouAcell, that men and woemen should not carry
base things through the Church, and that there should be not walking nor talking in the
Church, and that there should be noe walking nor talking in the Church in the tyme of
Divine service, and these orders among others are sett up on the dores. This man was
goinge through the Church to be married, and he could not hould, but must needs ease
himself in this inhumane manner. Why did you doe this? LrTTON fell downe upon his
knees and desired mercie, he knew not where he was, he is a country man and never was
at London before, and he knew it not to be a church, and is very sorry for his offence,
and prayeth to be released, but he is committed againe to prison.
Francis Litton petitioned, humbly shewing that he is troubled often with a disease
called the stone, and entring into St. Paule's Church, he did endeavour to make water
within the doore. He is furre of from his friends, and submitteth himself humbly to the
Court, beseeching their pardon, for he knew it not to be a Church. Being asked where he
dwelled, he saieth, three myles from Bedford. He fell downe upon his knees and wept
desiringe their Lordships to forgive him. Whereupon the Court was inclined to favour
him; and soe ordered, if upon examinacion it were found he did it ignorantly, and he was
to gett bayle.
135. [1884] 14 Q.B. 273.
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THE PRIMA FACIE TORT THEORY AND THE JUST-CAUSE PRINCIPLE

The prima fade tort theory holds that one who intentionally harms an-

other is legally liable unless he can establish a just cause for his conduct,
meaning a socially serviceable reason or motive, strong enough to overcome
the presumption against him for the harm he has done. 136 It is unfortunate
that the principle should have been confined to intentional harms. Much confusion might have been spared had there been general agreement to the even
broader principle, that is, that one who harms another, whether intentionally
or not, is legally liable unless he can establish some socially acceptable defense. 137 This is actually what the law of torts amounts to, after everything
possible has been said about "nominate" and "innominate" torts, actions on
the case, "pigeonholes," and so on. 138 But since Anglo-American law has
tended to resist broad generalizations that might lead to candid and coherent
reasoning by the courts,13 9 we must content ourselves with the fragmentary
statement known as the prima facie tort principle. Even this seems to be more
general and coherent than our legal system wants to be, judging from the
resistance that it has met in spite of its modest and self-evident character, and
136. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 762-774 (1979). For statements of theprinciple by
American judges, see Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194,204 (1904); White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 266,290-91 (1845); May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 14-16,51 N.E. 191, 192-93 (1898) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080-82 (1896) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 (1870);
Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909); Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595
(1909); Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 A. 224 (1914); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327
(1903); Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915); Payne v. Western & AtL. R.R., 81
Tenn. 401, 418-30 (1884) (Freeman, J., dissenting). Some of the more notable statements in the
English cases are to be found in Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, [1903] 2
K.B. 600; Skinner v. Shew [1893] 1 Ch. 413, 422; Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, 527-28
(Bowen, LJ.); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 598, 618-19 (Bowen,
LJ.), afl'd, 1892 A.C. 25; Bromage v. Prosser, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1825). I omit the New York
cases, despite New York's reputation as the outstanding prima fade tort state in the country,
because the New York Court of Appeals' decisions were not true applications of the prima facie
tort principle.
The law reviews here and abroad contain hundreds of articles involving the prima fade tort
principle, far too many to cite. For a few, see the works cited at notes 111-13 supra. See also
Ames, supra note 4; Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle,
54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 563 (1959); Dawson, Is There or Should There Be a Prima Fade Tort in New
Zealand, 2 Auckland U.L. Rev. 1 (1974); Forkosch, An Analysis of the 'Prima Fade Tort' Cause
of Action, 42 Cornell L.Q. 465 (1957); Hale, supra note 120; Heydon, supra note 105; Heydon,
supra note 125; Huffcut, supra note 120, Lewis, supra note 100; Walton, Motive as an Element in
Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1909); Note, The Prima Fade
Tort Doctrine, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1952).
137. Both Holmes and Pollock thought that such a broad, general and unifying tort principle
already prevailed at the turn of the century. See F. Pollock, supra note 60, at 1-55; Holmes, supra
note 100. See also Williams, supra note 60; Winfield, supra note 113. A general tort theory called
"strict liability" has been urged more recently by Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal
Stud. 151 (1973).
138. See Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91 (1921). See also Dawson, supra note 136. G. Alexander, Commercial Torts 337 (1973), contends that the prima fade
tort should be conceived of "as an additional specific tort." He also thinks that New York has
been in the forefront in developing the prima fade tort. Id.
139. E.g., W. Prosser, supra note 39, at 4-5. ("There is no necessity whatever that a tort must
have a name."). Compare Cohen, supra note 119, on the character and consequences of AngloAmerican anti-intellectualism in the law, see also Holmes, supra note 113, at 468-71, 476 on the
desirability of more and better legal theory.

1982]

CONSPI_?. CY AND TORT IN LABOR LAW

from the confusion
in which it has been shrouded despite its elegant
14 °
simplicity.
One source of confusion derives from the historical importance of the
idea, "malice," and from the fact that this term has been used in two different
senses. A second source of confusion traces to the complexity of two of the
concepts that play a large role in the principle, the concepts of "self-interest"
and "competition." And these confusions have been exacerbated by conflicting conceptions of personal freedom and its legal counterparts, private property and freedom of contract, and by the way in which they relate to selfinterest and competition-all in all as confusing a series of overlapping and
I
interlocking ambiguities as has ever afflicted the law.
A. Malice in Fact, Malice in Law, andFreedom
Although the distinction between malice in fact and malice in law has
long been recognized, many lawyers and judges keep confusing them, failing
to understand how the two meanings relate to each other, to freedom,
and to
14 1
the intimately related concepts, "self-interest" and "competition."
Malice in fact is spite, rancor, the feuding tendency-vengeance, reprisal,
ill-will, old-fashioned meanness, sometimes referred to as "motiveless malignity." The archetypal case is the spite fence. However provoked, Brown
builds on his land a structure that blocks neighbor Mahan from overlooking
him, destroying a view that Mahan and his tenants have had. 142 At first in this
country and in England, Mahan would have been denied a remedy out of
hand unless he could prove a kind of easement under the name of "ancient
lights."' 14 3 Later, at least in this country, Mahan might get relief unless Brown
could prove
that he had some motive other than "mere spite" in erecting the
1 44
structure.
Sometimes the opinions in these cases left pitfalls for the unwary who
followed. Thus in Mahan v. Brown judgment went for the defendant on the
ground (at least so it was said) that he had a right to do as he wished on his
own land. However, Chief Justice Savage went on to say that given sufficient
time, the plaintiff might acquire an easement, an indefeasible right to overlook
the defendant's land: "But before sufficient time has elapsed to raise a presumption of a grant, he has no right, and can maintain no action for being
deprived of that easement, let the motive of the deprivation be what it
140. E.g., W. Prosser, supra note 39, at 1-8.
141. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-200 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-92 (1964). See also Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co.,
[1889] 23 Q.B. 598, 612-13, afrd, 1892 A.C. 25.
142. Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
143. Id. See also Chasemore v. Richards, 29 LJ.Exch. 81, 7 H.L. Cases 349 (1859).
144. Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). See, e.g., Norton v. Randolph, 176
Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1899); Kuzniack v.
Kozrninski, 107 Mich. 444 (1895); Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N.W. 381 (1890); Burke v.

Smith, 69 Mich. 380,37 N.W. 838 (1888); Noran v. Byrnes, 72 N.H. 93,54 A. 945 (1903); Barger v.
Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439 (1909); Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio 73, 42 N.E. 765 (1896). See

also Ames, supra note 4.
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may. . .. -145 Stopping here, one might conclude that the case is a "lawful in
itself' precedent. But Savage continued, saying this:
[T]he reason is, that in the eye of the law he is not injured. He is
deprived of no right, but only prevented from acquiring a right, without consideration, in his neighbor's property. Suppose an obliging
farmer permits his neighbor to pass and repass through his fields, to
go to the lands of that neighbor, if this is permitted for 20 years, it
becomes an easement, a right of way, which the owner of the soil
cannot infringe; but at the end of ten years, he chooses, from mere
malice or wantonness, to shut up this passage, and refuses permission
to his neighbor to pass over his lands, as he used to do for ten years
past; does an action lie? Most certainly not. And yet that case is not
distinguishable, in principle, from that under consideration. The defendant has not so used his own property as to injure another. No
one, legally speaking, is injured or damnified, unless some right is
infringed. The refusal or discontinuance of a favor gives no cause of
action. The plaintiff in this case has only been refused the use of that
which did not belong to her; and whether the motives of the defendant were good or bad, she has no legal cause of complaint.146
Observe in the foregoing analysis, strong as it is, how the ideas "lawful in
itself," "no right," "prevention of expropriation," "mere malice or wantonness," come together in the context of the justification for the defendant's action, then part, then come together again to end in the statement that "whether
the motives of the defendant were good or bad, [the plaintiff] has no legal
cause of complaint." 147 Surely the latter is not all the decision stands for. If it
were, why the talk about the plaintiffs acquiring an easement should the defendant fail to block that possibility? Such language must have been intended
to establish a motivation for the defendant's conduct that the court could regard as sufficient justification to exonerate him from liability for the admitted
harm done to the plaintiff and her tenants, whose light and view were cut off
by defendant's fifty-foot-high structure. Thus the case could be cited as a precedent forAllen v. Flood and as an example of the "lawful in itself' position.
But it could also be cited as an example of the just-cause principle: the defendant had a kind of self-defense basis for what he did; he did not act out of
pure rancor or spitefulness. That is, he did not act out of pure spite unless one
takes the position that refusing to make a gift of one's goods is spiteful.
For better or for worse, it has not yet become explicit in our culture that
one has a positive duty to make gifts to others, though this is probably an
implicit premise of the welfare state. Be that as it may, the great contribution
of the spite-fence and water-diversion cases lies in their demonstration of the
pervasive relevance of the teleological approach and of the pervasive functioning of the prima facie tort principle. These cases make it difficult to ignore the
purposiveness of human action, and they equally emphasize the emptiness of
145. 13 Wend. 261, 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
146. Id. at 264-65.
147. Id.
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the "malice in fact" category insofar as it is supposedly composed of cases of
"motiveless malignity." It may be doubted after reading all the cases that
there ever has been an instance of one person's deliberately harming another
for no reason at all. Tuttle v. Buck, 148 it should be remembered, was decided
on demurrer, before the defendant had occasion to put in a justification plea
or evidence thereof. The similar case of Beardsley v. Kilmer' 49 was decided in
favor of defendant at least in part because there was evidence that he had
started up a rival newspaper out of more than motiveless malignity toward the
plaintiff.
There are likely to be no--or extremely few--cases in which the defendant is moved by a purely evil drive to injure the plaintiff. Man's nature falls
somewhere between purely evil and purely good. So too do his motives, for
his nature is composed of his motives. The actual problem for the judges then
becomes this: given a motive for the harm that the defendant has visited upon
the plaintiff, is that motivation adequate to exonerate him from liability?
In this way the term "malice" in tort law has been divested of its deceptively concrete connotation of positive evil or wrongdoing and has become a
purely formal analytic device, just as the words "pleasure" and "pain" lost
their hedonistic connotation in sophisticated utilitarianism and economic
analysis, to become merely formal counters, signifying only, respectively,
choices made and choices rejected.15 0
So the prima facie tort theory emerges in finished, polished form with the
substitution of malice in law for the obsolete and empty idea of malice in fact.
And malice in law comes to mean unjustified, intentional harm, or, in more
extended form, harm that the defendant has intended to inflict but for which
he has not provided an explanation or reason adequate 5to constitute a justification that the law, as a social instrument, can accept.' 1
148. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). See, e.g., Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 A. 224
(1914), in which the court stated that a work stoppage to procure the discharge of a fellow-worker
was not privileged merely because the strikers "'did not care to work with [the plaintiff],"' id. at
562, 91 A. at 225 (quoting from jury instructions), implying that only an acceptable reason for
refusing to work with the plaintiff would exonerate the defendants; and that disliking the plaintiff
for reporting their thievery was not an acceptable reason. Id. at 564-66, 91 A. at 225-26.
149. 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923).
150. Holmes, supra note 100; Smith, supra note 4, at 345, 429.
151. Heydon, supra note 125, at 182. The fullest, most flexible, and most sophisticated develmalice
in law,
malice in
fact toand
as Judicial
summarized
of in
thethe
prima
fade tort theory
opment
the first
few
Courthere,
in thefrom
nineteenth
century
Massachusetts
Supreme
took place
years of the twentieth. Time and space limitations preclude more detailed treatment of the Massachusetts developments here, especially in view of their complexities (compare, for example, WorthHunt with Aerry v. Donovan and Plant v. Woods,
and Commonwealth
ington, Cornellier
discussed
infra). However,
since
is v.
nothing
in any of
to compare
what went on in Massachusetts, there
with
a generous
selection
ofthe
theother
cases,jurisdictions
in chronological
order,
is
presented for those who might wish to examine th
e authority for the developments summarized
text: Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836); Phippen v. Stickney, 44
Mass. in(3the
Met.)
384 (1841); Commonwealth v. Hunt,

45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842); Marsh v. Billings, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 322 (1851); Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867); Carew v.
Rutherford,
106 Mass. 1 (1870); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Snow v. Wheeler, 113
Mass. 179 (1873);
Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592

(1874); Commonwealth v. Waterman, 122 Mass.
43 (1877); Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass. 582 (1886); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390
(1889); Morasse v. Brcehu, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N.E. 74 (1890); Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26
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We now deal with the case in which the defendant does deliberate harm
to the plaintiffs material interests but offers no defense other than his "basic
right of freedom." Lord Macnaghten along with the other members of the
majority in Allen v. lood thought that the iron workers could have quit work
"for any reason, or for no reason, or even for a bad reason." 152 Lord Watson
as they were not under contract, they were thus "at perfect
agreed that, so long
153
liberty" to quit.
Critically examined, such assertions turn out to be porous. If the ironworkers had quit work in a body when there was certain knowledge that the
result of their action would have been the destruction of their employer's
premises, surely Lords Macnaghten and Watson would have wanted them to
establish some kind of justification for their action. The fact that the ironworkers were under no fixed-term contract of employment would have made
were
little difference if, say, in quitting suddenly without notice, the ship they
154
working on would have been exposed to the elements and destroyed.
N.E. 417 (1891); Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 28 N.E. 1125 (1891); Worthington v. Waring,

157 Mass. 421, 32 N.E. 744 (1892); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896);
Hartnett v. Plumbers' Supply Ass'n, 169 Mass. 229,47 N.E. 1002 (1897); May v. Wood, 172 Mass.
11, 51 N.E. 191 (1898); Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454, 56 N.E. 619 (1900); Plant v. Woods,
176 Mass. 492,57 N.E. 1011 (1900); Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901); Martell
v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603
(1905); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205,
80 N.E. 817 (1907); Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N.E. 457 (1908); Willcutt & Sons Co. v.
Bricklayers' Benevolent Union, 200 Mass. 110, 85 N.E. 897 (1908); Davis v. New England Ry.
Publishing Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909); M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass.
394, 93 N.E. 584 (1911); DeMinico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N.E. 317 (1911); Folsom v. Lewis,
208 Mass. 336, 94 N.E. 316 (1911); Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N.E. 1036 (1911);
Hanson v. Innis, 211 Mass. 301, 97 N.E. 756 (1912); Holbrook v. Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, 100
N.E. 1111 (1913); Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717 (1914); Burnham v. Dowd, 217
Mass. 351, 104 N.E. 841 (1914); New Eng. Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, 105 N.E.
885 (1914); Comellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N.E. 643 (1915); Bogni v.
Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N.E. 853 (1916); Martineau v. Foley, 225 Mass. 107, 113 N.E. 1038
(1916); Shinsky v. Tracey, 226 Mass. 21, 114 N.E. 957 (1917); Tracey v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25,
114 N.E. 959 (1917); Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N.E. 304 (1917); Martin v. Francke,
227 Mass. 272, 116 N.E. 404 (1917); W.A. Snow Iron Works, Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116
N.E. 801 (1917); Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918);
Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790 (1919); Smith v. Bowen, 232 Mass. 106, 121 N.E.
814 (1919); Mechanics Foundry and Mach. Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128 N.E. 877 (1920);
Hotel and R.R. News Co. v. Clark, 243 Mass. 317, 137 N.E. 534 (1922); Lawrence Trust Co. v.
Sun-American Publishing Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923); Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass.
356, 77 N.E.2d 318 (1948).
152. 1898 A.C. at 148.
153. Id. at 99. The "right-to-strike" formula had become a cliche in the United States before
the turn of the century. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1894) (Harlan, J.). See also
Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 F. 155, 171-72 (E.D. Wis. 1906). The New York
Court of Appeals thought that workers and unions "had the right to strike for any reason they
deemed a just one." National Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 323,
63 N.E. 369, 370 (1902), a view repeated by "strict" judges such as New Jersey's Vice Chancellor
Stevenson, in Booth v. Burgess, 72 NJ. Eq. 181, 65 A. 226, 230-31 (1906), but put definitively to
rest by Justice Brandeis, in Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
154. Judge Taft considered this question at length in Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 737-39 (N.D. Ohio 1893); Judge Ricks considered it at another stage in the
same case, 54 F. 746, 757-58 (N.D. Ohio 1893). Both judges thought that the purposes animating
and the circumstances surrounding a work-refusal should determine its legality.
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Holmes touched on this problem in an early article on the prima facie tort
theory:
If a case could be put where the defendant's act was justified by no
grounds of policy more special or other than the general one of letting men do what they want to do, it would present the point which I
wish to raise. Such a case I find hard to imagine, but if one should
occur, I think courts would say that the benefit of spontaneity was
outweighed by the damage which it causes. The gratification of illwill, being a pleasure, may be called a gain, but the pain on the other
side is a loss more important. Otherwise, why allow a recovery for a
to do
battery? There is no general policy in favor of allowing a man
155
harm to his neighbor for the sole pleasure of doing harm.
from the subject, saying that "there is no need to stay
Holmes moved quickly
156
air.'
thin
such
in
We need to pause here, however, for there is a point to be driven home.
Societies hold together and are strong when they fulfill the expectation that
those who do harm will be punished or made to pay unless they can demonstrate some ground of privilege or justification satisfactory to the community,
if not to the victim. Security of property and of freedom is a basic individual
and social value. Moreover, freedom does not belong only to defendants, as
Lord Herschell would have had us believe. 157 When one person brings about
demonstrable damage to another, especially knowingly and intentionally-as,
for example, in Allen v. Flood-the freedom of the person who suffers the
harm may be as much at stake as the freedom of the person who brings it
about.
Those who believe that Allen v. Floodwas correctly decided tend to agree
with Lord Herschell's statement that preserving freedom required the result
reached by the majority.15 8 Judgment for the plaintiffs would have implied no
right to strike in the iron workers and no right in Allen to threaten to call a
strike-obvious invasions of freedom, according to this point of view.
Granting much of this, one may still say that the judgmentfor the defendant also amounted to cutting down freedom, the freedom of both Glengall and
Flood and Jackson. The Glengall firm was committed to completion of a job.
Since this commitment required continuous and faithfd performance by the
iron.workers, they were in a position to exact by a sudden work stoppage concessions otherwise out of reach. The extortion cases illustrate the predicament
of the employer.' 59 In these cases, union agents are typically charged with
using the strike-threat in order to induce employers to pay what amounts to
155. Holmes, supra note 100, at 5-6.
156. Id. at 6.
157. "I think [that individual liberty] is never in greater danger than when a tribunal is urged
to restrict liberty of action because the manner in which it has been exercised in a particular
instance may be distasteful." Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. at 142.
158. E.g., Epstein, supra note 23, at 439 n.123.
159. The New York Appellate Division made a point of the employer's predicament in Anbum Draying Co. v. Wardell, 178 A.D. 270,274, 165 N.Y.S. 469,473 (1917), afl'd, 227 N.Y. 1, 124

N.E. 97 (1919).
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New York cases reveals how vulnerprotection money. Perusal of some of the
160
able employers are to such pressures.
Allen v. Floodis a variation on the extortion theme. The iron workers had
Glengall over a barrel. They knew it, and Allen knew it; and their combined
action was designed to make Glengall know it. When Allen brought the facts
home to Glengall, the fate of Messrs. Flood and Jackson was sealed. Glengall
fired Flood and Jackson because it found its prudential choices choked down
to one. Thus the iron workers and Allen were clearly guilty of limiting Glengalls choices. Their will was substituted for Glengalrs as regards contracting
with Flood and Jackson.161

Glengall had at least an arguable cause of action against the iron workers
and Allen, under the prima facie tort principle, as conspirators or as joint
tortfeasors, for the only excuse available to them--that Flood and Jackson had
done work elsewhere as the iron workers claimed-could scarcely have justified the harm which they intended or threatened to do to Glengall. Perhaps
Glengall was entitled to injunctive relief, as well, for why should it have been
harmed merely because the iron workers harbored rancor against the ship160. E.g., People v. Hughes, 137 N.Y. 29, 32 N.E. 1105 (1893); People v. Barondess, 133 N.Y.
649, 31 N.E. 240 (1892); People v. Commerford, 233 A.D. 2, 251 N.Y.S. 132 (1931); People v.
Walsh, 15 N.Y. 17 (App. Div. 1888); see also State v. Dalton, 134 Mo. App. 517, 114 S.W. 1132
(1908).
161. In the New York version of Allen v. Flood,National Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters v.
Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902), the dissenting judge referred as follows to the effect
upon employers of secondary-strike threats designed to procure the discharge of nonunionists or
of rival unionists:
It may be argued that the employers were not obliged to yield to these threats, and
this is true; but noncompliance meant ruin to them, for their work would be completely
tied up and their business paralyzed. A threat, with ruin behind it, may be as coercive as
physical force. The effect of such threats upon men of ordinary nerve is well known.
They could not perform their contracts, and would thus be subjected to great loss.
Hence, against their will, they yielded to unlawful demands. Personal libery was interfered with through coercion of the will. Some of them knew from experience, as the
record shows, that the military discipline of the defendant organizations practically compelled instant obedience of an order to strike. When an association is so strong and its
discipline so perfect that its orders to strike are equivalent to the commands of an absolute monarch, the effect is the same as the use of physical force.
Id. at 343, 63 N.E. at 378 (Vann, J., dissenting). For a more extended description of how secondary-strike pressures work on the will of employers, see Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 494-98,
501-04,57 N.E. 1011, 1012-13, 1015 (1900); see also Gregory Elec. Co. v. Custodis Constr. Co., 312
F. Supp. 300 (D.S.C. 1970); Soule & Son Co. v. Keith Mass. Corp., 10 Law & Lab. 56 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1928) (enjoining the breaking of a contract with plaintiff because of union pressure);
Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, 92 N.J. Eq. 131, 111 A. 376
(1920) (holding a firm jointly liable with the union which coerced it into breaking a contract with
the plaintifi).
For further appreciation of the juridically critical feature of the secondary boycott's effect
upon the freedom of the person in the middle, see Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in Labor
Disputes-The Secondary Boycott, 1 La. L. Rev. 277, 281 (1939). The "secondary boycott" proscriptions of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976), were stated by the sponsors of the
Act to have been motivated in part by a congressional desire to protect the persons in the middle,
referred to as "neutrals." 2 Legis. Hist. of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 1106-07
(1948). For examination of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act on this and related
points, see S. Petro, supra note 22, at 35-49. For a well-documented study concluding that the
congressional policy of protecting the party in the middle continues to be aborted by the National
Labor Relations Board, see R. Dereshinsky, The NLRB and Secondary Boycotts 1, 8, 48, 72, 9495, 124-25 (1972).
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wrights for work done elsewhere? Should a civilized legal system tolerate or
encourage such indiscriminate harm-doing, such a spreading of disputes to
innocent parties?
Someone might want to argue on the other side that the proper thing for
Glengall to have done was to have made no-strike contracts with the unions
representing its employees. While there is something to be said for the argument, the threatened strike of the iron workers constituted a violation of their
own constitution and bylaws, so much so that the union officials, including
Allen, threatened the iron workers with intra-union penalties. 162 Under these
circumstances, should not Glengall have been entitled to expect that the iron
workers would obey their own rules? If they would not abide by their own
rules, would they respect a contract?
Again, is it not a reasonable expectation of employers that their employees will not quit in the middle of a job for no better reason than to punish a
third party? Obligations may arise out of reasonable expectations, reliance,
foreseeability of harm and so on-as well as from explicit contracts. Ought
not a legal system to be concerned with encouraging reliability and responsibility in interpersonal relations? Did the result reached by the majority in
Allen v. Floodtend to encourage responsibility? Where was the social profit in
the kind of thing done by the iron workers?
Once one sees that Glengall was victimized by the iron workers and that
in a decent legal system he should have been able to count on relief, the weakness of the contention that the majority decision in Allen v. Flood protected
and promoted freedom becomes obvious. For if it is true that Glengall's freedom was restricted, impaired, wrongly coerced, or otherwise infringed, the
same must be true of the freedom of Messrs. Flood and Jackson. My freedom
of contract, my freedom, power, and privilege to make offers and acceptances
are diminished if the persons to whom my offers and acceptances might be
addressed will be harmed unjustifiably (hence illegally) if they deal with
me.

16 3

162. Flood v. Jackson, [1895] 2 Q.B. 21,22-24,33 ("the withdrawal of the men from their work
without the authority of the executive council would be against the rules;" that authority was
never obtained); Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. at 2.
163. "[A] person's liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless they are at liberty to
deal with him if they choose to do so." Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. at 534. It is
sometimes contended that inducing a breach of contract with a plaintiff may give rise to a cause of
action but that inducing third parties to refuse to make a contract with a plaintiff does notapparently because one's right to have an existing contract performed is somehow greater or legally more precious than one's right to have untrammeled access to all potential buyers or sellers.
E.g., Epstein, supra note 23, at 423-27. Many of the most carefully reasoned decisions have rejected the distinction. E.g., Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C.
at 535; Temperton v. Russel, [1893] 1 Q.B. 435, 715. Chief Justice Holt may well have meant to
deny the legal significance of the distinction when he stated that "[there are two sorts of acts for
doing damage to a man's employment for which an action lies: the one is in respect of a man's
privilege; the other is in respect of his property." Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574, 574, 103
Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (1706). At any rate, the proposed distinction only revives, in a slightly
different form, the controversy between the "lawful in itself' position and the prima facie tort
principle. If one believes that the basic legal issue in all cases is whether the harm done to the
plaintiff is justified, it makes no difference whether the plaintiff already has a contract, a violation
of which the defendant has procured- or whether the defendant has induced a refusal to deal with
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Everyone agrees that a good cause of action exists when a union or a
business competitor attempts physically to prevent potential customers from
dealing with the plaintiff. The reason for this universal agreement cannot lie
in the mere physical violence, for, as has often been noted, the customers, not
the plaintiff, are suffering such violence. The plaintiff is suffering only interference with his right to trade. 6 4
Again, it is agreed that the plaintiff has a cause of action even though he
has no right in the sense of an existing claim to the customers' patronage, since
they may refuse to purchase after entering his store. Nevertheless, he does
have a right to free customer access with a view to making offers or acceptances and contracts when mutual assent exists. The plaintiff is allowed recovthe
ery, and even injunctive relief, even though he has not proved that
1 65
interference.
defendant's
the
for
but
purchases
make
customers would
I am not saying that the case against economic boycotting of third parties
as
is clear as the case against obstructing third parties by physical violence or
threats of physical violence, or that the courts have so held. I contend, rather,
that it may be fundamentally the same case in some circumstances, and that
this was the dominant view of the courts, aside from the New York Court of
Appeals,1 66 until courts shifted away from the common law in labor relations
the plaintiff. The circular, question-begging character of the "lawful in itself' position remains
the same here as elsewhere: unless based on some such postulate as the prima fade tort theory,
approval of the idea that inducing breach of contract may be unlawful is purely arbitrary, a mere
assertion of a rule which is not at all self-evident. Why is it actionable to induce a breach of
contract? Why should the plaintiff not look to the party which has broken the contract rather than
to the party which has induced the breach? Cf. Gregory Elec. Co. v. Custodis Constr. Co., 312 F.
Supp. 300 (D.S.C. 1970) (violation of contract with plaintiff held tortious in secondary boycott
situation). Is every inducement to breach actionable? Is there never a privileged inducement?
Less arbitrarily and more analytically than the "lawful in itself' doctrine, the prima fade tort
theory holds inducing breach actionable only under conditions in which any other harmful conduct is actionable, viz., when the harm is inflicted without justification. Such being the case, secondary boycotts become actionable under the prima fade tort theory whenever they involve
unjustified harm, whether or not the party in the middle has a contract with the plaintiff.
The foregoing analysis may account for the refusal by Lord Herschell, one of the shrewder
law lords in the majority in Allen v.Flood,to refuse to commit himself for or against the doctrine
of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BL 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). He may have seen that admitting the
possible illegality of inducing a breach of contract implied the illegality also of unjustifiably inducing a refusal to negotiate. See Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. at 123. In any event, the House of
Lords soon put the issue to rest with its approval of Lumley v. Gye in South Wales Miners' Fed'n
v. Glamorgan Coal Co., 1905 A.C. 239.
164. W. Erle, On the Law Relating to Trade Unions 5-35 (1869). It would be hard to exaggerate the influence of this short book in the growth of the prima fade tort principle as applied to
trade-union action.
165. For detailed treatment of the pre-New Deal labor injunction cases, see Petro, supra note
3.
166. I am convinced that the prima fade tort principle was embraced as readily by the lower
New York courts as it had been by most of the other courts of the country. However, undoubtedly
because of its greater susceptibilities to the slogans and to the political power of the unions in the
state, the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York) took about as extreme a
"lawful in itself' position in the labor cases as can be imagined. This trend began with National
Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902), and reached a
pro-union apogee with J.H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 260 N.Y. 315, 183 N.E. 509 (1932), and
Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 606 (1932). In
this line of cases, the court of appeals held, with remarkable though not complete consistency (cf.
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beginning around 1940.167

Physical violence more obviously restrains personal freedom than economic coercion does; but not necessarily more effectively. Persons do at times
cross mass, violent picket lines to go to work. However, if a plant is shut down
because a union has engaged in secondary strikes against the employer's principal customers or suppliers, the beleaguered employer has suffered restraint
and damage more serious and more effective, perhaps, than he would have
suffered had a mass picket line been established, even though the secondary
strikes are peaceful to all intents and purposes.
As a matter of fact, secondary strikes and boycotts are generally more
effective than so-called "primary" picket lines in those cases in which the employees of the employer-victim are opposed to the union strongly enough to
resist its organizing and strike efforts. That is why unions have perfected secondary strikes and boycotts. Their purpose, usually, is to subdue resisting employers and employees when more direct organizing efforts have failed. For
when unions command the loyalty of an employer's employees there is rarely
need of secondary action; a primary strike is usually sufficient to bring the
employer to heel. 168 This may not be true in those relatively rare cases in
which an employer is in a position to replace his whole working force in case
of a strike. But when such conditions exist, unions rarely call strikes, for if
they do they may be unable to count upon the loyalty even of their own
members.
It may be argued that no decent legal system will prohibit or punish
peaceful conduct merely because it is effective to accomplish certain objectives
when violence might fail. Although a businessman could find himself impoverished more definitively by a successful competitor than by a thief, for example, the common law would not punish the competitor as it would the thief.
So too a union should not be punished merely because a peaceful secondary
strike or boycott has shut down an employer's place of business more effectively than violence might do.
As far as it goes, this contention is sound. It is true that there is nothing
"unlawful in itself' in an effective secondary strike or boycott. It may be,
indeed, that in some cases secondary strikes and boycotts are perfectly justified, for example, when they are imposed in self-defense againqt unjustifiable
aggressions on the part of someone else.
Here, as in so many cases of justification and privilege, the judgment must
turn on the issues of aggression and of the social value of the aggression. Who
started it? And was the aggressor, the first person to throw the punch, justified
Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919)), that only violent union conduct
was actionable or enjoinable.
167. This is a subject too large for treatment here. I have, however, attempted to describe the
process by which the common law was abandoned as regards trade-union aggression. S. Petro,
supra note 53, at 203-50; S. Petro, The Labor Policy of the Free Society 172-217, 262-89 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as S. Petro, Labor Policy].
168. For more extensive discussion of this point and for evidence that Congress was familiar
with it when it decided to prohibit all "secondary boycotts," see S. Petro, supra note 22, at 20-49.
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in doing so? It is entirely within the framework of the prima facie tort theory
to ask such questions.
But the point is that the peaceful secondary boycott, as such, is no more
lawful in itself than it is unlawful in itself. The basic element in the secondary
boycott is the refusal to buy from or sell to the person whose aid or "co-operation" the acting party seeks to enlist against the ultimate target, the plaintiff.
The "lawful in itself' school of thought would foreclose discussion of the issue
by saying that people have absolute rights to buy and sell as they wish--or, in
more exact terms, absolute rights to make offers and acceptances at will. But
once one understands the difficulties inherent in the position that acts are lawful, or unlawful, in themselves, this circular method of deciding the issue is no
longer available.
If it is to be intelligible and noncontradictory, the term "freedom" in society must be given the meaning of absence of restraint or constraint by others,
169 It
following one's own will rather than having another's will forced on one.
is a mistake to believe that one will may be substituted for another only by
violence. On the one hand, as already suggested, violence or threats thereof
do not always induce the victim to accede. On the other hand, at times economic coercion more effectively constrains or cuts off choices than physical
coercion does. This is especially true of secondary boycotts. These measures
have been developed precisely because of their effectiveness in subjugating
nonconformists and dissidents, whether the aggressor is a business combination or a labor combination seeking a monopoly.
IfI own a business the survival of which depends upon the labor of some
persons, material supplies of others, and the patronage of still others (all my
complementary parties), the business may be damaged equally by physical
assaults on my complements for dealing with me-or by peacefully boycotting
them for dealing with me. Whether or not it will be damaged more by the one
than by the other depends upon which harms them most and which they are
better able or willing to resist in the particular case.
The law declares that if my antagonist harms my complements physically
or threatens to do so, he is liable in tort, both to them and to me. That is, he is
liable unless he can establish some ground ofjustification that the law accepts,
such as self defense. Why should this be so? Why is violence actionable unless justified?
Violence is actionable unless justifiedfirst because it invades my comple-,
ments' rights in themselves and in their possessions, and by doing so injures
my economic interests, my trading privileges and immunities; and second because if these harms, though unjustified, are not usually discouraged, prevented or punished, society will break down. Society will break down because
169. The concept of freedom developed here, that of classical liberalism, is worked out more
fully in F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960); B. Leoni, supra note 23; . Mill, On Liberty
(many editions); L. von Mises, Human Action (1949); S. Petro, Labor Policy, supra note 167. The
more careful positivists generally agree on this question of defining liberty in a useful and noncontradictory way. E.g., M. Schlick, Problems of Ethics 143-58 (Dover ed. 1962).
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I and others like me will go to warring with our fellows if there is no agency
that will protect our freedom and our goods from unjustified assaults. And if
of life will
we are all busy fighting each other, production of the good things
70
diminish, and life itself will become nasty, brutish and short.'
The prima fade tort theory, the product of advanced society, considers
economic coercion to be subject to the same juridical approach. As we have
seen, it holds that all acts are, apart from their relevant circumstances, legally
nondescript, neither lawful nor unlawful in themselves. What counts isfirst
whether or not the plaiiff-- has been materially damaged by the defendant's
deliberate act, and second whether or not the infliction of harm was justified.
This means that a deliberate act of violence may be legally privileged in one
set of circumstances and legally actionable in another. It means, similarly,
that nonviolent conduct that does deliberate harm to17the plaintiff may be privileged in some circumstances, actionable in others.
Another objection is likely to be raised at this point: surely there is a
difference between a peaceful act and a violent act. But this difference is no
more relevant, legally, than the fact that there are considerable differences b'etween distinct acts of violence and between distinct peaceful acts. Some violent acts are aggressive invasions of freedom; others are defenses of freedom.
If I deliberately strike another because he is threatening to shoot me, and
knock him unconscious, or even perhaps kill him, I am neither civilly nor
criminally liable. Had I struck him with no such provocation, I should have
been both civilly and criminally liable; and this is so even though under other
circumstancesmy violent act was an exercise and a defense offreedom.
The same is true of peaceful acts, for example, a strictly peaceful offer or
acceptance in contract negotiations. Yet offers and acceptances are not always
and necessarily privileged. It is legally absurd to contend that freedom of contract is absolute, any more than other freedoms, such as the freedom to swing
one's arms around, are absolute. 17 2 One must be careful to avoid trespassing
170. "The ultimate yardstick ofjustice is conduciveness to the preservation of social coopera-

tion." L. von Mises, Theory, supra note 115, at 54. See also note 254 infra. For a valuable and
interesting development of the idea that the common law ties society together by constantly groping for the "common will" in determining which kinds of conduct are privileged and which are
actionable torts, see B. Leoni, supra note 23, at 135-55.
171. A point well made by Heydon, supra note 125, at 178, 180-82.
172. It is one thing to say that freedom is an absolute value, meaning one of the absolutely
necessary values for societies bent on maximizing human welfare, see S. Petro, Labor Policy,
supra note 167, at 10-52, and entirely another to say that this person's or that person's freedom is
absolute. The first is a statement that can make sense of the idea "free society"; the latter is not.
The only freedom worth discussing, in a legal sense, is freedom in society. L. von Mises, supra
note 169, at 279. If one person's freedom is absolute, the freedom of the others with whom he
interacts cannot be, for the "free" person can and may invade and infringe the freedom-rights of
the others. Who is then to determine which person's freedom is to be absolute and which
subordinate? And in what sense, if any, could it be said that the society is free? See Willcutt &
Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 118-19, 85 N.E. 897, 901 (1908), as quoted at note 122 supra.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts understood that in order for a country to be free,
the aggressive excesses of hid'viduals would have to be curtailed.
Freedom is the policy of this country. But freedom does not imply a right in one
person, either alone or in combination with others, to disturb or annoy another, either
directly or indirectly in his lawful business or occupation, or to threaten him with annoy-
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on the freedom of others when exercising one's own freedom. I must not offer

to assault, kill, or say evil and harmful things about my neighbor without some
just cause or excuse; neither may I lawfully accept someone else's offer to do
those things.
Normally, offers, acceptances, and refusals of employment are privileged
acts (in the absence of minimum-wage statutes and other such legislation). If I
offer my services for employment, or accept another's offer, or reject an offer, I
will normally not be intending to harm anyone else, even though if I accept an
offer of employment someone else may be denied the same post. But if I
alone, or, still more obviously, in concert with others, threaten to withdraw the
acceptance unless my employer quits dealing with someone else, I am, in the
first place, intending to do harm to another, and, in the second place, exercising my freedom in a manner designed to impair the freedoms of others.
When my fellows and I threaten to withdraw in order to induce our employer to quit dealing with someone else (the third party may be a business or
an employee as in.41len v. Flood), our purpose is to trespass on our employer's
freedom of choice, and, if we have our way, to trespass on the freedom also of
that deliberate
the ultimate target of our boycott. Is it really so remarkable
173
conduct with such purposes should be legally suspect?
Pursuing the teleological lead of the prima facie tort principle, courts possessing these insights were required then to look into the motives and purposes
as the surrounding circumstances most relevant to assessing the legal status of
action that did deliberate harm. In the case of strikes or strike-threats, in par-

ticular, the inquiry assumed that these acts were legally nondescript until the
ance or injury, for the sake of compelling him to buy his peace; or, in the language of the
statute cited above, "with intent to extort money or any pecumary advantage whatever,
or to compel him to do any act against his will." The acts alleged and proved in this case
are peculiarly offensive to the free principles which prevail in this country; and if such
practices could enjoy impunity, they would tend to establish a tyranny of irresponsible
persons over labor and mechanical business which would be extremely injurious to both,
Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 15 (1870) (Chapman, C.J.). For typical judicial efforts at harmonizing the right to picket with the employer's right to free access to laborers and consumers, see
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 203-07 (1921); Local
313, Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 91-97, 205 S.W. 450, 452-53
(1918).
173. For those who are shocked by the possibility, we repeat the observations made by Professor Lewis seventy-five years ago:
The act of selling one's labor or one's goods is an act which in the past has usually gone
which shocked the
under
circumstances
it was never
unquestioned,
moral
sense of because
the community.
The performed
idea that there
is an
inherent right to
buy or sell, to

work or not to work, as one pleases, was the natural result. But the act of selling one's
goods
does
essentially
from
There
is noofless
labor
or one's
no
more
inherent
right
to not
sell differ
labor or
goods than
to any
chopother
a tree.act.The
legality
theand
act
the surrounding circumstances; so with the sale.
tree-chopping
of supra
Lewis,
note 4, atdepends
449-50. on
Cf. Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 A. 224 (1914) (work stoppage
to
procure
discharge
of fellow-employee
who reported
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way, the supposedly
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right of the employer
to discharge
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132
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527,
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134
(1915),
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therein
Freeman);
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1897); International of
& Judge
Great N.
Ry. v. Greenwood,
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motives and purposes and other relevant circumstances were examined and
evaluated. Because a peaceful strike or strike-threat might be considered privileged in some circumstances and under some motivations, it did not follow
that it would be privileged in all circumstances, whatever the motive.
Such was the position of those courts that explicitly adopted the prima
facie tort theory. 174 In all probability it was the hidden view of even those
courts that verbally took the position that acts are either lawful or unlawful
"in themselves."'

175

The task of harmonizing competing freedoms became, under the prima
facie tort principle, a task of consciously weighing the social effects of the various types of action that were deliberately intended to harm others. 176 As we
shall see in examining the doctrines of privilege that went under the names
"self-interest" and "competition," the common law went about defining freedom, and thus eliminating what critics called its paradoxes, 177 by subjecting
conduct to the test of whether or not it served the general interest of all members of society in freedom and productivity. Since one of the principal values
of freedom in society lies in its tendency to promote interpersonal harmony,
division of labor, and productivity,178 it was a natural thing to do-and, as
long as it lasted, worked very well: it made the United States the freest, the
most ordered and harmonious, and the most productive society in history.
B.

National Protective Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming: A
Travesty of the Just-CausePrinc&Ile

NationalProtectiveAssociation of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 179 the deci80
sion that made the liberal reputation of the New York Court of Appeals,'
ranks among the most significant labor cases of American history, both for its
facts and for its role in the evolution of the prima facie tort theory.
As to the facts, they resembled those of Allen v. Rlood.18 1 Both cases in174. For a collection of cases from the outstanding prima facie tort jurisdiction, Massachusetts, see note 151 supra.
175. The vagaries of the New York Court of Appeals, already referred to in note 166 supra,
are traced possibly to the court's inability to apply the "lawful in itself" doctrine consistently,
because of its inherent defects, together with the court's inability, for ideological and political

reasons, to insist that unions defend their aggressions by convincing proof that the harm they did
was socially justified. The same appraisal probably a pp lied to the California Supreme Court. See
Pierce v. Stablemen's Local 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P.324 (1909); Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades

Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027 (1908).
176. Holmes approved the prima facie tort principle mainly as a device for inducing courts to
expose their social and economic views candidly. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E.

1077, 1080 (1896) (dissenting opinion). See also Holmes, supra note 113; Homes, supra note 100.
177. E.g., Nelles, supra note 8, at 175.
178. For an extended discussion of the identity between the legal institutions of personal freedom (private property and freedom of contract), the market economy, productivity and social

harmony, see S. Petro, Labor Policy, supra note 167, at 3-122.
179. 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
180. See C. Gregory, Labor and the Law 76-82 (1946), for use of the term "liberal" to describe
the pro-union tendency of the majority of the New York Court of Appeals and for an appraisal of

NationalProtectiveAssociation radically different from that presented here.
181. 1898 A.C. 1.
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volved conflicting unions and rivalry for control of certain work. In National
ProtectiveAssociation, the defendants were as follows: Duff and Cumming,
officials of the defendant Enterprise Association, an unincorporated union of
steam fitters; Mullaney and Nugent, officials of the defendant Progress Association, an unincorporated union of steam fitters' helpers; and O'Brien, president of a board of delegates of various trade unions similar to a present-day
central building trades council. The plaintiffs were Charles McQueed and the
National Protective Association of Steam Fitters and Helpers, a steam fitters'
union he had founded when denied admission to the Enterprise Association,
allegedly for failure to pass that union's competency test. 182
The plaintiffs, whose wage-scale was lower than that of the defendant
steam fitters,18 3 charged the defendants with the kind of union job-seeking
have since become standard organizing practice in the construction
tactics that
1 4
industry:.

strike-threats by the defendant steam fitters and helpers, backed

by threats that all the building trades unions on construction jobs would strike
unless members of McQueed's union working on the same projects were fired;
and additional threats of strikes wherever plaintiffs might be employed in the
future, except on "small jobs."' 8 5 After a hearing, the trial court found the
facts as alleged and enjoined all the defendants from "in any wise interfering
with, or in any manner hindering or harassing, the work or employment of
.. .any members of the plaintiff corporation, and from coercing or obtaining,
by threat, commands, strikes, or otherwise, the dismissal or discharge of such
persons, or from6 in any wise interfering with the business of the plaintiff or of
8
its members."'
O'Brien's association of building trades unions declined to appeal, and
182. For the facts in this paragraph, see 53 A.D. 227, 65 N.Y.S. 946-49

(1900).

Gregory, supra

note 180, at 79, took the position that the plaintiffs, if competent, "Would... be welcomedas
members" in the defendant steam fitters' union but stated that this was a "fair implication," not a
fact. Professor Gregory's point here is somewhat difficult to see. Society has not delegated to
unions either the authority or the responsibility for judging competency. In fact, the consumers
are the ultimate judges and they delegate the responsibility immediately to the investor-entrepreneurs, who go out of business if their goods or services are unsatisfactory. These persons, in the
NationalProtectiveAssociation case, regarded the members of the plaintiff association as compe-

tent and obviously were willing to hire them until the defendants exerted the pressures which
brought about the litigation. The members of the defendant unions of course were privileged to
establish such qualifications for membership as they wished, subject to the self-regulating, otherregulating principle of the prima facie tort theory. See text accompanying note 20 supra. The case
might have been developed in such a way as to test the sufficiency of the competency test as a
justification for the defendant's deliberate infliction of harm on the plaintiffs. If it had, the court
would have been compelled to decide the question of the union's authority and responsibility in
the premises. Neither the pleadings nor the arguments, however, developed along those lines.
Hence the question whether the union would have been willing to accept the plaintiffs as members, if they could pass the competency test, was irrelevant. Perhaps Professor Gregory's comment
was intended to encourage belief in the defendant union's good faith and to discourage suspicion
that it was doing what every union is always doing, viz, seeking to monopolize the labor market in
the sector of the economy over which it claims 'Jurisdiction."
183. 170 N.Y. at 328, 63 N.E. at 372.
184. See Petro, Job-Seeking Aggression, the NLRA, and the Free Market, 50 Mich. L. Rev.
497 (1952); Petro, supra note 22.
185. 170 N.Y. at 329, 63 N.E. at 372.
186. 53 A.D. at 228, 65 N.Y.S. at 947.
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the appeal by the steam fitters' helpers was dismissed for failure properly to
except at trial.18 7 The only appellants, therefore, were the steam fitters! union
and its officials, Duff and Cumming. They won handily in the appellate division, in which the court was undivided in their favor, but the vote to uphold
was only four-to-three in the New York Court of Appeals.
When the decision of the appellate division was handed down in 1900 the
House of Lords had only recently published its conclusions in Allen v.
Flood,'8 8 and for the New York appellate court little more needed to be said;
it simply adopted those conclusions.' 8 9 However, between then and 1902,
when the New York Court of Appeals passed on the case, the House of Lords
had side-tracked41len v. Floodwith Quinn v. Leathem. 90 This created quite a
quandary for the majority of the New York Court of Appeals.
Five years earlier, in Curranv. Galen, 19 1 the court of appeals had taken an
extremely strong stand against job monopolies by unions; had held unanimously, in fact, that an agreement requiring membership in a union after four
weeks of employment was positively wrongful and actionable, even without an
inquiry into the means by which the agreement had been secured. Moreover,
the powerful prima facie tort decisions of the neighboring Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court provided no support or comfort to the majority; 192
indeed, the Massachusetts court in Plant v. Woods, 193 a similar case of rival
unions and job-seeking aggression, decided only two years earlier, went
against the aggressor union. And now the House of Lords, finally, in the almost identical case of Quinn v. Leathem, had taken away the authority ofllen
v. Flood.
Since all the most impressive authorities were against the position it
wished to take, the New York majority made do without authority. The main
opinion, by Chief Judge Parker, is virtually citation-free. Mentioning no
names, Parker said that the British decisions were not relevant because they
were based on old English statutes, 194 a mistake that Judge Vann, dissenting,
corrected by pointing out that statutes figured not at all in the most recent and
most authoritative English case in point, Quinn v. Leathem, a straight common-law application of prima facie tort theory.195 As to the Massachusetts
cases, Parker simply ignored Plant v. Woods, though so recently decided and
so similar on the facts, and cited instead a thirty-year-old Massachusetts 1deci96
sion whose authority had been considerably shaken by Plant v. Woods.
187. Id. at 229-30, 65 N.Y.S. at 948.
188. 1898 A.C.I.
189. 53 A.D. at 232, 65 N.Y.S. at 950.
190. 1901 A.C. 495.
191. 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897).
192. See the line of Massachusetts decisions cited at note 151 supra.
193. 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
194. 170 N.Y. at 332, 63 N.E. at 373-74.
195. Id. at 348, 63 N.E. at 379. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
196. Id. at 325, 63 N.E. at 371. The case that Parker chose to cite, Bowen v. Matheson, 96
Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867), proved to be something of a sport in Massachusetts long before
Parker cited it. Decided on 'lawful in itself' doctrine, Bowen . Matheson was soon shown to be
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Curran v. Galen was disposed of in a concurring opinion by Judge Gray
who had apparently written the court's unanimous per curiam decision in that
case. 197 He "distinguished" Curran v. Galen by misstating it. According to
Gray the defendant in Curran v. Galen had admitted allegations of malicious
intent to injure the plaintiff by false and fraudulent misrepresentations, allegations absent in NationalProtectiveAssociation.This admission, said Gray, was
implicit in the defendant's "demurrer to the complaint." 198 However, the
statement of facts in Curran v. Galen establishes that the defendant had not
demurred to those charges; he had denied them. 199 This may have been why
in his opinion Chief Judge Parker omitted any mention of Curran v. Galen.
Thus, ignoring the precedents Chief Judge Parker ruled in favor of the
defendant in an opinion in which strands of "lawful in itself' circularity were
inextricably intermingled with strands of malice and just-cause analysis.
The Parker opinion was as dubious in the way it dealt with legal principles as it was in the way it dealt with the authorities. He began by misquoting
some statements from the dissenting opinion of Judge Vann to make them
sound like assertions that the right to strike was absolute. 2°° This was Parker's
preferred ground of decision. He thought the just-cause principle "illogical
and little short of absurd." 20 1 Nevertheless, he said, "[w]hile I purpose to take
the broader ground. . . that the defendants had the right to strike for any
reason they deemed a just one, and further, had the right to notify their employer of their purpose to strike," 20 2 the defendants should have had a right to
refuse to work on just-cause grounds, too, so long as the fellow-servant doctrine prevailed:
I am unable to see how it is possible to deny the right of these defendant organizations and their members to refuse to work with nonmembers, when, in the event of injury by the carelessness of such coemployees, the burden would have to be borne by the injured, without compensation from the employer and with no financial responsibility, as a general rule, on the part of those causing the injury; for it
is well known that some men, even in the presence of danger, are
perfectly reckless of themselves and careless of the rights of others,
at odds with the main, prima fade tort, approach of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
See Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871), a decision, incidentally, almost squarely in conflict
with NationalProtective Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming and implicitly conflicting with
Bowen v. Matheson. It would be hard, too, to reconcile Bowen v. Matheson with Plant v. Woods,
176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900), and still harder to reconcile it with Martell v. White, 185
Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904), and Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
197. 170 N.Y. at 334, 336, 63 N.E. at 374, 379.
198. Id. at 334, 63 N.E. at 374.
199. In fact, the defendant in Curranv. Galen entered no demurrer at all. It denied the allegations of malicious misrepresentation and offered the union-shop contract as an affirmative defense
to the complaint. 152 N.Y. 33, 34-35, 46 N.E. 297, 298 (1897).
200. 170 N.Y. at 321, 63 N.E. at 369-70.
201. "Itseems to me illogical and little short of absurd to say that the everyday acts of the
business world, apparently within the domain of competition, may be either lawful or unlawful
according to the motive of the actor." Id. at 326, 63 N.E. at 371.
202. Id. at 323, 63 N.E. at 370.
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with the result that accidents are occurring almost constantly which
snuff out the lives of workmen as if they were candles, or leave them
to struggle through life maimed and helpless. These careless, reckless men are known to their associates, who not only have the right to
protect themselves from such men, but, in the present state of the
law, it is their duty, through their organizations, to attempt to do it,
as to the trades affording special opportunities for mischief arising
from recklessness.
. I. ... .assert that, so long as workmen must assume all the
risk of injury that may come to them through the carelessness of coemployees, they have the moral and legal right to say that they will
not work with certain men, and the
employer must accept their dicta203
tion or go without their services.

Parker's stand is weak, for if the strike-threat were lawful in itself, of
course no reason or just cause for it was needed. However, if the strike-threat
was subject to a just-cause condition, then the cause would have to be shown
to exist. The plaintiffs were fellow-workers. Hence it was irrelevant for
Parker to say that the employer could not insist on the defendants' working
despite their objections. The relevant question under the just-cause principle
should have been whether or not the defendants had just cause to believe that
working with the plaintiffs was unsafe. This question was neither raised by the
pleadings nor resolved one way or the other by the evidence; indeed no evidence was offered on the question. 2°4 Thus for Parker to hold the strike threat
justified by the fellow-servant doctrine was equally as arbitrary as his assertion
that the threat to strike was lawful in itself.
Parker made much of Judge Vann's statement that a strike to improve
economic conditions, wages, and so forth, was privileged. If this was so, said
Parker, there is a
right ... to strike in order to benefit. . . members; and one method
of benefitting them is to secure them employment. .

.

. There is no

pretense that the defendant associations or their walking delegates
had any other motive than one which the law justifies of attempting
to benefit their members by securing their employment. Nowhere
•

.

. will be found even a hint that a strike was ordered.., for the

purpose of accomplishing any other result than that of securing the
discharge of the members of the plaintiff association. .

.

. [Sluch a

motive is conceded to be a legal one. It is only where the sole purpose is to do injury to another, or the act is prompted by malice that
it is insisted that the act becomes illegal. No such motive is alleged in
[the trial court's] finding .... On the contrary, the motive which
always
underlies competition is asserted to have been the animating
20 5
one.

203. Id. at 323-24, 63 N.E. at 370-71.
204. Id. at 342-43, 63 N.E. at 378.
205. Id. at 327-28, 63 N.E. at 372.
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Vann had stated,
Workingmen have the right to organize for the purpose of securing
higher wages, shorter hours of labor or improving their relations with
their employers. They have the right to strike, that is, to cease working in a body by prearrangement until a grievance is redressed,providedthe object is not to gratfy malice, or inflict inuryupon others, but
to secure better terms of employmentfor themselves. A peaceable and
orderly strike, not to harm20 others
but to improve their own condition,
6

is not a violation of law.

Vann was restating Judge Daly's principle in Master Stevedores'Association v.
Walsh20 7 to the effect that self-governing conduct was presumptively privileged while other-governing conduct was at least prima facie wrongful.
Parker's transformation of Vann's meaning was heavy-handed to an extreme.
When Vann said that a strike to improve the wages and other economic conditions of the strikers would be privileged, he did not say that a strike that would
benefit the strikers in any way would be privileged, nor did he mean to say
that, as both the language he used and the fact of his dissent proved.
The course of decision marked out by the bare majority in NationalProtective Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming was destined to be carried to
greater heights by stronger majorities in the New York Court of Appeals for
almost forty years, 20 8 until the controversial decision in Opera on Tour, Inc. v.
206. Id. at 338-39, 63 N.E. at 376 (emphasis added).
207. 2 Daly I (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867), discussed in the text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
208. Landmarks along the way, in chronological order, were Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207,
76 N.E. 5 (1905) (deceptively but definitively abandoning Curran v. Galen); Kellogg v. Sowerby,
190 N.Y. 370,83 N.E. 47 (1907) (a puzzling decision in which an employer combination similar to
the competition-destroying labor combination in NationalProtectiveAssociation was held unlawful but judgment for defendant was ordered anyway); McCord v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 198
N.Y. 587, 92 N.E. 1090 (1910) (per curiam affirmance of a decision holding void the closed-shop
arrangement of a combination of employers); Kissam v. United States Printing Co., 199 N.Y. 76,
92 N.E. 214 (1910) (closed-shop contract held valid, enforceable); Farrelly v. Schaettler, 207 N.Y.
644, 100 N.E. 1127 (1912) (employer combination aimed at hiring only nonunion employees held
unenforceable and void where the employers were said to have a monopoly); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221
N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917) (self-interest doctrine ofNationalProtectiveAssociationextended to
hold privileged a large-scale secondary boycott against nonunion products); S.C. Posner Co. v.
Jackson, 223 N.Y. 325, 119 N.E. 573 (1918) (inducing breach of contract held actionable in nonunion case); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919) (self-interest doctrine of
NationalProtectiveAssociation and Bossert cut back to deny privilege to city-wide general strike;
origin of New York "unity of interest" doctrine and germ of equally well-known "allowable area
of economic conflict" doctrine); Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N.Y. 418, 125 N.E. 817 (1920)
(inducing breach of contract again held actionable in nonunion case; see S.C Posner,listed supra,
and Reed,Exchange Bakery, Interborough and Stilwell, listed infra); Reed Co. v. Whiteman, 238
N.Y. 545, 144 N.E. 885 (1924) (injunction against inducing breach of fixed-term contract of employment affirmed four-to-three; Cardozo, Pound, and Lehman, JJ., dissenting; union case); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927) (stran$.er-picketing
and inducing breach of yellow-dog contract held privileged, where contract was at will; a four-tothree decision); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863 (1928) (injunction against inducing breach of at-will contract vacated; injunction against violence, vandalism and intimidation also vacated, solely on ground that injunction was overbroad); People v.
Nixon, 248 N.Y. 182, 161 N.E. 463 (1928) (pickets marching four abreast on New York sidewalks
are guilty only of "bad manners," not disorderly conduct); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174
N.E. 690 (1931) (injunction against all picketing affirmed where picketing in rival-union dispute
enmeshed in violence); J.H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N.Y. 315, 183 N.E. 509 (1932) (strangerpicketing for recognition in rival-union dispute held privileged); Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 159
N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 606 (1932) (stranger-picketing inducing breach of
contract with rival union held privileged on ground that it was not designed to induce breach but
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Weber,20 9 which engendered a vehement dissent of Chief Judge Lehman, who
quite rightly pointed out that the decision departed drastically from the main
New York tendency to hold that all union conduct was privileged so long as it
2 10
was nonviolent and so long as it was self-interested.
Using the language of the prima facie tort theory, the majority opinion in
NationalProtectiveAssociationof Steam Fittersv. Cumming made three points.
First, if deliberately harmful conduct was designed "primarily" to benefit the
defendant rather than to harm the plaintiff it had to be held privileged on the
ground that only conduct purely malicious in fact was actionable. Second,
seyf-interest constituted justification within the meaning of the prima fade tort
theory, so that if deliberately harmful conduct was motivated by the self-interest of the actor, it became privileged. Third, the competition justification recognized in such leading cases as Mogul was applicable to cases in which
unions sought to eliminate nonunionists and rival unionists. 2 11
Although these points intersect and overlap, it is convenient and instructive to deal with them separately so far as possible.
C. Benejt to Defendant Rather than Harm to Plaintiffas "Primary"Motive
The courts had long found that it made complete sense on causal grounds
to hold the defendant not liable if harm to the plaintiff was only an incidental,
unforeseen, and unintended result of the defendant's conduct. For example,
in Donovan v. T & P. Ry. ,212 a warehouse company informed a railroad company that its employee, Donovan, a drayman, could not be allowed to enter
the warehouse company's storage room but would have to do business at the
counter, as others did. As a result, the railroad company discharged Donovan.
only to inform public that employer was not dealing with defendant union; court uses term "allowable area of economic conffict" for the first time); Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, 264 N.Y.

521, 191 N.E. 545 (1934) (decision holding secondary strikes and boycotts privileged when
designed to force Teamsters Union on materials suppliers; affirmed by memorandum); Stuhmer &
Co. v. Korman, 265 N.Y. 481, 193 N.E. 281 (1934) (picketing of grocery store for using plaintiff's
nonunion bread held enjoinable when no objection made to other nonunion bread); People v.
Ward, 272 N.Y. 615, 5 N.E.2d 359 (1936) (affurming per curiam decision below holding police
authorized to limit-but not to prohibit-picketing on reasonable belief that breach of peace is
imminent); Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E.2d 674 (1937) (picketing of one-man
business to force hiring of union member held enjoinable; no "labor-dispute" within meaning of
state anti-injunction act); Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937) (secondary
picketing of grocery store for handling products of nonunion manufacturer held privileged as
within the "allowable area of economic conflict"); Paul v. Mencher, 279 N.Y. 813, 17 N.E.2d 684
(1937) (denying appeal from injunction against picketing to compel employer to reopen factory;
shutting down business held absolute right).
209. 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941). See also American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941). But see Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124
N.E.2d 104 (1954) (deliberately putting plaintiff out of business by refusing to supply labor, when
defendant union had monopoly of labor supply, held privileged in absence of proof that defendants conduct was "purely malicious").
210. 285 N.Y. at 365-67, 34 N.E.2d at 356-57. The New York cases cited at note 208 supra
generally bear out Lehman's contention, except that the New York Court of Appeals had always
reserved to itself the prerogative of drawing more or less arbitrary lines of privilege and liability.
See, e.g., Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919).
211. See 170 N.Y. at 321-31, 63 N.E. at 369-73.
212. 64 Tex. 519 (1885).
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When Donovan sued both the railroad and the warehouse company, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the action should have been dismissed as to both.
The defendant warehouse company was only defending its private property in
confining Donovan to the counter. The motivation of its conduct was defense
of its rights, not invasion of any of the rights of the plaintiff. In fact its conduct
was not even intended to procure the plaintiffs discharge.
The same theme recurs in a number of variations 2 13-all reminiscent of
2 14 It
the "malice in fact" cases involving spite fences and water diversions.
will be remembered that there, under the prima facie tort theory, determining
liability vel non gradually came to require inquiry into the motive of the defendant: if the motive was exclusively spite and rancor, judgment for plaintiff;
if the motive was to defend the defendant's private property right, judgment
for defendant.
In NationalProtectiveAssociation of Steam Fittersv. Cumming the majority of the New York Court of Appeals held that, just as in the "malice in fact"
spite-fence cases, judgment had to go for the defendants because their conduct
was not motivated by pure spite. To put the situation in the Austinian formulation, their intention might have been to harm the plaintiffs, but their motive,
2 15
the ultimate spring of their action, was benefit to themselves.
Despite the subtleties of the problem, the defects of the majority position
are fairly clear. Unlike such cases as Donovan, the cases of which National
ProtectiveAssociation of Steam Fitters v. Cumming is an example involve intentional harm to the plaintiffs. Given intentional harm, the defendant must
show just cause. He does so in the water-diversion and spite-fence cases by
establishing that his conduct was designed to protect his existing
right of pri'2 16
vate property in his own land. It is not "purely malicious.
Do the defendants in the union cases have a just cause for their deliberate
harm, equal in social value to that of land owners? What right are they defending when they threaten to quit work unless the employer refuses to continue its relationship with the plaintiffs? Unlike the defendant in the spitefence or water-diversion cases, the union defendant does not own the jobs or
213. E.g., Sharp v. Whiteside, 19 F. 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1883) (refusal to admit to defendant's

scenic lookout point passengers transported by plaintiff, when defendant had arranement for
transport with another person, held privileged); Collins v. American News Co., 34 Misc. 260, 69
N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1901), afi'd, 68 A.D. 639, 74 N.Y.S. 1123 (1902) (refusal to sell newspapers to

plaintiff, who used them to distribute his competing circulars, held privileged); Swift & Co. v.
Allen, 151 S.W. 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (complicated facts essentially as in Donovan;judgment
for defendant).
214. See cases cited at note 123 supra.
215. "The intention is the aim of the act, of which the motive is the spring." 1 J. Austin,
Lectures on Jurisprudence 165 (3d ed. London 1869) (1st ed. London 1861), quoted in Smith,

supra note 4, at 257.
216. See the discussion ofMahan v. Brown, text accompanying note 142 supra. In holding the
defendant's water diversion on his own land privileged in Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, 1895 A.C.

587, 600-01, Lord Macnaghten put the matter succinctly. "Well," stated Macnaghten, "lie has
something to sell, or, at any rate, he has something which he can prevent other people enjoying
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occupations that it seeks to deny to the plaintiffs. 2 17 A "job"is a contractual
arrangement between an employer and an employee. No one has a proprietary interest in it until the contract of employment is made, and even then the
ultimate employment contract is between the employer and individual employees, not between the employer and the union. Until it is made, all that is
in (legal) existence is the privileges and immunities of the respective parties,
the various offerors and offerees of employment.
If a union should strike or induce or encourage secondary strikes and
boycotts when an employer violates a valid, enforceable, contract providing
for a given remuneration, or for employment on certain work, a just cause in
the nature of self-defense would presumptively exist, as in the spite-fence
cases. But a strike or a secondary boycott, or a threat thereof, in the absence of
such a contract, is prima facie actionable when intended to harm. To say that
justification exists in the right of the union to strike or to induce secondary
boycotts, as Chief Judge Parker did in NationalProtectiveAssociation of Steam
Fitters v. Cumming, is simply to move in a circle. The question is whether or
not a strike, a strike-threat, or a secondary strike is justified. And that being
the case, it becomes absurd to say that the challenged act is its own justification. Such a conclusion represents an abandonment of the prima facie tort
principle, not an application of it. It is an application of the "lawful in itself"
doctrine in a way designed to exonerate unions from responsibility for harm
whenever they act 2peaceably,
for unions are not likely to do intentional harm
18
out of pure whim.
It will be noted that a strike-threat intended to oust nonunionists or rival
unionists has here been termed only presumptively actionable, even in the absence of contract. The prima facie tort principle always leaves open the possibility that an act harmful to the plaintiff may nevertheless be privileged, if the
defendant is able to establish a sufficiently persuasive justification. So, although the spite-fence and water-diversion cases fail as precedents establishing
a privilege in the usual job-seeking aggression case, it does not follow that
such aggression is in all circumstances actionable. All arguable grounds of
justification or excuse must be considered before reaching a decision as to
whether or not the conduct is wrongful.
D. Sef-Interest as a Groundof Justftcation. The "Free Strugglefor Life"
The most notable product of the majority opinion, in NationalProtective
Association oSteam Fittersv. Cumming, the one with the greatest influence on
the later cases both in New York and other jurisdictions, was the doctrine that
the harm done by nonviolent union coercion was privileged so long as it was
designed to advance the material interests of the union and its members.
217. Bear in mind here that we are not discussing the actionability of individual, voluntary
"quits." We are discussing union commands to strike, backed by the threat of fine, explusion or
other discipline.
218. "[1)n ninety-nine labor cases out of a hundred the defendant's motive. . . is to promote
his own advantage." Smith, supra note 4, at 453.
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Chief Judge Parker took Judge Vann's statement that a strike for higher wages
would be privileged, transformed it into a statement that a strike that benefited
the strikers in any way would be privileged, triumphantly announced that
striking to gain jobs being performed by others would be beneficial to the
striking organization, and since that was the object of the strikes and strikethat they were necesthreats in the NationalProtectiveAssociation case, held
219
reasoning!
own
Vann's
Judge
sarily privileged-on
The New York Court of Appeals was not the only source of this idea that
self-interest might provide a just cause for inflicting harm deliberately. As a
matter of fact, a number of judges, including Lord Bowen, 220 perhaps the outstanding British judge of his period, and Chief Justice Taft of the United
States Supreme Court,2 2 1 as well as outstanding scholars such as Ames and
Lewis,22 2 made statements to that effect. The most famous expression of the
self-interest doctrine, however, was contained in the variant proposed by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner.22 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, though committed by then to the prima facie
tort principle, 224 was as yet uncommitted on the question whether, in labor
disputes, the employer and the union were competitors. Holmes thought that
if unions were not entitled to a narrowly construed competition justification,
even when their concerted activities intentionally harmed employers, then certainly they were entitled to a privilege based on the "free struggle for life" in
which, according to Holmes, they were engaged:
I have seen the suggestion made that the conflict between employers
and employed was not competition. But I venture to assume that
219. See text accompanying notes 200-07 supra.
220. The context of Bowen's comment, however, suggests that he did not intend to establish
self-interest as a ground ofjustification in the sense that competition was ajustification. He stated,
[I]f the real object were to enjoy what was one's own, or to acquire for one's self some
advantage in one's property or trade, and what was done was done honestly, peaceably,
and without any of the illegal acts above referred to, it could not, in my opinion, properly be said that it was done without just cause or excuse.
Mo$ul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 598, 619, afi'd, 1892 A.C. 25. For
similar comments by judges equally committed to the prima facie tort theory, see Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 539-44, 179 S.W. 134, 137-38 (1915); Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn.
401, 419-21 (1884) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
221. The self-interest doctrine is implicit in Taft's well-known statement that "Labor unions
. were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in
dealing with an employer." American Steel Foundries v. Ten-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 209 (1921). This view is the premise on which Taft established a privilege for (limited) stranger-picketing in the American SteelFoundriescase. It is possible that Taft secured Holmes' silent
concurrence in the American Steel Foundriescase by expressing such fidelity to the "labor-disadvantage" doctrine, since Holmes, while on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, had dissented from a decision virtually indistinguishable from that of the Aerican SteelFoundriescase.
See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104,44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896). For a powerful exposition
of the defects of the "labor-disadvantage" idea, see W. Hutt, The Theory of Collective Bargaining
21-75 (1930). See also A. Alchian and W. Allen, University Economics 427-28 (3d ed. 1972).
222. Ames, supra note 4, at 412; Lewis, supra note 98, at 507. See also Forkosch, The Doctrine
of Just Cause, I Lab. L.J. 789, 792-93 (1950).
223. 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
224. See cases cited at note 151 supra.
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none of my brethren would rely on that suggestion. 2 25 If the policy
on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term
"free competition," we may substitute "free struggle for life." Certainly, the policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the
same class, competing
for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of
226
temporal interests.
In Vegelahn v. Guntner Holmes thought that the "free struggle for life"
should constitute justification for what he considered peaceful inducements to
refrain from working for a struck employer. In Plant v. Woods, Holmes
thought it should also privilege strikes and boycotts designed to induce employers to compel employees to abandon a rival union in favor of the defendant union. 227 If a union is privileged to inflict the kind of harm that strikes
involve where the aim is the economic betterment of the strikers, Holmes
stated, then a strike to build up the bargaining power of a union should similarly be privileged. In either case the ultimate end is the same--the economic
interests and betterment of the striking union:
The immediate object and motive [of the strikes and strike-threats in
Plant v. Woods] was to strengthen the defendants' society as a preliminary and means to enable it to make a better fight on questions
of wages or other matters of clashing interests.
I differ from my Brethren in thinking that the threats were as
lawful for this preliminary purpose as for the final one to which
strengthening the union was a means. I think that unity of organization is necessary to make the contest of labor effectual, and that societies of laborers lawfully may employ in their
preparation the means
228
which they might use in the final contest.
We have already encountered Holmes' opinion that deliberate harm
would not be privileged if the only justification advanced for it was the personal freedom of the defendant. 229 Here, in Plant v. Woods, then, Holmes
placed economic self-interest at a higher point in the value-scale; for him, economic self-interest would justify deliberate harm that personal freedom alone
would not justify. But Holmes did not rank the self-interest of aggressive unions so highly for any social reason. On the contrary, he thought that aggressive unionization, while it might serve the self-interests of the unionists, served
no one else; in fact, it was contrary to the general interest.
I think it well to add that I cherish no illusions as to the meaning and
effect of strikes. While I think the strike a lawful instrument in the
225. Holmes misjudged his brethren. Two of the most able, Hammond and Knowlton, were
to do precisely what Holmes thought they would not do. See their opinions in, respectively, Plant
v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 502, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900) (union's coercive action denied "the
shelter of the principles of trade competition"), and Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 357-59, 74
N.E. 603, 605-06, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905) (Job-seeking aggression by union defendant "is not competition. ... [A]ttainment of such an object in the struggle with employers would
not be competition but monopoly.").
226. Vegelabn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. at 107, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
227. 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
228. Id. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, CJ., dissenting).
229. Holmes, supra note 100, at 5-6, discussed in the text accompanying notes 155-57 supra.
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universal struggle of life, I think it pure phantasy to suppose that
there is a body of capital of which labor, as a whole, secures a larger
share by that means.
The annual product, subject to an infinitesimal deduction for the
luxuries of the few, is directed to consumption by the multitude, and
is consumed by the multitude always. Organization and strikes may
get a larger share for the members of an organization, but, if they do,
they get it at the expense of the less organized and less powerful portion of the laboring mass. They do not create something out of nothI think it lawful for a body of workmen to try by
ing . ...
combination to get more than they now are getting, although they do
it at the expense of their fellows, and230to that end to strengthen their
union by the boycott and the strike.
These comments establish Holmes' credentials as a social Darwinist, but
they raise doubts concerning the seriousness of his commitment to the prima
facie tort theory, with its emphasis on the necessity of social justification for
deliberate harm, at least as applied to the intentional harms committed by
trade unions. One wonders how Holmes would have responded to the suggestion that on the same reasoning embezzlers and confidence men-both notable
practitioners of peaceful conduct in pursuit of self-interest-would be entitled
to his approval. 23 1 They do little for society; like trade unions in Holmes'
view, what they gain others lose. But, to adapt Holmes' language, they "try
.. . to get more than they now are getting,... [and] they do it at the expense
of their fellows."
All deliberate human action proceeds from one or another variety of selfinterest, as the actor perceives his self-interest. When Holmes said that unions
were justified in deliberately inflicting harm if their conduct was motivated by
self-interest, even though the social interest was opposed, he revealed a basic
flaw in the structure of his thought, a contradiction of his contention that public-policy considerations defined the area of privilege under the prima facie
tort principle;2 32 either that, or he renounced the prima facie tort principle
exclusively in union cases. For what consideration of public policy other than
that of pure liberty of action-which he had denied--could he cite in support
of his view that the "free struggle for life" should privilege all peaceful conduct in labor disputes?
The conclusion implicit in Holmes' authoritative re-affirmation of the
prima facie tort principle later 233 is that he had a mental block when it came
to applying the principle to economically coercive union conduct. 23 4 For
230. 176 Mass. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, CJ., dissenting).
231. Epstein, supra note 23, at 427, points out that ordinarily a defendant "cannot justify infficting physical harm upon the plaintiff in order to advance his own self-interest" or "take another's goods to better his own lot."
232. See his dissent in Vegelahn v. Guniner, quoted in the text accompanying note 226 supra,
and his articles, Holmes, supra note 100; Holmes, supra note 113.
233. E.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
234. Only a mental block would seem to account for the failure of a man such as Holmes to
recognize that the sole ground for his position was one that he would normally reject, namely that
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Holmes, it would appear, as for the New York Court of Appeals in National
ProtectiveAssociation of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, the use of prima facie tort
concepts in union cases was ritualistic, a formality, a kind of lip-service, obscuring their conviction that the "lawful in itself' absolute-rights doctrine applied to nonviolent union conduct, no matter how economically coercive it
might be, and whether it was self-regulating or other regulating. Strikes and
boycotts, they thought, should be as absolutely privileged when they aimed at
monopolistic control of labor markets as they were when aimed at the direct
economic benefit of union members.
Holmes might have taken the position that other-regulating strikes and
boycotts should be equally privileged with self-regulating strikes and boycotts
for fear that if the former were held actionable and unlawful, the latter would
have to be dealt with similarly. The ground for this suspicion lies in the "Darwinian" character of his economic views, particularly his view that
"[o]rganization and strikes may get a larger share for the members of an organization... at the expense of the less organized and less powerful portion
of the laboring mass."
This view has a long history. It accounted for the extreme version of the
conspiracy doctrine, the view that worker combinations and strikes were incompatible with market-pricing of labor services.235 However, a more sophisticated economic view holds that labor combinations are no more
incompatible with market pricing than capital combinations are, provided that
neither possesses the privilege of excluding competition. Collective bargaining
and strikes cannot produce higher than market wages unless fortified by coercive exclusion of market alternatives. If unions are denied special governmental monopoly privileges, or the special privilege of excluding competitive labor
or technology by violent means or by picketing and secondary strikes and boycotts, then the wages and other economic conditions they negotiate for their
members are by definition market wages, and no more exploitative than any
other market prices. For the meaning of market wages and prices is that they
have been negotiated without monopolistic exclusion of competitive
236
alternatives.
the end justifies the means. It certainly is not normal to say that the goal of self-advancement is so
paramount to all other considerations that it justifies coercive action designed to establish a monopoly position, from which self-interest is better served. At least it is not normal, especially for a
person who believes that the general good is all-important, to hold that conduct that he recognizes
as contrary to the general good should be privileged.
235. Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), 3 Doe. Hist., supra note 17, at 61; People v. Fisher, 14
Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
236. See L. von Mises, supra note 169, at 584-630, 763-73. "The problem is not the right to
strike, but the right-by intimidation or violence--to force other people to strike, and the further
right to prevent anybody from working in a shop in which a union has called a strike." Id. at 773.
Of course if one defines a strike as "a concerted action by a group of employees to prevent other
people from working in specified jobs at wages less than demanded by the strikers," as do A.
Alchian and W. Allen, supra note 221, at 447, and W. Hutt, supra note 221, at 43-58, then the
strike itself is incompatible with free-market pricing of labor. However, it seems inadvisable thus
to broaden the meaning of the verb "to strike," for we should then be left without a verb that
connotes the well-known type of combined action which involves many persons concertedly withdrawing from their work and doing nothing else, except, perhaps, going fishing. Understanding
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While Holmes may have been unfamiliar with these economic theorems
in 1900,2 7 they had by then been the common possession of the legal system
for a long time. As early as 1815, in Commonwealth v. Morrow, 23 8 a criminal
conspiracy case, Judge Roberts instructed the jury that society had nothing to
fear from a self-regulating combination of journeymen cordwainers intent
only on fixing their own wages. If they engaged in strikes and boycotts to
eliminate competing workers, they should be held guilty of a criminal conspiracy, he said.239 But so long as they were intent only upon fixing their own
wages, the matter was of
little consequence: if the citizens residing in this part of the country
could not be supplied at a fair price, by mechanics in their neighborhood, they would obtain the article elsewhere, or it would be obtained for them. Boot and shoe shops would be opened, upon a scale
sufficiently large to supply the consumption...; if the manufacturers throughout the United States should be so blind to their own inwould
terest, as to approach extortion, importations from24Europe
0
cause the price of the article to find its proper level.
Economic sophistication of an even higher order illuminated Judge
Daly's opinion in MasterStevedores'Association v. Walsh. 24 1 And it presumably accounted for the persistent, though far from universal, tendency among
American judges to distinguish between self-regulating and other-regulating
activities of both labor and capital combinations. 242 Like Judge Vann and the
other dissenters in NationalProtectiveAssociation of Steam Fittersv. Cumming,
practically all American judges were convinced that self-regulating labor comand communication are advanced, I suggest, by distinguishing between strikes, as such, and the
violent or coercive activities which often accompany them, for example, picketing in numbers. It
is the difference, again, between self-governing and other-governing activities. A strike defined as
a concerted withdrawal from work to gain better wages and working conditions for the strikers is a
self-goveming activity, whereas picketing, inherently designed to influence others, as it is, and
usually in a coercive manner, constitutes other-governing activity. If we define the free market as
the state of affairs in which only self-governing activity prevails, then strikes and voluntary worker
organizations as here defined are compatible with the free market and with free market wagedetermination that exploits no one.
237. In his opinion for the Court in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917),
Holmes thought that union boycotting of nonunion lumber millwork "has no tendency to produce
a monopoly of manufacture or building since the more successful it is the more competitors are
introduced into the trade." This suggests full understanding of the self-defeating character of
monopolistic pricing unaided by special privileges from government or by violent, coercive exclusion ofcompetitors. The dissenters in this case thought, however, that Holmes underestimated the
power of the defendant union to exclude competition coercively. Id. at 473-75 (Pitney, J.,
dissenting).
238. 4 Doc. Hist., supra note 17, at 15 (known as the "Pittsburgh Cordwainers" case (1815)).
239. Id. at 85.
240. Id. at 84-85. See also Commonwealth v. Moore (Phila. Mayor's Ct., 1827), 4 Doc. Hist.,
supra note 17, at 99, 259-60.
241. See his opinion at 2 Daly 1, 10-13 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867), stating that voluntary, self-regulating labor organizations are incapable of pushing wages above market levels, but that "[ilt is otherwise ... where organizations are formed to intimidate employers, or to coerce other
journeymen." Id. at 12.
242. The cases relying on the distinction are legion. For two of the most frequently cited ones,
see Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904), and Doremus v. Hennessy, 6211. App.
391 (1895), af'd, 176 IML608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898).
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binations, no matter where they set their own wage demands, were not engaging even presumptively in tortious conduct. The threshold requirement,
intentional harm to another, was absent. 243
Despite the admiration that Holmes excited later, his colleagues on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were not above poking fun at the vagaries in his approach to the prima facie tort principle. 244 Judges in other
jurisdictions, too, were less than impressed with his grandiloquent phrases
about the "free struggle for life," and rejected what they considered "fanciful
and far-fetched definitions of the word 'competition' which would include all
conflicts of temporal interests. ' 245 Outstanding scholars, then 246 and later,24 7
were not convinced that all peaceful conduct, no matter how coercive, should
be held privileged so long as it was motivated by the self-interest of the
defendant.
The failure of the self-interest doctrine to sweep the courts,248 despite its
acceptance by a majority of the judges on the New York Court of Appeals,
was paralleled by the refusal of many courts to accept the contention that the
competition justification was applicable to the concerted activities of unions.
243. Almost every one of the hundreds of pre-New Deal labor cases made this point explicitly
or implicitly, including those from Massachusetts, allegedly the most "conservative" state in labor
cases. E.g., the majority opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 93, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077-78

(1896) states: "A combination among persons merely to regulate their own conduct is within
allowable competition, and is lawful, although others may be indirectly affected thereby."
244. See the sly reference of Judge Hammond to "an instructive article in 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
where the subject [i.e., the prima facie tort principle on which the majority, over Holmes' dissent,
relied] is considered at some length." Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 500, 57 N.E. 1011, 1014
(1900). The reference was to Holmes' article, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 100, and
particularly to Holmes' derisive reference to the sic utere maxim "which," he said, like all "general
propositions ...teaches nothing but a benevolent yearning." Id. at 3. Judge Hammond and the
majority rejected the "lawful in itself" dictum ofAllen v. Rlood, while Holmes, the eloquent advocate of the prima facie tort theory, embraced it in Plantv. Woods. Referring then to the "lawful in
itself' dictum as slightingly as Holmes had to the sic utere maxim, Hammond went on to state, "It
is manifest that not much progress is made by such general statements as those quoted above from
Allen Y.Flood, whatever may be their meaning." 176 Mass. at 500, 57 N.E. at 1014. Despite the
anomalies of his views on "competition," Holmes and those views are still admired. See Note, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1533-37 (1980) (author thought Holmes was a realist and the judges who
disagreed with him "formalists").
245. Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 Ill. 424, 431, 83 N.E. 940, 943
(1908). See also McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 780-81, 108 S.E. 226, 229
(1921); Olive & Sternenberg v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630, 636-37, 25 S.W. 428, 430-31
(1894).
246. E.g., Lewis, supra note 100, at 123; Lewis, supra note 4, at 449; Smith, supra note 4, at
453.
247. E.g., Epstein, supra note 23. See note 231 supra.
248. Union self-interest as a defense to an alleged violation of the Sherman Act was rejected
by a majority of the Supreme Court but accepted by Holmes and Brandeis in a dissent by the
latter in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 467-68, 479-83 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). There was a similar split in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 917, 921, 922-23
(8th Cir. 1897), allg 72 F. 695, 699-700 (D. Kan. 1896). For other noteworthy rejections of the
self-interest doctrine in the federal courts, see Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203, 206-07 (E.D. Pa. 1929); Central Metal Prods. Corp. v. O'Brien, 278 F. 827, 830-31
(N.D. Ohio 1922). For an example ofjudicial disapproval of the self-interest doctrine in England,
see Read v. Friendly Soc'y of Operative Stone Masons, [1902] 2 ICB. 88, 96-8, 732, 737, 741-42.
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E. Competition, the Unseen Hand
From the economic point of view, free competition is the least-cost
method of organization, hence the system that maximizes production, wealth,
and social utilities. From the legal point of view, free competition is the state
of affairs that prevails when the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities necessary to freedom in society are preserved intact. Thus the common-law rights
established in the law of torts and the optimal wealth production associated
with free competition are congeneric, two aspects of one institution: personal
freedom in society. Moral and economic optimality merge.
Among the values that may constitute just cause within the meaning of
the prima facie tort theory, competition ranks very high; for few other values
so profitably combine individual and social good. Hence, even though the
most purely economic and impersonal competition was at least potentially
harmful to someone, 249 it early acquired a privileged status.2 50 In Allen v.
Flood25 1 Lord Herschell denied that competition was especially favored by
the common law, and from time to time American judges have made similar
statements. 5 2 But against the demonstrable facts of Anglo-American legal
history 253 and the utilitarian, libertarian tendency of Anglo-American political
philosophy, 25 4 such denials are not to be credited. The significant problem
249. For early recognition of the point that all competition is prima facie tortious, see Wyman,
Competition and the Law, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 444-45 (1902).
250. Id. See also F. Pollock, supra note 60, at 24, 111; W. Prosser, supra note 39, at 1020;
Restatement of Torts, § 708, Comment d (1939).
251. Lord Herschell's antipathy toward market competition and to the prima facie tort theory
was consistent with that of the majority of the New York Court of Appeals as expressed in NationalrotectiveAssociation of Seam Filtersv. Cumming and in the other leading New York cases
cited at note 208 supra. Presumably with a straight face, Herschell stated in Allen v. Flood, 1898
A.C. at 140-41, "I am aware of no ground for saying that competition is regarded with special
favour by the law;, at all events, I see no reason why it should be so regarded." It is hard to
imagine a more brazenly perverse version of English legal history, of economic fact or of social
value.
252. E.g., Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 231-33, 55 N.W. 1119, 1120 (1893); John D.
Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N.Y. 1, 9-14, 67 N.E. 136, 139
(1903). But see the strong pro-competition dissent of Judge Martin, id. at 22-44, 67 N.E. at 143-52.
253. Merely listing the English and American decisions ruled by a pro-competition policy
would require hundreds ofpages. For a balanced account, rather underestimating the pro-competition inclination in early English law, see Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355 (1954). One of the earliest-known decisions invalidating a
contract in restraint of trade was the Dyer's Case, 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414). The fullest account
of the old English restraint of trade cases, so far as I know, is W. Sanderson, Restraint of Trade in
English Law (1926).
254. The dominant strain in Anglo-American political-juridical-economic policy, as represented inthe writings of Coke, Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill, Macauley, Maine, Spencer and Dicey, has been summed up in a powerful statement of the meaning of
legal justice:
The ultimate yardstick ofjustice is conduciveness to the preservation of social cooperation. Conduct suited to preserve social cooperation is just, conduct detrimental to the
preservation of society is unjust. There cannot be any question of organizing society
according to the postulates of an arbitrary preconceived idea ofjustice. The problem is
to organize society for the best possible realization of those ends which men want to
attain by social cooperation. Social utility is the only standard of justice. It is the sole
guide of legislation.
L. von Mises, Theory, supra note 115, at 54. See also H. Maine, Popular Government 64 (1885); J.
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has never been whether or not competition is a paramount public value. For
Anglo-American law the problem has been to define competition in a manner
designed to preserve the socially useful varieties while discouraging the socially destructive ones.2 55

If competition is so clearly a social value, monopoly must perforce always
operate at least prima facie under a stigma. There is no need to dwell upon
the strong anti-monopoly sentiment, which dates back so far in English history.25 6 The sentiment was founded in experience. Royal monopolies and the
exploitation associated with the English guilds nourished it.257 The sentiment
found its way into historic cases such as Darcy v. Allen, 25 8 and, as Culpepper's

parliamentary diatribe suggests, popular antipathy to monopoly had grown to
the point that it was as politicaly advantageous to rail against it in seventeenth
century England as it was to be in nineteenth-century populist America.259
To repeat, the problem for Anglo-American law and policy has never
been whether free competition should be prized as a social value. The problem has lain elsewhere-in conceptual ambiguities concerning the relationship
between free competition and freedom of contract, in deciding whether certain
Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government 48-56 (Everyman ed. 1910); S.
Petro, Labor Policy, supra note 167, at 24-122. See also Fried, supra note 115; Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979). Professor Posner takes the position that policies favoring wealth- and production-maximizing are somehow different from
traditional utilitarianism, but this assertion would come as a surprise, I believe, to any true utilitarian. For the currently most prominent example of the confusion of justice with egalitarianism of
economic condition, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), a work that has provoked a strong
libertarian response in R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). F. Hayek has dealt with
most of these issues in The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, Legislation, and Liberty
(1973, 1976).
255. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 149, 119 N.W. 946, 947 (1909).
256. "[Mlonopoly, or the control of one man or combination ofmen of economic conditions in
any field of industry, has always been and is still regarded by English-speaking communities as
inimical to public welfare." Lewis, supra note 4, at 449.
257. See 1 T. Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James H 58 (London
1849), as quoted in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 WaiL) 36, 46-49 (1872) (argument of
counsel); see also 2 E. Lipson, The Economic History of England 269-370 (6th ed. 1956); 3 id. 330409.
258. 11 Co. Rep. *84, Moore *671, Noy *173,74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1602) (crown grant of monopoly held contrary to common-law right to compete). See also Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore *576
(1599) (monopolistic guild bylaw held illegal); Case of the Ipswich Tailors, 11 Co. Rep. 53,
Godbolt *252 (1614) (restrictive apprenticeship requirement held invalid). For discussion of these
and related cases, see H. Fox, Monopolies and Patents 24-26, 86-88 (1947); W. Sanderson, supra
note 253, at 9, 11-12; Davies, Further Light on the Case of Monopolies, 48 L.Q. Rev. 394 (1932);
Letwin, supra note 253, at 359-66. The reader will note that the present Article interprets the
course of English legal history differently from Letwin.
259. Of the monopolists, Culpepper said in the Long Parliament,
"They are a nest of wasps-a swarm of vermin which have overcrept the land. Like
the frogs of Egt they have gotten possession of our dwellings, and we have scarce a
room free fromt em. They sup in our cup; they dip in our dish; they sit by our fire. We
find them in the dye-fat, wash-bowl, and powdering-tub. They share with the butler in
his box. They will not bait us a pin. We may not buy our clothes without their brokage.
These are the leeches that have sucked the commonwealth so hard that it is almost hectical. Mr. Speaker! I have echoed to you the cries of the Kingdom. I will tell you their
hopes. They look to Heaven for a blessing on this Parliament."
As quoted in the argument of counsel in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 47
(1872).
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types of conduct promoted or destroyed competition, in reconciling a general
preference for free competition with dread of its results in some cases, in coming to some rational conclusion concerning the relationships between large
firms or combinations and the social values which competition is seen as serving. Discussion of these problems in recent years has tended to focus on the
antitrust laws and cases. 2 60 This is probably as unfortunate as it was in the
first place to remove them from the relatively disinterested inquiry they were
receiving in common-law decisions and to put them into a statute so broad as
to be meaningless. In a country that has never had a shortage of populist
demagogues, the most significant consequence of the Sherman Act, that early
populist victory, has been to transform judicial decisions into political statements rather than juristic
operations when relatively large-scale businesses
26 1
have been involved.
The high favor that free competition enjoyed at common law as a justification or excuse for harmful conduct appeared at an early date in the Schoolmaster' Case, in which the court declared that setting up a rival school, even
though it damaged the plaintiff schoolmaster, was not actionable since everyone had the right to engage in all gainful activities provided no crime was
committed or exclusive franchise violated. 2 62 However, not every kind of
competition in the broad sense was privileged. If one schoolmaster frightened
away the students of another, the conduct would be actionable. 263 The law
thus held privileged only free competition--competition that served the public
good. It privileged catallactic competition-that is, peaceful trading and exchanges, price- and quality-competition-not the kind evidenced by opposing
64
armies or thugs.2
260. I have discussed these questions from the point of view of the antitrust laws in Petro, The
Growing Threat of Antitrust, 66 Fortune 128 (1962). For a more recent and more extensive critique of the way in which the antitrust laws are being used to distort and pervert competition, see
R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 134-60, 198-216 (1978).
261. Id.
262. Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, f. 47, pl.21 (1410).
263. Id. See also Y.B. 29 Edw. 3, f. 18, pl. 1 (1365).
264. Professor Wigmore, the author of the most extensive review of the old cases that I have
seen, apparently had no idea of their significance as the foundation of the law of society-serving
competition, of the free enterprise system, and of the prima facie tort theory. See Wigmore, The
Boycott and Kindred Practices as Ground for Damages, 21 Am. L. Rev. 509, 515-19 (1887). He
thought of them merely as "cases of violence or nuisance." Id. at 520. For a more perceptive
analysis of the line beginning with the Schoolnaster's Case, see the opinion of Lord North, in
Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. at 38-44. In chronological order, the old cornerstones of the law of free
competition after the Schoolmaster'r Case, were the Miller's Case, Y.B. 22 Hen. 6, f. 14, pl. 23
(1443), discussed in F. Pollock, supra note 60, at 154 (defendant entitled to establish a competitive
mill on his own land. "He who hath a freehold in the viii
may build a mill on his own ground,
and this is wrong to no man."); Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. *567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (1621) (action
on the case lies against a person who threatens the plaintiffs customers and employees with mayhem and lawsuits); Keeble v. Hickeringill, Holt 14, 17, 19, 90 Eng. Rep. 906, 907, 908 (1707)
(described in text infra); Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake *270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (1794) (threatening, shooting at, killing some ofplaintiffs native customers held actionable); Carrington v. Taylor,
11 East *571, 103 Eng. Rep. 1126 (1809) (duck hunter held liable for frightening ducks away from
plainti%s decoy pond even though defendant was merely pursuin&his own trade and intended no
harm to plaintif overruled [as it should have been under the prima facie tort theory] in411en v.
Food); bbotson v. Peat, [1865] 34 L.J. Exch. 118,3 H. & C. 644, 159 Eng. Rep. 684 (discussed in
text infra). Adherents of the "lawful in itself' or "absolute rights" school have never grasped the
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The point of the old cases is sharply made by the contrast between Keeble

v. Hickeringil1265 and Ibbotson v. Peat.266 In the first, Lord Holt declared it

actionable for the owner of one duck-decoy pond to frighten away the dticks
attracted to his neighbor's pond. Standing on his own land as he fired, the
'defendant broke no law in simply firing his gun. But the fact that defendant's
conduct was not positively unlawful made no difference. It harmed the plaintiff intentionally, and it brought no social benefit to anyone. It was justified in
no perceptible way; it served no value; it was therefore actionable.
In Ibbotson v. Peat, the trouble started when the plaintiff attracted game
and wild fowl from the Duke of Rutland's adjoining land by spreading corn
and other food. Rutland's gamekeeper retaliated massively, exploding "terrifying and dangerous rockets, fireworks, missiles, projectiles and combustibles
• ..[making] disturbing noises close to and over [plaintiff's] land..

.[and

terrifying plaintiffs horses and cattle and causing them to run wildly] into
certain bogs and quagmires. . . against and over. . . walls, banks and fences
267
... to escape.., and became... wild, dangerous and unmanageable."

Plaintiff thereupon sued in tort.
The defendant pleaded justification, and the plaintiff demurred to the
plea. All the judges concurred with Lord Bramwell in holding that the defendant's plea was not good, and that the violent retaliation was actionable.
Aside from citing Keeble v. Hickeringill,the court did not explain its rationale;
but the decision speaks for itself. The plaintiffs conduct was the sort of thing
that benefits society. It is generally a good thing to make attractive offers; but
it is bad to visit reprisals on one who has acted thus prima facie properly;
society stands to gain nothing from reprisals. If coercive and destructive forms
of "competition" were allowed, there would be no "unseen hand" converting
the self-seeking rivalry of producers and traders into public good.
Ibbotson v. Peat is an unfair-competition parable. Let the wildfowl be
customers and the corn be low prices, and the case is then a pattern for upholding the competition that discount houses represent and for striking down
such competition as promises no social dividend but only harm to the plaintiff.
Benefit to the defendant, standing alone, will not suffice to privilege deliberate
significance of the fact that in these cases the physical harm, if any, has not been done to the
plaintiff but to his customers or workers, so that what plaintiff has recovered for has been the
damage done to his right of free trade, his privilege of free access to potential customers and
suppliers. For a contemporary example of this deficiency in a perceptive scholar, see Epstein,
supra note 23, at 434-39. Epstein believes that it was wrong to grant the plaintiff a recovery in
Keeble because he neither owned nor contracted with the ducks that the defendant dispersed.

Since businessmen own neither their customers nor their employees, it would follow under Ep-

stein's view that there should be no recovery when the defendant frightens away customers or
workers, unless they are under contract. However, Epstein approves of Tarlelon v. McGawley (id.
at 428-29) and, presumably, Garretv. Taylor. Hence his disagreement with the decision in Keeble
implies a distinction between free access to customers and suppliers on the one hand and unhampered access to wild animals on the other. The distinction and its ground in law are hard to
grasp. See further the discussion of Ibbotson v. Peat in text infra.
265. Holt 14, 90 Eng. Rep. 906 (1707).
266. [1865] 34 L. Exch. 118, 3 H. & C. 644, 159 Eng. Rep. 684.
267. 159 Eng. Rep. at 685.
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harm. The rancor of the Duke of Rutland and of his gamekeeper may have
been appeased by their fireworks. But no one else was served, least of all
society. Had the defendant's plea in Ibbotson been held good, the unseen
hand would not have worked in the way that Adam Smith said the system of
"natural liberty" should, and did, to harmonize self-interest and social
26 8
benefit.
As economic forms developed during the nineteenth century, so too did
the "economic torts," sometimes called "unfair competition." The impulse of
the Statute of Westminster 11269 was at work, creating remedies when wrongs
were perceived, although the words "prima facie tort theory" did not appear
until late in the century, when the idea and the stimulus were almost six hundred years old.270 Violent or near-violent forms of business competition grew
rare as the centuries passed, but they were held actionable whenever they appeared, for they did injustice to the victims, disturbed the peace, and had no
tendency to reduce costs or to increase wealth;271 they merely transferred it
from the plaintiff to the defendant. Judgment for the plaintiff cancelled the
transfer. 272 For the same reason, threats to sue the plaintiffs customers, especially in patents cases, became actionable unless the defendant demonstrated
good faith.273 Product defamation and passing off the defendant's goods as
the plaintiffs 274 also failed to pass the test of social serviceableness. Courts
could see no way in which such "competition" made any contribution to social
welfare or to productivity.
Inducing breach of contract posed a special challenge, for a number of
values intersected in these cases. 275 Free competition involves rivalry among
268. See A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, bk. IV, ch. ii, at 423 (mod. lib. ed. 1937).
269. 13 Edw., ch. 24 (1285). See 2 W. Holdsworth, supra note 23, at 365-66.
270. As good a way as any of tracing the development is by perusing the old commentators'
treatment of the action on the case. See 1 M. Bacon, supra note 54, at 44-64. See also 1 J. Comyns, supra note 54, at 271-444, the source of one of the earliest formulations of a general tort
theory: "In all cases, where a man has a temporal loss, or damage by the wrong of another, he
may have an action upon the case to be repaired in damages." Id. at 272. And in the footnote to
this statement, Comyns adds that "it is no objection to an action that it be new in the instance if it
be not new in its principal [sic]." Of course this kind of juristic elegance was abhorrent to the
"lawful in itself" reactionaries who composed the majority in Allen v. Rood, and to their epigoni,
for whom Comyns has become a nonperson.
271. Among other qualities, Adam Smith had a firm grasp of law and of the indispensable role
played by broad legal principle in the preservation of social order. "The object ofjustice is the
security from injury, and it is the foundation of civil government." A. Smith, supra note 124, at 1,
3. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
272. For more recent cases reminiscent of Garret and Tarleton, discussed at note 264 supra,
see Evenson v. Spaulding, 150 F. 517, 519, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1907) (peddlers' association interferes
with plaintiff's salesmen); Only Independent Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Cummings, 12 Law and
Labor 68 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1930) (rival bus companies engage in boisterous retaliatory picketing).
273. Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929); Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46
(N.D. l. 1888); Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., [1893] 1 Ch. 413.
274. E.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877) (defendant copies plaintiff's trademark);
Davis v. New Eng. IKR. Publishing Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909) (defendant wrongfully
induces third party to omit plaintiff's name from list of "reputable" express companies); Marsh v.
Billings, 61 Mass. (7 Cush) 322 (1851) (defendant passes offhis carriage as plaintiff's; held actionable; plaintiff citedKeeble v. Hickeringill, id. at 328-29); Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213,48 Eng. Rep.
610 (1836) (defendant enjoined from imitating the design, color and name of plaintiff's bus).
275. The issues appeared in the early American cases, e.g., Citizens Light, Heat & Power Co.
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firms for the same customers and would be constricted if a firm could not
lawfully solicit business among its rival's customers. Yet freedom of contract
lies at the foundation of the system of free competition. There would be no
free competition if the privileges of offer and acceptance did not exist universally among all members of society. Nor would the system of free competition
be viable if contracts once made were not regarded as sacred.
Viewed in this light, to hold inducing breach privileged in the name of
competition would be to encourage a variety of parricide. Still, should contracts always be regarded more sacred than the counsels of friendship or of
parental guidance, which might sometimes induce a breach? Only the prima
facie tort theory provided a ratiocinative technique sufficiently powerful to
cope with so complicated a problem. In the end, inducing breach of contract
became actionable unless the defendant could show some justification other
than his mere self-interest, or other than rivalry. For in the prima facie tort
theory not even rivalry is sacrosanct. It is a value, of course; but not the only
one.
These cases demonstrate that the promotion of socially-serving competiion may require the limitation or even exclusion of some forms of rivalry.
The paradox is only apparent. To privilege inducing breach of contract in the
name of competition would introduce a socially destructive contradiction. As
has been pointed out, thefirstprinc&pleof all law--the principle of principlesis the preservation of society, social co-operation and the consensual division
276
of labor.
Contracts and combinations in "restraint of trade" raised similar difficulties. It has been argued that English law abandoned its competitive orientation when it moved from absolute outlawry of agreements not to compete to
the conclusion that most such agreements, if made on good consideration,
were valid and enforceable contracts. 277 This contention, which has been embodied in the Sherman Act, may be called the "atomistic view" of competition:
the view that all restrictions, however voluntary and contractual, are incompatible with the social interest in free competition.
Dating back as far as it does, this atomistic view is of a piece with the
general retarded condition of the common law when contract is concerned. As
Henry Maine said, "The positive duty resulting from one man's reliance on
the word of another is among the slowest conquests of advancing civilizav. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 F. 553 (M.D. Ala. 1909); Beekman v. Marsters, 195
Mass. 295, 79 N.E. 817 (1907); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y.
82 (1876); Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); and in the English cases, e.g.,
Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 435, 715; Lumley v. Gye, 2 EL & Bl. *216 (1853), 3 EL & BL.
114 (1854), 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 1083.

276. L. von Mises, Theory, supra note 115, at 54. See note 254 supra.
277. Letwin, an outstanding representative of this position, considers such cases as Mitchell v.
Reynolds, P. Wins. *181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711) and Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns &
Ammunition Co., 1894 A.C. 535, both of which held contracts not to compete enforceable, as
betrayals of the common-law policy in favor of competition. See Letwin, supra note 253, at 3-679. As I attempt to demonstrate in the text above, the Letwin position fails to perceive how deeply
rooted competition is in contract. See note 311 and accompanying text infra.
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tion. ' 27 8 Indeed, the relationship between contract and competition is not
universally perceived even today. In the old days, every agreement not to
compete was thought bad, even evil.27 9 Later, a distinction was made between
agreements not to compete that were associated with ("ancillary to") other
transactions-for example, partnerships, sales of land, sales of a businessand agreements that had no object other than to eliminate competition. The
leading case of Mitchell v. Reynolds280 held that a reasonably limited agreement not to compete, ancillary to a sale of a business, was valid and enforceable. In so holding, the court emphasized that if made on a good consideration,
there was no reason to deny enforcement of the contract. This emphasis on
consideration suggests full awareness in the court that what mattered was
whether or not the contract was voluntary; for the function of the consideration requirement in contract law is to confine legal enforcement to deals that
are voluntary, to deny the aid of the law to coercion. It seems pretty clear that
courts were beginning to see that there was an identity between freedom of
contract, free markets, and free competition.
Many American courts adopted the atomistic view in holding at common
law that all nonancillary combinations in restraint of trade, however voluntary
and merely self-regulating they might be, were unenforceable if not positively
unlawful. 2 81 Others took a more flexible attitude.28 2 The bidding cases illustrate the considerations that the latter courts found relevant in evaluating
agreements not to compete. If an agreement to refrain from competitive bidding at an auction was accompanied by a pooling of resources that permitted
the parties to participate as a group in bidding for an item that they could not
as individuals have afforded, the courts held the agreements valid. 28 3 On the
other hand, if the agreement to refrain from bidding was designed exclusively
to deny the seller the benefits of free competition among buyers, then it was
278. H. Maine, Ancient Law 338 (F. Pollock ed. 1930).
279. The cases and other authorities are reviewed in Sanderson and in Letwin, supra note 253.
280. P. Wins. *181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
281. E.g., Western Union TeL Co. v. Burlington & S.W. Ry., 11 F. I (C.C.D. Iowa 1882); Craft
v. McConoughy, 79111. 346 (1875); Ganewell Fire-Alarm Tel. Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50,35 N.E.
98 (1893); Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592 (1874); Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102
(1889); People v. Milk Exch., 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N.E. 1062 (1895); De Witt Wire-Cloth Co. v. New
Jersey Wire-Cloth Co., 16 Daly 529, 14 N.Y.S. 277 (1891); People v. North River Sugar Refining
Co., 3 N.Y.S. 401,413 (N.Y. County Cir. Ct. 1889), afrd mem., 129 N.Y. 696,24 N.E. 1099 (1890);
Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877); Saratoga County Bank v. King, 44 N.Y.
87 (1871); Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147 (1870); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. 1848);
Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. 1847). Judge Taft collected the cases in United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
The English position as expressed in Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 EL & BL. 47, 32 Eng. L. & Eq. 198
(1855), was that a nonancillary combination whether of masters or workmen was void but not
positively unlawful or actionable. The various judges conceded as much in Mogul S.S. Co. v.
McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 589, afi'd, 1892 A.C. 25.
282. E.g., Gloucester Isinglass & Glue Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92, 27 N.E. 1005
(1891) ("reasonable" restraint agreed to in compromise of confficting claims held enforceable).
Extensive restraints were held valid in the following cases, but each involved ancillary agreements:
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887); Hodge v. Sloan, loTN.Y. 244,
17 N.E. 335 (1885); Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
283. Kearney v. Taylor, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 494 (1853); Phippen v. Stickney, 44 Mass. (3 Met.)
384 (1841).
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unlawful as a variety of fraud that produced a lower than market price. 2 8 4
This seems sound. Carried to a logical conclusion, the atomistic view
would be incompatible with the social end that free competition is designed to
achieve, namely the lowest-cost method of production. There is no possibility
that individual action can always equal the production of combined action.
Being inconsistent with the end that free competition is valued for, namely
maximizing production, the atomistic view must be regarded, then, as inconsistent with free competition itself. It is obviously inconsistent with freedom of
contract, the foundation of free competition.
Again there is no real paradox, only a semantic shortcoming. In other
words, not all arrangements called agreements "not to compete" are properly
so-called. If, by combining, individuals achieve lower costs and hence greater
productivity, they may eliminate competition among themselves, but the competition they pose for others is increased and with it the total social product.
The combination has served society, not injured it.
The idea of atomistic competition is murky, unresolved, and no one really
holds to it. There is only a spurious and superstitious allegiance to it, bred by
the populist dread of "bigness." Any society honestly and consistently adopting the atomistic view would have to abandon it swiftly, if it wished to prosper.
One is reminded of the pure (atomistic) conspiracy doctrine, that every combination is criminal regardless of the legality of its ends or means. Sergeant
Hawkins and others said it, but no one believed it.
The more sustainable view, expressed by Judge Daly in Master Stevedores'Associationv. Walsh,28 5 distinguished as we have seen between self- and
other-regulating combinations on typical prima facie tort grounds. A purely
self-regulating combination was prima facie not tortious at all if and when it
involved no intentional harm to anyone. However, when it appeared that a
combination was designed to oppress outsiders, persons not members of the
combination, the prima facie tort analysis was called into operation. The
other-governing activity became actionable unless justified as a species of society-serving competition or on some other social value.
The cases involving combination-boycotts of delinquent debtors demonstrate how subtle the issues may become despite the aid of the distinction between self-regulating and other-regulating action. Some courts held that it
was actionable for a combination to require its members to refuse to deal with
delinquent debtors, because such a boycott usurped the functions of the courts
and took the law into private hands, perhaps denying the debtor a defense that
the law would recognize. 28 6 Others held such boycotts privileged on the
284. E.g., Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147 (1870).
285. 2 Daly I (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867).
286. E.g., Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454, 56 N.E. 619 (1900); Hartnett v. Plumbers' Suply Ass'n, 169 Mass. 229, 47 N.E. 1002 (1897); McIntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. 52, 45 A. 666 (1900).
ee Bracken, Trade Organizations for the Collection of Debts Due Members by Means of Boycott,
39 Am. L. Reg. (ns.) 691 (1900).
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ground that it is sound social policy to encourage people to pay their debts. 287

Although there is much to be said on both sides, the former would seem
to be the better view. No doubt an individual acting alone is privileged to
refuse to extend credit whenever he wishes, in the same way that everyone is
privileged to refuse to make a gift to another. But combinations are not individuals. Boycotts by groups are often vicious, hurtful activities, long on blind
passion and rancor, short on discrimination. It may be that a net social good
will result from collective action in some instances. But men abandon mob
rule and anarchy, and choose to build social orders around legal systems, in
order to increase the chances that public good will result from human action.
Herein, indeed, may be one of the deepest grounds for the law's longrun antipathy to boycotts.
Despite its sophistication, the distinction proposed by Judge Daly in
Master Stevedores'Association v. Walsh288 between self- and other-governing
action did not prevail in the business-combination cases, although, as we shall
see, it enjoyed greater success in the labor cases.
In the business-combination cases, as Judge Taft's extensive review in
UnitedStates v. Addyston Pope & Steel Co. 289 indicated, American courts generally held that nonancillary price-fixing combinations were void if not positively unlawful. The leading Pennsylvania case, Morris Run Coal Co. v.
Barclay CoalCo., was typical.29° In that case, on the ground that the combination involved was engaged in a bare price-fixing arrangement, with the
members perserving their separate business identities, the agreement to pool
and share profits was held void and unenforceable. Looking the other way,
the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollrs,29 1 held

that a combination of retailers might lawfully refuse to purchase from a
wholesaler who insisted on selling directly to consumers, but the force of this
decision was dissipated in a few years by the passage in Minnesota of an antitrust statute similar to the Sherman Act. 292 Thus, in the states, as in the federal system, the fact that a business combination might be of the purely
voluntary and self-regulatory type did not guarantee its legality. The self- versus other-regulating distinction gave way in business-combination cases to the
ancillary-nonancillary distinction.
The strength of the common-law commitment to competition was especially evident in the other-regulating business-combination cases. Boycotting
was the form that the other-regulating conduct usually took. In the typical
287. E.g., McCarter v. Chamber of Commerce, 126 Md. 131, 94 A. 541 (1915); Reynolds v.

Plumbers' Material Protective Ass'n, 30 Misc. 709,63 N.Y.S. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Delz v. Winfree,
80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111 (1891), judgment for defendant afrd on remand, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 25
S.W. 50 (1894).
288. 2 Daly 1 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867).
289. 85 F. 271, 280-302 (6th Cir. 1898).
290. 68 Pa. St. (18 Smith) 173 (1871).
291. 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893).
292. See Ertz v. Produce Exch. Co., 79 Minn. 140, 81 N.W. 737 (1900) (overruling a demurrer
to the complaint), and 82 Minn. 173, 84 N.W. 743 (1901) (granting judgment for plaintiff on the
merits in a boycott case similar to Bohn).
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case, a combination of retailers would boycott wholesalers in an effort to induce them to quit supplying a competitive retailer, a price-cutter or someone
who refused to join the combination. Though occasionally held privileged,
293 or on "lawful in itself' thinking, 294
either on some ground of justification
such boycotts were normally held actionable. 2 95 Fortunately one of these
cases came before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court during the pethe prima facie tort theory most exriod in which that court was developing296
plicitly. The case was Martell v. ffhite.
If one had to choose a single example of American common-law adjudication at its best, one might do worse than to choose this decision and its
opinion by Justice Hammond. The decision was bold, even extreme. There
was a division on the court. We know from Hammond's opinion in the Willcut case, 2 9 7 four years later, that five of the Massachusetts justices sat in Martell, and that four of them, a majority of the whole court, decided for the
plaintiff there. 298 It is thus quite possible that Chief Justice Knowlton, who
dissented in W'llcut, dissented also inMartell. But whoever the dissenter was,
he declined to write an opinion or otherwise to identify himself. Thus Martell
is almost as authoritative an indication of the view of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court as it would have been had it been unanimous.
The case involved the granite cartel which had been dominating New
299
England, or trying to dominate it. Five years earlier, in Boutwell v. Mdarr,
the Vermont Supreme Court had held the same kind of cartel liable in damages for boycotting a granite polisher who had refused to join. Composed of
ninety-five percent of the businesses engaged in quarrying, cutting or polishing
granite in Vermont, the cartel had adopted a resolution establishing a fiftydollar fine against any member who did business with a nonmember. This
was an actionable tort, the Vermont court held, because even though the members of the cartel had implicitly consented to the fine by retaining their membership, the fine was nevertheless from the point of view of the plaintiffoutsider a form of coercion against those with whom he had a right to trade
freely. The opinion in Martell was even stronger. While it asserted no new
principle, it is more valuable than the Vermont decision for present purposes
293. E.g., Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 A. 190 (1894) (boycott of combination member,

who broke ranks in dispute with union, held justified as species of self defense).
294. Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R.IL 255, 33 A. 1 (1895) (refusal by master plumbers' cartel to
purchase from wholesalers, who dealt with nonmembers of the cartel, held lawful in itself but also
justified as a form of competition).
295. E.g., Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 II. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898); Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind.
592, 36 N.E. 445 (1894); Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md. 232, 64 A. 1029 (1906);
Ertz v. Produce Exch. Co., 79 Minn. 140, 81 N.W. 737 (1900), and 82 Minn. 173, 84 N.W. 743
(1901) (see note 292 supra); Kellogg v. Sowerby, 190 N.Y. 370, 83 N.E. 47 (1907). But see John D.
Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists Ass'n, 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903). See also
Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., 75 A.D. 145, 77 N.Y.S. 373, 1139 (1902); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y.
251, 34 N.E. 785 (1893); Olive & Sternenberg v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630, 25 S.W. 428
(1894).
296. 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904).
297. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 85 N.E. 897 (1908).
298. Id. at 115, 85 N.E. at 899-900.
299. 71 Vt. 1, 42 A. 607 (1899).
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because of its greater explicitness concerning the kind of competition that constitutes just cause for deliberate harm under the prima facie tort principle.
"The defendants contend," stated Hammond, "that, both as to object and
means, they are justified by the law applicable to business competition."
Hammond agreed that competition will justify deliberate harm. But the
"competition" that constitutes such justification, he insisted, is not to be confused with the much broader concept, "rivalry." "The trader has not a free
' '3
lance," he added. "He may fight, but as a soldier, not as a guerilla. 00
One can scarcely ask for a neater or more precise isolation of what must
rank among the most subtle and complicated issues ever confronted by a court
of law. Hammond could not deny that the members of the granite cartel had a
general right to quarry, cut, and polish granite, respectively; to choose their
trading partners, to form a voluntary association, to enact a fine 30 1 in order to
enforce the rules of the association. He stated,
We do not mean to be understood as saying that a fine is of itself
necessarily, or even generally, an illegal implement. In many cases it
is so slight as not to be coercive . ..; in many, it serves a useful
purpose to call the attention of a member..,
to the fact of the in30 2
fraction of some innocent regulation.
However, he went on, it would be absurd to hold that, merely because an
association happened to be formed voluntarily, all measures adopted by a majority of the association were ipso facto privileged.
[Where, as in the case before us, the fine is so large as to amount to
moral intimidation or coercion, and is used as a means to enforce a
right not absolute in its nature, but conditional, and is inconsistent
with those conditions upon which the right rests, then the
coercion be30 3
comes unjustifiable, and taints with illegality the act.
The clue to Hammond's thinking lies in his references to "a right not absolute
in its nature" and to "those conditions upon which the right rests." The
"right" in question is the right to compete, the right of competition. Hammond makes clear what he means by "those conditions upon which the right
rests." Referring to the association's fine, he commented,
This method of procedure is arbitrary and artificial, and is based in
no respect upon the grounds upon which competition in business is
permitted, but, on the contrary, it creates a motive for business action
inconsistent with that freedom of choice out of which springs the
benefit of competition to the public, and has no natural or logical
30 4
relation to the grounds upon which the right to compete is based.
Hammond is explaining that the right to compete is accepted by society for
300. 185 Mass. at 260, 69 N.E. at 1087.
301. Hammond disregarded as "euphemistic" the cartel's description of the payment required
of members who dealt with nonmembers, which carefully avoided calling it a fine. 185 Mass, at
256, 69 N.E. at 1086.
302. 185 Mass. at 262, 69 N.E. at 108.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 261, 69 N.E. at 1088.
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two reasons-first, because it is an expression of personal freedom in action,
andsecond, because it is a kind of expression of personal freedom that contributes to the general good. It would be different if the measure adopted by the
cartel held out some promise of public benefit, in the form, say, of cost- or
price-reductions. This is why it was proper, Hammond noted, for the English
courts to hold the price-cutting in the Mogul case a privileged form of
harm.30 5 Referring to Mogul and to other decisions in favor of defendants,
Hammond noted, "In none of these cases was there any coercion by means of
fines upon those who traded with the plaintiff. Inducements were held out, but
adthey were such as are naturally incident to competition, for instance, more
'30 6
vantageous terms in the way of discounts, increasedtrade, and otherwise.
The Mogul case has for a long time been regarded as the outstanding
decision on the place of competition in the law of torts. As significant as Mogul was, however, it falls considerably short of the significance of Martell v.
White on the question. Mogul held that hard price-cutting and rebating fell
within privileged competition, but none of the opinions, whether in the
Queen's Bench or in the House of Lords, came even close to Hammond's explanation of the principle upon which the competition privilege rested. The
opinions in Mogul, including those of Bowen and Fry in the court of appeal
and that of Lord Halsbury in the House of Lords, also had nothing to say
about the rationale that produced a privileged status for competition, hard or
soft.
They seemed to take it for granted, as Lord Halsbury expressed it succinctly, that if the act in question was "ordinary" competition it should be
privileged. "I should rather think," he said, "that it is very commonly within
the ordinary course of trade so to compete for a time as to render trade unrid of him you may
profitable to your rival in order that when you have got
30 7
appropriate the profits of the entire trade to yourself."

Such comments fail to show why the legal system should accord competitively committed harm a privileged status. Hammond approved the decision
in Mogul, but went beyond it to establish both the social basis for the competition privilege and to demonstrate how that basis provided a standard for determining the extent of the privilege. He saw the competition privilege
anchored firmly in the public interest and found in this foundation the principle determining the activities to which the privilege should attach:
The right of competition rests upon the doctrine that the interests of
the great public are best subserved by permitting the general and natural laws of business to have their full and free operation, and that
this end is best attained when the trader is allowed, in his business, to
make free use of these laws. He may praise his wares, may offer
more advantageous terms than his rival, may sell at less than cost, or
305. It will be remembered that there the defendant combination offered lower rates and rebates to those merchants who shipped exclusively with members of the combination. Mogul S.S.
Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 598, afl'd, 1892 A.C. 25.

306. 185 Mass. at 263, 69 N.E. at 1089 (emphasis added).
307. 1892 A.C. 25, 37.
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in the words of Bowen, L.J., in the Mogul Steamship Case, ubi supra,
may adopt "the expedient of sowing one year a crop of apparently
unfruitful prices, in order, by driving competition away, to realize a
fuller harvest of profit in the future." In these and many other obvious ways he may secure the customers of his rival, and build up his
own business to the destruction of that of others; and, so long as he
keeps within the operation of the laws of trade, his justification is
complete. But from the very nature of the case, it is manifest that the
right of competition furnishes no justification for an act done by the
use ofmeans which in their natureare in violation of theprincleupon
which it rests. The weapons used by the trader who relies upon this
right for justification must be those furnished by the laws of trade, or
at least must not be inconsistent with their free operation. No man
can justify an interference with another man's business through
fraud or misrepresentation, nor by intimidation, obstruction, or molestation. In the case before us the members of the association were
to be held to the policy of refusing to trade with the plaintiff by the
imposition of heavy fines, or, in other words, they were coerced by
actual or threatened injury to their property. It is true that one may
leave the association if he desires, but, if he stays in it, he is subjected
to the coercive effect of a fine, to be determined and enforced by the
majority. This method of procedure is arbitrary and artificial, and is
based in no respect upon the grounds upon which competition in business ispenmitted, but, on the contrary, it creates a motive for business
action inconsistent with thatfreedom ofchoice out of which springsthe
relabenefit of competition to thepublic, andhas no naturalor logical
308
tion to the grounds upon which the right to compete is based
Just as the Massachusetts court had earlier rejected the idea that self-interest constituted a just cause for deliberate harm, 3 ° 9 so too it now rejected the
idea that anything that served the defendants in their competition with the
plaintiff would justify their deliberate infliction of harm. Whereas Mogul had
left the implication that anything that advanced the interests of defendants in
a competitive struggle would privilege their conduct--certainly an unacceptable statement of the law-Martellv. White more correctly ruled that the justcause privilege extended to only such conduct as promised a social benefit.
Thus was free enterprise domesticated and the unseen-hand metaphor vindiand combinacated. And thus were the socially valuable features of contract
3 10
tion reconciled with the policy in favor of free competition.
308. 185 Mass. at 260-61, 69 N.E. at 1087-88 (emphasis added).
309. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92,
44 N.E. 1077 (1896); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871). See text accompanying notes 244-48
supra.
310. This interpretation of the leading cases at the turn of the century in England and Massachusetts, and in most of the state courts, is what leads the present writer to disagree with Professor
Letwin's view, as expressed in the work cited at note 253 supra, that the common law had abandoned its pro-competition stance at the turn of the century. I should say that the English and
Massachusetts courts had done as good a job as anyone could reasonably expect in harmonizing
the values of combination, contract, and competition-until the legislatures in England and the
United States, overwhelmed by the syndicalist philosophy of the trade-unionists and their intellectual supporters, adopted the view of the court majorities that had prevailed in NationalProtectlve
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Thus also did the Massachusetts court provide a rational, social foundation for the rules it was fashioning in labor disputes, rules which the courts of
most of the other states adopted, more or less. Before reviewing the labor
cases, however, it seems desirable to recapitulate the developments just reviewed in a form that accentuates their main lines. Such a summary should
help to clarify what went on in the labor cases before the legislatures, state and
national, embarked upon the compulsory-unionism and compulsory-collec3 11
tive-bargaining policies that have prevailed since the 1930s.

V.

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPETITION
JUSTIFICATION AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LABOR CASES

The cases just passed in review record and reflect five hundred years of
intertwined and reciprocating moral, political, and economic evolution. As
soon as the records are good enough to give an idea of what is going on, that
is, from the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries, we see that the Schoolmaster's312 and the Miller's3 13 cases recognize as a feature of English law the
privilege to set up competing businesses. At roughly the same time, the Dyer's
case 3 14 evinces powerful opposition to contracts that restrain competition.
These evidences of a policy in favor of competition and against monopoly are
confirmed by the anti-monopoly cases of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-Darcy,Davenant, and the Ipswich Tailors.3 15

Concurrently with these cases, political events in England led to the Glorious Revolution, which involved another kind of anti-monopoly sentiment:
monarchical dominance was rejected in favor of parliamentary supremacy,
but in the context of whiggish opposition to all-powerful government. This is
the burden of what Locke had to say in the seventeenth century; Burke, Hume
and Adam Smith in the eighteenth; and Macaulay, the Mills, Maine and Spencer in the nineteenth.
While periods of Whig domination of politics were producing the theory
of limited government, whiggish judges were deciding the line of cases that,
Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming and Allen v. Flood to give trade-unionism privileges of
coercion and compulsion denied to all other persons or institutions. The British legislation was
mainly in the Trades Dispute Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47-see note 103 supra. The American
legislation began shortly thereafter with the Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 17-26 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), and continued with the Railway Labor Act
of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976)); the NorrisLa Guardia Act of 1932, ch. 90,47 Stat. 70 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §& 101-115 (1976 & Supp
1111979)); and the Wagner Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 131168 (1976)).
311. For elaboration of the observation that current labor policy is composed to a large extent
of compulsory unionism and compulsory collective bargaining, see Petro, Civil Liberty, Syndicalism, and the NLRA, 5 Toledo L. Rev. 447 (1974).
312. Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410). See text accompanying notes 262-63 supra.
313. Y.B. 22 Hen. 6, f. 14, pl. 23 (1443). See note 264 and accompanying text supra.
314. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414). See note 315 infra.
315. Darcy v. Allen, 11 Co. Rep. *84, Moore *671, Noy *173,74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1602); Davenport v. Hurdis, Moore *576 (1599); Case of the Ipswich Tailors, 11 Co. Rep 53, Godbolt *252
(1614). See note 258 supra.
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despite their humble facts, established the distinction between punitive rivalries and catallactic competition. This, I believe, is the main teaching of Garret
v. Taylor 316 and Tarleton v. McGawley,3 17 and especially of the parables, Keeble v. Hickeringill and Ibbotson v. Peat,reviewed above 18s Feeling their way
to a general principle, these cases held that while businessmen were generally
privileged to struggle against each other for trade, there were limits to what the
law would permit them to do. Punitive rivalries were out: scaring ducks, customers, or workers away from a competitor was actionable. But catallactic
competition, the offering of favorable terms of trade in order to attract business away from a competitor, was privileged.
Except for Ibbotson v. Peat, a mid-nineteenth century decision, the cases
produced these principles without the aid of the advances in economic theory
associated with Hume, Adam Smith and the French physiocrats. The courts
were working out the implications of the personal freedom and private property which preoccupied John Locke and many other seventeenth century
thinkers. Darcy v. Allen was not mere bumbling. The lawyers who argued
knd the judges who decided it knew perfectly well what they were doing: they
were promoting personal freedom over royal power.3 19 I do not believe it
possible to exaggerate the influence of this litigation on the subsequent legal,
political, economic, and intellectual history of England, and of America.
One may doubt, however, that in thus promoting personal freedom, however designedly, the sixteenth and seventeenth century judges were conscious
that they also were promoting social productivity as well. The productionmaximizing aspect of free competition is an economic theorem, the cognition
of which must be credited to Adam Smith, his predecessors, and his successors.
Thus, while it may be true that free competition would have been a policy of
the common law even had the eighteenth century developments in economics
not occurred, because of the moral values of which it was constituted, it seems
reasonable to believe that those developments in economics encouraged later
judges to advance free competition from the position of merely one commonlaw policy among others, to a position of paramount importance.
The growth of economic theory probably accounted also for the mitiga316. Cro. Jac. *567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (1621). See note 264 supra.
317. Peake *270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (1794). See note 264 supra.
318. See text accompanying notes 265-66 supra.
319. Mild exception is being taken here to the tendency among a number of eminent jurists to
insist to what I consider an exaggerated degree on the nonlogical and even "irrational" elements
in the common law. E.g., G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (1977); 0. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881). Of course there are many inconsistent, poor, even blatantly wrong, decisions
and opinions. And of course common-law rules and principles have changed and evolved. But
when people call the common law "irrational" and "illogical," one may ask: "compared to
what"? Lord Halsbury's famous insistence upon the purely empirical, nonlogical character of
common-law decisions (Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. at 506), was actually itself a logical way of
laying the groundwork for abandoning the indefensible position taken by a majority of the law
lords in Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. 1. And anyone who really believes that Holmes was anti-logic
in law understands Holmes as little as he did himself. No greater tribute to logic in law can be
found than those that appear in his article, The Path of the Law, supra note 113, despite his
cautions about it. Id. at 465.
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tion of the common law's passionate opposition to contracts in restraint of
trade, 320 a mitigation associated with the eighteenth century and Mitchell v.
Reynolds.32 ' Economic theory teaches that capital aggregations, up to a certain point, increase social productivity by reducing costs, and hence that the
policy in favor of competition should not induce judges to invalidate all combinations. There is no point in discouraging voluntary agreements to refrain
from competing when such agreements promote, i.e., are "ancillary" to, legitimate transactions, and do not establish monopolies with the power of excluding competition.
We have seen that Judge Daly in Master Stevedores' would have gone
further and held privileged all combinations of a strictly voluntary and selfregulating character,322 those that lacked the power to exclude competition, on
the theory that, if they pursued restrictive policies, and made higher than competitive returns, they would attract competitive investors who would then restore market prices. However, contrary to a rather common opinion, Judge
Daly's laissez-faire inclination never ruled this country. The main bent of the
man in the street, as of college professors, journalists, preachers, and thus,
perforce, of judges and other politicians, has always been a kind of populism,
sometimes more and sometimes less suspicious of the "big capitalists." In the
so-called heyday of laissez-faire, the second half of the nineteenth century,
Judge Daly's proposal of a laissez-faire attitude toward peaceful, voluntary,
nonmonopolistic business combinations was rejected by most American
judges. 323 In addition, many, if not all, the legislatures, state and federal,
passed statutes absolutely forbidding voluntary price-fixing combinations by
businessmen.
Moreover, we have seen that business boycotts designed to force outsiders
to join a combination or to go out of business were practically universally
outlawed. 324 Martell v. White 3 2 5 was the definitive case. It denied a business
combination any means, even a fine agreed to by the membership, of making
such a boycott work. A combination might engage in hard competition
against outsiders by price-cutting, rebates and other such means of attracting
customers. But under no circumstances would it be allowed to oust a competitor by coercing its customers or workers.
The truth seems to be that, even during its alleged heyday, laissez-faire
did not extend to business conduct or combinations. The same kind of populist dread of "big business" that spawned the Sherman Act and which, today,
in the midst of an energy shortage condemns the large petroleum companies,
320. In the Dyer's Case, Judge Hull stated, "Per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here, he should go
to prison till he had paid a fine to the king." 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414). Sanderson, supra note

253, at 14, states that for 200 years every "partial restraint" that came before the English courts
was held invalid, until 1711, when Mitchell v. Reynolds, P. Wins. *181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711),
was decided.
321. P.Wms. *181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
322. 2 Daly 1 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867).

323. See text accompanying note 281 supra.
324. See text accompanying notes 286-96 supra.
325. 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904). See note 296 and accompanying text supra.
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evoked similar common-law decisions, though perhaps not quite so extreme
and not so politics-ridden as the ones which afflict us nowadays. When the
masses are hungry for bread, the first thing they do, as Manzoni said (and
326
Ortega following him), is burn down the bakeries.
Several generations of Americans have been taught that from 1870 to
1930 laissez-faire prevailed with respect to business conduct while the strictest
kinds of controls were exerted against "labor," meaning union, conduct. But
the truth is that then, as now, the law dealt more strictly with the activities of
businesses than it did with the activities of unions. It granted unions pricefixing privileges that it denied to business firms. Some courts were disposedin the name ofcompetition-even to grant unions special privileges to establish
coercive monopolies. When unions and their supporters complained of unfair
legal treatment, what their complaints actually amounted to was that the
courts in a number of states refused to participate unreservedly in this travesty
of the privilege to engage in society-serving competition.
VI.

THE COMPETITION JUSTIFICATION AND UNION ACTION

Many commentators at the turn of the century complained that the courts
were going too far in granting unions special monopolistic privileges to destroy competition in labor markets. For example, in a note to a report of Florida's first reported labor case, 327 which held privileged secondary strikes for
the closed shop on a construction project in Tampa, the writer stated,
The truth of the business is that too much sympathy or judicial favoritism has been shown toward the labor union, which has blinded the
vision of the courts to the fact that as now constituted, at least, it is
one of the most gigantic combinations in restraint of trade and commerce that exists today, and is a standing menace to our commercial
life on a par with
gigantic combinations of capital which we denomi' 328
nate "trusts.
Not all courts went so far as Florida, or as the New York, 329 Califor330
nia, Kentucky,331 and other courts 332 went in holding coercive union boy326. The observation about burning down the bakeries is usually attributed to J.Ortega y
Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses 60 (1943). However, it almost certainly traces to A. Manzoni's
powerful account of the insane rioting which went on in Milan during the seventeenth century.
See The Betrothed (I Promessi Sposi) 184-226, 424-44 (Dutton paperback ed. 1961).
327. Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
328. Note, Labor Unions as Monopolies, 65 Cent. L.L 261, 262 (1907).
329. E.g., Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63, cert. denied, 288 U.S.
606 (1932); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927);
Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917). But see Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285
N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919),

cases which indicated that the New York Court of Appeals did not intend to allow the monopolistic unions to get completely out of hand.
330. E.g., Pierce v. Stablemen's Local 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 324 (1909); Parkinson Co. v.
Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027 (1908).
331. E.g., Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local No. 165, 249 Ky. 639,
61 S.W.2d 283 (1933); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. UMW, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920);
Saulsberry v. Coopers' Int'l Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912). But see J.L. Strassel Co. v.
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cotts privileged even when designed to control labor markets. Indeed, a

number of courts reflected more or less the positions adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its elaboration of the prima facie tort principle and of the competition excuse for delibarately inflicted harm. These
courts, like those that shared the New York view, held that strictly self-regu-

lating strikes designed to gain economic benefits for the strikers were privileged.333 But they viewed differently strikes, picketing, and boycotts designed

to establish monopolistic control of labor markets.
In the Massachusetts view and in the view of jurisdictions that shared it,

granting coercive boycotts a privileged status when their objective was to establish monopolistic control of labor markets would have amounted to a travesty of the just-cause principle. 334 Numerous cases had established what no
union ever bothered to hide, namely, that the main object of the unions was to
establish monopolistic control of the relevant labor markets in order to "take
wages out of competition." 335 This was as much as to say that the unions
intended to destroy competition and competitive pricing generally, not merely
in isolated firms. For it had become evident already at an early date that
monopolistic wages could be maintained in unionized firms only if the competition of nonunion firms was eliminated either by forcing them to accept collective bargaining or by driving them out of business. 336 From time to time, it
Brotherhood of Painters, Local 118, 7 Law & Lab. 118 (Ky. County Ct. 1925) (enjoining a secon-

dary strike in violation of contract).
332. See, e.g,, cases cited at note 166 supra and notes 360 & 362 infra.
333. See text accompanying notes 349-51 infra.
424, 431, 83 N.E. 940, 943 (1908);
334. E.g., Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill.
A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 56-60, 157 N.E. 82, 85-8 (1927), afi'd, 264
Mass. 511, 163 N.E. 193 (1928); New Eng. Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, 105 N.E.
885, 887 (1914); Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N.E. 457, 459-60 (1908) (Knowlton, C.J.,
dissenting); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 355-59, 74 N.E. 603, 605-06 (1905) (containing a
valuable discussion of the difference between the competition of employees for jobs on the basis of
cost-considerations and the kind of "competition" normally involved where a union seeks to impose closed-shop conditions by coercive devices); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492,496-500, 57 N.E.
1011, 1014-15 (1900); White Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy, 78 N.H. 398, 404-06, 101 A. 357,
361-62 (1917). The famous English decision in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495, also found that
coercive union pressures to establish closed-shop conditions were travesties of the kind of competition that the common law favored. Id. at 528 (Lord Brampton). And see the decision below, sub
nom. Leathern v. Craig, [1899] 2 Q.B. 667, 756 (opinion of Lord Porter). For a powerful critique
of the idea that monopolistic coercion by unions should find shelter in the competition privilege,
see Lewis, supra note 4.
335. For an extensive discussion of this proposition, see the opinion of the district court in
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 172 F. 963 (N.D.W. Va. 1909), afrd as modified, 245 U.S.
229 (1917). For an example of the complacency with which the New York Court of Appeals
viewed the monopolistic aspirations of the Carpenters' Union, see Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342,
117 N.E. 582, 584-85 (1917). The desire to take wages out of competition is apparently as old as
unionism, or maybe as mankind. See R. Morris, Government and Labor in Early America 15052, 514-15 (1946). See also Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 87, 56 A. 327, 330 (1903) (noting the
defendant union's intention to form a combination "throughout the city and the world, to the end
that 'competition shall be replaced by unity of action' "). And for the similar aspirations of the
Plumbers' Union, see Schneider v. Journeymen Plumbers Local 60, 116 La. 170, 40 So. 700, 703
(1906). For less complacent attitudes toward the monopoly aspirations of unions, see M. Bigelow,
Torts 249-50 (8th ed. 1907); L. von Mises, Socialism 481 (151); Bullock, The Closed Shop, 94
Atlantic Monthly 433, 437-38 (1904).
336. For some representative cases, see Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Electrical Workers, 325
U.S. 797 (1945); Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 212 F. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aid, 214 F. 82 (2d
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had been said that union workers were more productive than nonunion workers, but proof of such assertions was never forthcoming. 337 In the meanwhile
unions continued to use coercive means to force themselves upon unwilling
employers and employees-something which would not have been necessary if
union workers were actually more productive than their rivals.
Already by the turn of the century it had long been recognized that labor
costs are far and away the dominant costs of production. 338 If these were
taken out of competition, most of the social value of the enterprise system
would disappear, for the production-maximizing feature of the system of free
competition would therefore no longer obtain. Indeed, if entire industries had
to be organized in order to take wages out of competition, it seemed to those
courts that shared the views of the Massachusetts court that the unions and
collective bargaining would replace the system of natural liberty,
the system of
339
free competition, with a system of cartels, or of syndicalism.
Cir. 1914), af'd 244 U.S. 459, 460-61 (argument of counsel), 470-71 (1917); Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 F. 512, 554-57 (N.D.W. Va. 1912), afl'd, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); Employing
Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353 (1905); Baton Rouge Bldg. Trades
Council v. James & Co., 201 La. 749, 10 So. 2d 606 (1943); A.T. Steams Lumber Co. v. Howlett,
260 Mass. 45, 56-58, 157 N.E. 82, 85 (1927); Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting, 92
NJ. Eq. 131, 111 A. 376 (1920); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917); Willson &
Adams Co. v. Pearce, 135 Misc. 426, 237 N.Y.S. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1929), rev'd per curiam, 240 A.D.
718, 265 N.Y.S. 624, afl'd mem., 264 N.Y. 521, 191 N.E. 544 (1933); Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc.
714, 205 N.Y.S. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N.Y.S. 199, 201
(1920), afld per curiam, 194 A.D. 913, 185 N.Y.S. 85 (1920); State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49
S.E. 177 (1904); Bailey v. Master Plumbers, 102 Tenn. 99, 52 S.W. 853 (1899); Best Motor Lines v.
Teamsters, 150 Tex. 95, 237 S.W.2d 589 (1951); Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947), (possibly overruled by Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948)).
337. The latest such contention I have encountered is in a pamphlet by S. Allen, Unionized
Construction Workers Are More Productive at il-iii (1979), stating that it costs employers fortythree percent higher wages for union construction workers in order to get from them thirty-eight
percent more
production
they get from
construction workers. The pamphlet was
published
by an
AFL-CIOthan
organization
callednonunion
the Center
to Protect Workers' Rights. The Cleveland Plain Dealer of December 7, 1979, on page 10A, carries an interesting article on the question
whether Professor Allen's own findings justify the title of his pamphlet. Neither Professor Allen
nor the AFL-CIO official interviewed was sure about this. Perhaps everyone was confused by the
recondite algebra that Professor Allen used to reach his curious conclusion. See S. Allen, supra, at
7, 10, 13.
For the similarly remarkable view that public policy should ignore the consumer-abusing
economic effects of monopolistic unionism because "unions represent the political interests of
lower-income and disadvantaged persons," see Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism,
The Public Interest, Fall 1979, at 69, 75. One would have thought it obvious that monopoly costs
and prices hurt "lower-income and disadvantaged persons" more than they do anyone else. If so,
then with friends such as the monopolistic unions and their academic protagonists, "disadvantaged persons" have no need to look for enemies. For a powerful critique of the Freeman-Medoff
position, see Reynolds, The New Rationale for Unionism, 5 J. Soc. & Pol. Stud. 259 (Fall 1980).
338. The point and its implications for the just-cause principle were noted in the most widely
cited legal treatise of the period on labor and capital combinations. See I A. Eddy, supra note 4,
§ 379, at 247 & §§ 383-384, at 249. One of the most influential economic treatises of the nineteenth century had a great deal to say about wage-rates and collective bargaining. See J. McCulloch, A Treatise on the Circumstances Which Determine the Rate of Wages and the Condition of
the Labouring Classes, Including an Inquiry into the Influence of Combinations (2d ed. 1854).
339. It is not possible to deal adequately here with the "class struggle" aspects of labor disputes at the turn of the century. For some glimpses, see Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v.
Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 F. 500,526-28 (D. Nev. 1908); Marks Arnheim, Inc. v. Hillman, 198
A.D. 88,94-96, 189 N.Y.S. 369, 371-72 (1921). See also E. Debs, Writings and Speeches of Eugene
Debs 223-41 (1948); J. Hobson, The Conditions of Industrial Peace (1927).
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This system was repugnant in many ways to judges imbued with the

whiggish, libertarian, common-law point of view. Besides the economic inefficiencies of the syndicalism or cartelism that aggressive union activities aimed
34 0
to produce, those activities were ethically and morally intolerable as well.
In a typical case, a union or group of unions would threaten to strike or boycott any person who chose to do business with the firm that resisted organization of its employees and collective bargaining. 34 1 Very often in these cases

the offending employer who refused to recognize the union or to grant the
closed shop was nonetheless operating on nondiscriminatory open-shop principles. 342 Often, indeed, the employees themselves were against union representation.34 3 Or the existing employees might be members of a rival union,
340. See Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. at 54-55 (comments of Grantham, J.); Leathem v. Craig,
[1899] 2 Q.B. 667, 697-98 (comments of O'Brien, J.). One of the patron saints of whig libertarianism, R. Cobden, was quoted by Dicey as saying: "Depend upon it, nothing can be got by fraternizing with trade unions. They are founded upon principles of brutal tyranny and monopoly. I
would rather live under a Dey of Algiers than a trades committee." A. Dicey, supra note 4, at 199.
For a similar comment by a twentieth-century whig libertarian, see L. von Mises, supra note 335,
at 483. Whiggish judges could scarely have remained unaffected by the kind of union conduct
that so exercised Cobden and von Mises, among many other observers.
341. For a few of the many cases that could be cited, see Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117
N.E. 582 (1917) (granting the Carpenters' Union the privilege of monopolizing the segment of the
construction industry that it claimed); Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, 135 Misc. 426, 237 N.Y.S.
601 (Sup. Ct. 1929), rev'd per curiam, 240 A.D. 718, 265 N.Y.S. 624 (1933), aff'd mem., 264 N.Y.
521, 191 N.E. 544 (1934) (observe that there is no appellate court opinion justifying the grant of a
privilege to monopolize the trucking industry in this case); Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495
(showing that British unions could give American unions lessons in aggressive arrogance).
342. "Open shop" means a hiring policy which does not discriminate either in favor of or
against union members. It is as interesting as it is little-remarked that open-shop principles dominated among employers at the turn of the century, if the evidence present in most of the reported
decisions is to be credited. The evidence suggests that as a rule "yellow-dog" anti-union contracts
were made a condition of employment only after employers learned that they could not rely on
unions to act responsibly. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 236-40
(1917) (plaintiff employer had dealt voluntarily with defendant Mine Workers until the latter
displayed more interest in destroying plaintiff than in bargaining for plaintiffs employees). See
also Van Owner's Ass'n v. Huth, 2 Law & Lab. 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1920); Ward Baking Co. v.
Ursprung, 2 Law & Lab. 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1920). The Massachusetts court, applying the prima
facie tort theory to employer blacklisting of union members, found it tortious when no just cause
was proved. Corellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N.E. 643 (1915). Of
course, when employers blacklisted unionists or exacted yellow-dog contracts from them, which
would amount to the same thing, such action would be justified if it was defensive-that is, provoked by irresponsible union conduct. Cf. In re Opinion of the Justices, 12 Law & Lab. 106
(Mass. 1930); State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N.W. 1098, 1102-03 (1902) (anti-yellow-dog
statute held unconstitutional because it failed to allow defenses). For an unsuccessful attempt by
a union to recover on the prima facie tort theory against an employer for alleged anti-union activities, see Friendly Soe'y of Engravers v. Calico Engraving Co., 238 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
It seems as though there should have been many more actions against employers for blacklisting unionists than there were. One explanation for the paucity is provided by our inference that as
a rule employers pursued open-shop policies. Indeed, employer associations often included the
open shop as one of their basic principles. See, e.g., Bulletin of Associated Gen. Contractors 29,
31 (Feb. 1921), quoted in F. Jones, Trade Association Activities and the Law 130-32 (1922). R.
Morris, supra note 335, at 203, writes that open-shop policies were common among employers
during colonial days. Only space limitations preclude citation of the hundreds of cases-such as
Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 27 F.2d 560 (S.D.N.Y.), afi'd, 29 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1928); Gray v. Building
Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663 (1903); Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516,
279 S.W. 232, 233-34 (1926); Pre' Catelan, Inc. v. International Fed'n of Workers, 114 Misc. 662,
188 N.Y.S. 29 (1921)-in which it appeared that the employers followed open-shop hiring
practices.
343. This was the situation in Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,260-61 (1917).
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3
and their employer might be under contract with that union. 4
The aggressor union might contend that its members were more efficient
or more qualified, as it did in NationalProtectiveAssociationofSeam Filters v.
Cumming;3 45 but this contention was not likely to be convincing when the
nonunion or rival-union employees were being voluntarily engaged by employers at less pay than the aggressor union demanded. 346 Moral and economic considerations then coalesced in the courts sharing the Massachusetts
view to hold that job-seeking aggression in the form of secondary strikes and
boycotts and stranger-picketing designed to control labor markets was actionable and enjoinable. 347 These courts could not see how unions aiming to destroy competition, to substitute monopolistic for competitive pricing of labor,
could properly avail themselves of the competition justification for the 3deliber48
ate harm they were inflicting on nonunion employers and employees.

344. As was the case in the long rivalry between bakery workers' unions in New York that
culminated, in Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927), in another four-to-

three decision privileging the more aggressive and consumer-exploiting union to use coercive
methods to increase wage rates. For persisting judicial indignation in New York over the kind of
conduct approved in the Exchange Bakery decision, see the opinion of Judge Schmuck in Park
Lane Baking Co. v. Christel, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1930, as quoted by Judge Black in Wolchak v.
Wiseman, 145 Misc. 268, 278-79, 259 N.Y.S. 225, 236-37 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
345. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
346. That is, not convincing to courts applying the prima facie tort principle. See note 347
infra. The reader will remember that a bare majority of the New York Court of Appeals in
NationalProtectiveAssociation ofSteam Fitters v. Cumming thought the lower-paid plaintiffs were

inferior to the higher paid defendants, despite the willingness of the employers to hire the plaintiffs. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
347. E.g., State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 A. 890 (1887); Bricklayers' Int'l Union v. Seymour
Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931) (secondary strike to oust nonunion labor); Aberthaw
Constr. Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N.E. 478 (1907) (defendant under pressure from union
to break contract with plaintiff, enjoined); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77
N.W. 13 (1898) (boycott to oust nonunionists enjoinable as "an attempt to stifle competition," id.
at 22); Alfred W. Booth & Bros. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 65 A. 226 (1906) (secondary strike to
oust nonunionists held enjoinable where implemented by threats of fines and expulsion of union
members); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (1894) (general boycott of
nonunion firm enjoined); Bolivian Panama Hat Co. v. Finkelstein, 215 N.Y.S. 399 (1925) (stranger-picketing held enjoinable in absence of strike). But see Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v.
Rilkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927), discussed at note 344 supra.
348. As indicated in notes 299-310 and accompanying text supra, these courts could see that
ousting a competitor by offering customers lower prices or higher quality of service, as in Mogul,
should be held privileged as society-serving competition. But they could not accept the contention
that the competitionjustification should extend to union conduct designed deliberately to harm an
employer for hiring lower-paid nonunion workers. The Illinois Supreme Court was especially
keen on this point. See Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 II. 424, 431, 83 N.E. 940,
943 (1908). See also Evenson v. Spaulding, 150 F. 517, 519, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1907); March v.
Bricklayers' Union, 79 Conn. 7, 63 A. 291, 293 (1906); George Jonas Glass Bottle Blowers v. Glass
Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 72 N.J. Eq. 563, 66 A. 953, 958 (1907). Perhaps the best judicial critique of
the idea that unions and their members competed with employers, in the sense in which the justcause principle used the term "competition," is that of Chief Judge Knowlton in Berry v.
Donavan, 188 Mass. 353, 358-60, 74 N.E. 603, 605-06 (1905).
Many commentators have noted the anomaly of classifying unions as competitors of employers within the meaning of the prima facie tort principle. See, e.g., M. Bigelow, supra note 335, at
250-57; Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts-Tortious Interference, 23 Drake L. Rev.
341-63 (1974); Jaffin, supra note 39, at 1113-14; Lewis, Some Leading English Cases, supra note
60, at 157; Smith, supra note 4, at 357-58. But see Forkosch, supra note 222, at 791 (distinction
between the rivalry of entrepreneurs and that arising out of the employer-employee relationship is
an "unimportant... factual distinction... assuming the just-cause doctrine is to be utilized as a
method").
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It needs to be emphasized at this point that courts sharing the so-called
Massachusetts view distinguished sharply-in the labor cases, at any ratebetween self-regulating and other-regulating conduct. 349 These courts emphatically affirmed the privilege of workers to form self-governing labor organizations and to take concerted action to defend themselves against wage-cuts
or to back up demands for wage-increases. 350 So far as the conduct was vol-

untary and self-regulating it was privileged. Some courts went so far as to
hold actionable, on suit by employers, the imposition by unions of fines against
members who worked during strikes. 35 ' For the most part, however, suits and
349. As indicated at the beginning of this Article, even the much misunderstood criminal con-

spiracy cases gathered by Commons & Gilmore, supra note 27, mostly conceded that peaceful,
voluntary strikes for higher wages were privileged. By the second half of the nineteenth century,
there could be no doubt at all about this. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077,
1077-78 (1896), in which the court agreed that "[a] combination among persons merely to regulate
their own conduct is within allowable competition, and is lawful, although others may be indirecly
affected thereby." See also Master Stevedores' Ass'n v.Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (C.P.N.Y.C. 1867), discussed at text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
350. The suggestion in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R.R., 60 F. 803 (E.D. Wis.
1894), that a strike for higher wages might be enjoinable was swiftly eschewed on appeal, sub
nom. Arthur v. Oakes, 673 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894).
351. Regarding the right to strike for higher wages, the only question remaining at the turn of
the century was whether or not union rules providing for fine or expulsion of members who refused to obey strike orders were privileged in suits brought against the union by the strike-bound
employer. No court seemed to question the validity of such rules as between the union and consenting members, but some held that the employers had a good cause of action against a union
that fined members for working during strikes of those employers. For some of the cases and
other authorities, see Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 212 F. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), afl'd per curiam,
214 F. 82 (2d Cir. 1914), atfd 244 U.S. 459 (1917) (involving a secondary boycott enforced by fines
of union members); Saulsberry v. Coopers Int'l Union, 147 Ky. 170, 173-74, 143 S.W. 1018, 1020
(1912) (union strike orders held valid though members unwilling to strike); Yankee Network, Inc.
v. Gibbs, 295 Mass. 56, 60-61, 3 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1936) (suspension, expulsion of union members
for resisting secondary-boycott orders, enjoined); A.T. Steams Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass.
45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927), afrd, 264 Mass. 511, 163 N.E. 193 (1928) (semble); W.A. Snow Iron Works,
Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N.E. 801 (1917) (injunction against fines denied in absence
of evidence that union intended to fine noncomplying members); L.D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v.
Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 114-20, 85 N.E. 897, 901-03 (1908) (leading case, holding that employer
had good action against union for fining members who refused to strike, but implying that union
could sue members for disobeying strike orders; see discussion of Mariell v. White at text accompanying notes 296-308 supra); Alfred W. Booth & Bros. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 195-99, 65 A.
226, 232-33 (1906) (affirming union privilege of fining, expelling members who violate strike orders, but holding coercive a secondary boycott implemented by such orders); Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492 (1890) (holding that unions have absolute
right to grant or deny membership at will, subject to their own rules); Opera on Tour, Inc. v.
Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (union rules compelling members to engage in secondary strike held coercive, and enjoinable); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 89 Misc. 501, 508-11,
152 N.Y.S. 475, 482-83 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 178 A.D. 270, 165 N.Y.S. 469 (1917), afi'd, 227 N.Y.
1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919) (semble). But see Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 354-55, 359, 361, 364-66,
117 N.E. 582, 583, 585, 587 (1917) (right of union to fine, expel members is absolute and does not
make secondary boycott coercive or actionable); National Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters v.
Cumming, 53 A.D. 227,65 N.Y.S. 946,947 (1900), afl'd, 170 N.Y. 315,63 N.E. 369 (1902) (validity
of union rules forcing members to strike held unquestionable).
English judges thought that union members would obey secondary-strike orders only under
compulsion. Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715,724,726-27 (Lord Esher, M.R.), 731 (Lopes,
L.). In Conway v. Wade, 1909 A.C. 506, the House of Lords held that a strike to compel the
discharge of a member for refusing to pay a fine was actionable, thus confirming the holding in
Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, [1903] 2 K.B. 600. See also Larkin v. Long,
1915 A.C. 814.
For comment on the issues involved in the implementation of strikes and boycotts by union
rules, see Blakemore, Intimidation by Fines in Labor Disputes, 20 Green Bag 620 (1908); Smith,
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action against unions were successful only when the unions had sought by
coercive means to exclude competition in the labor market. The key ideas
were coercion and exclusion.
The exclusion might be by means of contract or it might be by means of
boycott. 352 A closed-shop contract was not always viewed as a coercive means
of excluding competitive labor, however. In some courts, the closed-shop contract was regarded as privileged if it was made voluntarily by a willing union
dealing with a willing employer. True to its principled stand on the prima
facie tort theory, the Massachusetts court, for example, held the closed shop
privileged when the union and the employer had voluntarily negotiated it out
of a shared conviction that it best solved their employment problem. 353
In the same way, and for the same reason, the Massachusetts court held
privileged a refusal by members of a bricklayer's union to work for any employer who would not grant them the pointing work as well as the bricklaying.354 However, if the bricklayers struck or threatened to strike one
employer, with whom it had no dispute, in order to compel that employer to
cease dealing with another, then the court would hold the strike or threatened
strike actionable, even enjoinable, on the ground that it was an unjustified
infliction of harm-unjustified because its objective was to monopolize the labor market and because the action in no way resembled the society-serving
catallactic competition privileged by the just-cause principle. 355
A form of secondary boycott, not always recognized as such, is strangerpicketing. Picketing of every variety is a boycott-inducement. It is designed to
induce customers or suppliers (of labor or materials) to cease dealing with the
picketed person or establishment. But peaceful picketing in connection with a
lawful strike has generally been presumptively lawful because of the extreme
regard in this country for freedom of communication. 356 The same has not
been true-indeed is not true even today-of stranger-picketing. 357
supra note 4, at 355-56; Note, Discipline of Members by Pressure on Employers, 3 Cornell L.Q. 72
(1917).
352. For examples, see cases cited at note 347 supra.
353. Compare Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717 (1914) (holding privileged a
voluntarily-made preferential-hiring contract in an extremely instructive opinion), with Berry v.
Donavan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603 (1905), and Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011
(1900). See also Tracey v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25, 114 N.E. 959 (1917) (inducing breach of a
voluntarily-made preferential-hiring agreement held enjoinable).
354. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906).
355. Id. at 584-88, 78 N.E. at 758-60.
356. The apotheosis of picketing as a form of constitutional speech occurred in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). For the current status of the picketing-free speech doctrine, com-

pare Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1956), with Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284
(1957), and Empire Storage & Ice Co. v. Giboney, 336 U.S. 490 (1949). For elaboration of the
contention that picketing is always secondary action in the sense of legal relations, see Part I of
this series, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 99, 103-06 (1980).

357. Stranger-picketing was the main target of section 8(b)(7) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (b)(7) (1976), and remains prohibited to the degree that the National Labor Relations Board sees fit to enforce the will of Congress. See S. Petro, supra note 22, at 51-70. For a
summary of the law relating to stranger-picketing, see the Part I of this series, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 99,
112 n.38 (1980).
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The main reason for this, I believe, lies in the general perception that
stranger-picketing-that is, picketing by a union that represents none of the
employees of the picketed person or establishment-is a coercive, monopolistic, practice. It is designed to force unionization upon unwilling employees, or
employers, or both. Indeed, it is often designed to compel an employer to
break off with one union in order to make a collective agreement with another.

In any case, it is conduct that judges have not often found appealing. Since
stranger-picketing is deliberately intended to harm, social grounds ofjustification for it have been hard to find, at least by judges whose views of legal right
kind of thought and experience that proand wrong have been shaped by the 358
duced the prima facie tort principle.
The same has not been true, of course, in respect to those courts that have
shared the odd mixture of the "lawful in itself' doctrine with the prima facie
tort theory as it was concocted by the New York Court of Appeals in the first
third of this century.359 These courts tended to differ with the Massachusetts

view in each instance. They regarded compulsory unionism agreements either
as lawful "in themselves" or at any rate as competitively justified even when
forced by strike, strike-threat, or secondary boycotts on unwilling employers
and employees. 360 Stranger-picketing, they found similarly privileged even in
the most extreme situations, namely, when the picketing union was seeking to
force the picketed employer to break a contract with a rival union. 36 1 Finally,
they held privileged the most extreme variety of secondary strike or boycott,
362
the boycott designed to cartelize an entire industry.

VII.

RECAPITULATION

The values that made the prima facie tort principle axiomatic collided in
358. The most illuminating examples of the repugnant features of stranger-picketing are con-

tained in the New York cases, where, during the twenties, it seems to have been one of the main
"organizing" devices. For typical cases, see Wolchak v. Wiseman, 145 Misc. 268, 259 N.Y.S. 225
(1932); Park Lane Baking Co. v. Christel, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1930; Michaels v. Hillman, 112 Misc.
395, 183 N.Y.S. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Foster v. Retail Clerks Int'l Protective Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 78
N.Y.S. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1902). The reader must bear in mind that the New York Court of Appeals
later held that stranger-picketing, if peaceable, was absolutely privileged. Exchange Bakery &
Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927), and Stillwell Theatres, Inc., v.
Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 606 (1932). However, the court ultimately drew back somewhat from that position. See Goodwins v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101
N.E.2d 697 (1951). For a more extensive account of the law relating to stranger-picketing, see Part
I of this series, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 99, 112 n.38 (1980).
359. See text at notes 179-248 supra.
360. E.g., Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 76 N.E. 5 (1905).
361. See cases cited at note 166 supra.
362. E.g., Pierce v. Stableman's Local 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 324 (1909); Parkinson Co. v.
Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027 (1908); cases cited at note 330 supra. See also
Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917). For cases showing the devices by means of
which the Teamsters' Union monopolized the trucking industry in Texas, see Teamsters Local 941
v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 273 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1954) (featuring a strong dissenting opinion by
Judge Smith); Best Motor Lines v. Teamsters Local 745, 150 Tex. 95, 237 S.W.2d 589 (1951)
(Teamsters tell employer he must recognize union without NLRB election and sign "contract"
without reading it).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

labor disputes with the belief that worker organizations were so meritorious
that they ought to enjoy special privileges and immunities. Labor organizations did not emerge unscathed from the collision; even in such states as New
York they never achieved the condition of total privilege that some of their
protagonists sought. 363 Still, the restraints to which unions had to submit
under the prima facie tort principle were light in comparison to the damage
the prima facie tort principle was to suffer. Stimulated by the pro-union sentiments that most common law judges had resisted, later legislation so crippled
the prima facie tort principle in labor disputes that its axiomatic character has
since gone largely unrecognized or even denied. 364 As a result, unions to this
day are privileged to act in ways denied to others. Abandoning the prima
facie tort principle in labor disputes, in which its application might have enmay also have
hanced the utility and sensitivity of the legal system universally,
365
retarded the development of tort law in other areas.
The judges who developed the prima facie tort principle were moved by
profound social considerations. They reasoned that if society is to endure and
prosper, no person may be allowed to harm others with impunity unless the
harm is incidental to a superior social purpose, for, if persons are permitted to
harm each other where there is no higher benefit to all, harmonious society
sense in which it is
will give way to the war of all against all. This is the
3 66
proper to call the prima facie tort principle axiomatic.
A typical case for application of the prima facie tort principle is presented
by the bankrupting of a business rival. Harm of a sort has been done; going
broke is painful. However, whether or not the law will award a remedy for the
pain depends on the circumstances, the motives, and the means. If the pain is
inflicted merely in order to cause suffering, society has nothing to gain, and a
proper case for legal relief is present, according to such cases as Tulle v.
Buck. 3 6 7 Again, if the plaintiff is driven out of business by frightening off his
workers and customers, the law will provide relief, even if the defendant is not
a mere sadist and is seeking to increase his own wealth; for society gains nothing from wealth transfers by coercive means. 368 However, society does have
something to gain if the defendant has been put out of business as a result of
catallactic competition from a wealth-seeking opponent-that is, peaceful
price- and quality-competition. Here the defendant has sought to enrich himself, but only by means that serve the interests of all others as well. The un363. See notes 206-08 and accompanying text supra.
364. E.g., Epstein, supra note 23, at 423-42.
365. For all the talk of "consumerism" and corporate responsibility that pervades the legal

literature, tort law, in my opinion, is today no less primitive and crude than it was in the middle
ages when pigeonholing was all the rage and the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw., ch. 24 (1285),

was passed to encourage judges to think more broadly about the social function of the law,
"Spreading the risk" and 'deep pocket" slogans have nothing to do with law or justice or with

inducing people to be more civil and considerate of each other. Their social utility is unproven.
366. See section IV.., notes 152-78 and accompanying text supra.
367. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). See text accompanying notes 141-51 supra.

368. See section IV.E., especially at notes 262-67 and accompanying text supra.
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seen hand is at work, harmonizing social and self-interest.3 69
Although the bankrupt may suffer harm from vigorous but peaceful competition, the members of society gain more from such catallactic competition
than the occasional bankrupt loses. Indeed, even bankrupts gain when competition prevails. They may lose in the particular instance, but they benefit with
the rest of society from the abundance, the opportunities, and the economies
which free competition produces. If they gained special privileges despite
their competitive inferiority, they would set in motion a process bound ultimately to destroy the competitive system, the source of their own welfare as
well as that of the rest of society.
We have seen in our review of the evolution of the competition justification that English and American judges were long animated by these ideas.
Beginning very early, they ruled that harm resulting from peaceful catallactic
competition was damnum absque injuria-harmfor which the law could provide no remedy without sacrificing greater values. If one schoolmaster were
allowed to prevent the competition of others, both the freedom of those others
and the benefits of competition to society as a whole would be sacrificed. 370 In
brief, the cost of preventing that kind of harm would come too high. However,
if the harm to the plaintiff was brought about by threatening his workers or
customers, then he was entitled to protection because the defendant could
show no social benefit flowing from his coercive conduct. 37 1 Keeble and Ibbotson made the point dramatically. 372 Frightening the ducks attracted by the
plaintiff was actionable; luring them by better offers, however, was privileged.
Everyone gains from free competition in price and quality offerings, except the
person who is unable to meet such competition. That person must take his
lumps.
The problem with the deliberate harm inflicted by unions was that there
373
was no redeeming social benefit. The union defendants in Allen v. Flood,

Quinn v. Leathem, 374 and NationalProtective Association of Steam Fitters v.
Cumming 375 could show no compensating social benefit for the harm that they
did to the plaintiffs and to others. A small majority of the law lords in Allen v.
Flood, aware of this fact, abandoned the prima facie tort theory and held instead that the defendants were absolutely privileged to quit or to threaten to
quit, no matter what their objective might have been. 376 An even smaller majority of the judges on the New York Court of Appeals reached the same result
by an absurd caricature of the prima facie tort principle, holding that the defendants were privileged to inflict deliberate harm on the plaintiffs because
369. See section IV.E. supra.
370. See notes 262-64 and accompanying text supra.
371. See cases cited and discussed in note 264 supra.
372. See notes 265-69 and accompanying text supra.

373. 1898 A.C. 1. See section III. supra.
374. 1901 A.C. 495. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
375. 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902). See section IV.B. supra.

376. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
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they were acting in their own self interest.3 77
Rationales as fragile as those could not survive in a common-law system
in which injured persons had ready access to lawyers anxious to persuade
largely fair-minded judges of the merits of their clients' claims. The lawyers
found it easy to convince disinterested judges that no action known to mankind can be granted absolute immunity to social control, no matter what the
six law lords inAllen v. Floodsaid. Freedom and property are subject to invasion by even the most apparently innocuous conduct: raising an eyebrow may
be enough. 378 Moreover, the idea advanced by the bare majority of the New
York Court of Appeals in NationalProtectiveAssociation that deliberate harm
was privileged if inflicted by a union in its own interest, could not withstand
scrutiny.

379

So three years later a unanimous House of Lords in Quinn v. Leathem
abandoned the position taken by the shaky majority in.411en v. Flood.38 0 The
same drama was staged contemporaneously in America, with byplay provided
by the opinions of Justice Holmes. A large majority of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, carrying most other state and federal judges along,
was developing the prima facie tort principle clearly, boldly, consistently 3 8 1in contrast to the floundering of the small majority on the New York Court of
382
Appeals in National Protective Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming.
While great judges on the Massachusetts court, now forgotten, were articulating their powerful doctrines, Justice Holmes, the most famous American judge
of modem times, was betraying his eloquently expressed approval of the
prima facie tort principle by his insistence upon absolute rights for unions,
even while asserting that they were enemies of society and opining that there
383
can be no such thing as an absolutely privileged act.
But it was never true that the common law or the prima facie tort doctrine
condemned worker organizations as such, or denied them privileges of action
enjoyed by others. On the contrary, we have seen that the conspiracy doctrine
377. See section IV.!D. supra.
378. See section III.B. supra.

379. See discussion in section IV.B. supra.
380. The six-to-three majority in Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. 1,was composed of Lords Watson
(id. at 90), Herschell (id. at 114), Macnaghten (id.at 143), Shand (id. at 160), Davey (id. at 169),
and James of Hereford (id. at 175). Dissenting were Lords Halsbury (id. at 67), Morris (id. at
154), and Ashbourne (id. at 109). The court that decided unanimously against the union in Quinn

v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495, was composed of Lords Halsbury (id. at 505), Macnaghten (id. at 508),
Shand (id. at 512), Brampton (id. at 515), Robertson (id. at 532), Lindley (id. at 532) and Davey.
Lord Davey read the opinions of Lords Shand, Robertson, and Lindley. He seems not to have
voiced an opinion of his own, either for or against the defendant union, though he had been with
the majority in41len Y.Flood. I interpret the absence of dissents in Quinn as an indication that the
House of Lords, together with the vast majority of other English judges, thought the majority
opinion in41len v. Flooda juridical anomaly and were anxious to deprive it of any authority. See
the reference to Professor Ames, supra note 101.
381. See notes 296-310 and accompanying text supra.
382. See text accompanying notes 179-248 supra. I will demonstrate in a forthcoming article
that the decision in Cumming was largely ignored by the lower New York courts for the next
fifteen years, during which the court of appeals avoided any further decisions on secondary boycott issues.
383. See text accompanying notes 110, 155-56, 223-34 supra.
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which darkens the dreams of most educated Americans never existed, so far as
trade unions were concerned. 384 Many courts applied a kind of conspiracy
doctrine to business combinations, even when they were purely self-governing,
as in voluntary price-fixing combinations. Unions, however, were always privileged price-fixing combinations. 385 So long as their conduct was self-governing, they enjoyed privileges denied business combinations. Only when
their conduct was coercively other-goveming--only, that is, when it was
aimed at compelling others to act, as in secondary boycotts, did unions encounter legal constraint in some jurisdictions. 386 And such legal constraint as
they then met did not at all involve the fabled conspiracy doctrine. Plaintiffs
seeking relief against coercive union conduct in even the strongest prima facie
tort jurisdictions had to prove that the conduct did unjustified harm; a bare
387
allegation of combined action never produced relief.
The truth, then, is that unions in this country have never been singled out
for unfavorable legal treatment, certainly not during the age of "government
by injunction." The conspiracy doctrine was a chimera, so far as unions were
concerned; indeed, unions enjoyed combination privileges denied to others.
As for the prima facie tort principle, courts applied it to unions no more rigorously than they did to other persons or groups; on the contrary, unions were
privileged in many states to inflict harm deliberately, as in stranger-picketing
and other secondary boycotts, 3 88 even though they were incapable of demonstrating how such harm worked any social benefit.
On the eve of the New Deal period, with its legislation professedly
designed to correct an alleged imbalance against worker organizations, such
organizations were already enjoying special privileges denied to all other persons and groups.

384. See section II., especially notes 269-310 and accompanying text supra.

385.
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387.
388.
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notes 349-51 and accompanying text supra.
notes 327-37 & 349-51 and accompanying text supra.
section II. supra.
notes 329-32 and accompanying text supra.

